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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y 
The After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings reflects the find-
ings of an after action review of response and recovery activities of public safety, public health, and 
medical personnel related to the April 15 bombings, the care and support of those impacted by the 
events in the following days, and the search and apprehension of the bombing suspects. The after 
action review was coordinated by a multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional project management 
team consisting of key organizations involved in response activities, with the support of a private 
sector, third-party vendor. 
This report details best practices, lessons learned and recommendations for the purpose of 
assisting public safety, public health, and medical personnel involved in the response in further 
developing actions that went well, and taking corrective measures to address areas needing 
improvement. The majority of these agencies and organizations implemented a number of the 
recommendations identified in this report prior to the 2014 Boston Marathon. 
In addition to providing assistance to response agencies and organizations, the best practices and 
lessons learned identified through this after action process can hopefully provide insight to other 
agencies, jurisdictions and organizations across the nation and assist them in better preparing for 
potential incidents in the future.
Key Events
The Boston Marathon, unlike other large city marathon courses that run circuitously within a 
single jurisdiction, is a straight-line course that crosses eight cities and towns: Hopkinton, Ashland, 
Framingham, Natick, Wellesley, Newton, Brookline, and Boston. To ensure streamlined coordina-
tion among the many federal, state, and local public safety, public health and emergency medical 
services (EMS) personnel and the Boston Athletic Association (BAA), comprehensive, multi- 
jurisdictional, multi-disciplinary planning is conducted each year, beginning in January. This 
annual planning concludes with a tabletop exercise in which each of these partners participates to 
work through the coordination of response activities to several Marathon-specific public safety and 
medical scenarios. A significant byproduct of this planning process and exercise participation is 
the networking and relationship-building among public safety, public health and medical partners. 
A significant planning component for the 2013 Boston Marathon was the enhancement of 
the medical system supporting the race. Under the leadership of the BAA, the medical system 
consisted of 26 medical tents along the course (including eight enhanced medical tents) and two 
medical tents at the Finish Line (Alpha Medical Tent and Beta Medical Tent). Alpha Medical 
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Tent was the medical tent located closest to the bombings.1 This medical system was designed to 
have sufficient capabilities and capacity to handle an increased number of patients so as not to 
overburden area hospitals with non-critical patients.  
On April 15, 2013, 80 representatives from state and local law enforcement, fire services and EMS, 
the BAA, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), the Massachusetts De-
partment of Public Health (MDPH), the Massachusetts National Guard (MANG), the American 
Red Cross (ARC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) staffed the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) at MEMA Headquarters 
in Framingham. The purpose of the MACC was to coordinate public safety, public health and EMS 
activities across the jurisdictions, and provide situational awareness. In addition to the MACC, 
various state and local coordination and operations centers were also activated, including: the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) Department Operations Center (DOC), 
the Boston Police Department’s (BPD) Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC), and the 
Boston Public Health Commission’s (BPHC) Medical Intelligence Center (MIC).2
At 2:49 p.m. the first of two bombs was detonated at 671 Boylston Street; the second bomb was 
detonated thirteen seconds later 180 yards up course at 755 Boylston Street. It was later deter-
mined that explosions were caused by homemade improvised explosive devices (IEDs) hidden 
in backpacks and placed on the ground level in these viewing areas just seconds before they were 
detonated. The explosions took the lives of three individuals and injured 264 spectators—many 
critically, with 16 survivors suffering traumatic amputations. 
Following the explosions on Boylston Street, emergency responders (police, fire and EMS), BAA 
medical volunteers from Alpha Medical Tent, and numerous spectators and bystanders quickly 
responded to the critically injured, triaging their injuries and facilitating their transport to area 
hospitals. The hospitals that received patients rendered life-saving medical care; as a result, every 
patient that was transported to a hospital from the scene survived.  
Unified Command began to form moments after the explosions when senior law enforcement 
and emergency management officials came together on Boylston Street and immediately began 
coordinating priorities. Less than 40 minutes following the explosions, UC shifted operations 
to a Unified Command Center (UCC) established at the nearby Westin Hotel. The UC would 
ultimately include the Governor, Mayor of Boston, Secretary of the Executive Office of Public 
1 The 2012 Boston Marathon took place on an unseasonably warm day with temperatures above 90 degrees, and resulted in a 
large surge of patients with heat-related injuries. The approach to the 2013 Boston Marathon was intended to build capabilities 
to adequately handle a similar surge of patients directly on the course as opposed to transporting patients to area hospitals. 
2 The LECC was called the Unified Command Center at the time and was renamed to the Law Enforcement Coordination Center 
in 2014. To avoid confusion with the Unified Command Center that was activated at the Westin Hotel following the bombings, 
this facility will be referred to as the LECC throughout this report.
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Safety and Security (EOPSS), MEMA Director, Massachusetts State Police (MSP) Superintendent, 
BPD Commissioner, Boston Fire Department (BFD) Commissioner, Boston Emergency Medical 
Services (Boston EMS) Chief, Director of the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), 
MANG Adjutant General, Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Transit Police 
Department (Transit PD) Chief, and FBI Boston Special Agent in Charge (SAC). The UC made 
decisions on initial law enforcement response and investigation issues, including securing the 
crime scene, determining the extent of the ongoing threat, and protecting critical infrastructure, 
as well as managing the runners evacuated off the course. The UCC remained operational until 
Tuesday, April 16, 2013.
The UCC carefully crafted coordinated messages to provide periodic updates to the public. On 
the day of the bombing, four formal press conferences were convened to provide information 
to the public on the incident, explain what public safety officials were doing in response to the 
bombings, and ultimately, request photographs or video from the public taken before, during 
or after the bombings.
In the days that followed, a significant amount of coordination continued in support of law 
enforcement activities and the provision of mental health and human services to survivors, the 
families of the deceased, the runners, and other individuals who were greatly impacted by the 
incident. Local and state law enforcement worked with the FBI to secure and process the crime 
scene, respond to increased calls for suspicious activity and suspicious packages, and conduct 
the investigation. The City of Boston opened a reunification center at the Castle at Park Plaza 
facility (Castle) to assist affected individuals and runners. Over the course of its operation, the 
Castle provided services to an estimated 1,500 individuals. 
On April 17, the President issued an emergency declaration for the incident. 
On the morning of April 18, an interfaith service lead by the President, Governor and Mayor 
was held at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Boston. 
On the evening of Thursday, April 18, the FBI publicly released photographs of the two suspects 
during a press conference. The FBI SAC provided a description of the two suspects, asked for 
the public to provide information on the suspects’ identity and whereabouts, and cautioned the 
public that the suspects may be heavily armed and should be considered extremely dangerous. 
Thousands of tips and information poured into the FBI. 
That night, around 10:28 p.m., Officer Sean Collier of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) Police Department was fatally shot as he sat on patrol in his marked police vehicle on the 
MIT campus in Cambridge. 
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At 11:20 p.m., a Mercedes sport utility vehicle (SUV) was carjacked in the Allston neighborhood of 
Boston. The vehicle’s owner was held captive in the car for nearly an hour as the two perpetrators 
drove around the area. On Friday, April 19 at approximately 12:19 a.m., the victim successfully 
fled his captors and called 911 when they stopped at a gas station on Memorial Drive in Cam-
bridge. While being interviewed by Cambridge Police Department (Cambridge PD), the victim 
relayed that his captors may have been involved with the Boston Marathon bombings, based on 
conversations he had overheard between them. 
While the interview was ongoing and before the connection between the carjacking suspects 
and the Boston Marathon bombings was made, police officials were able to locate the vehicle in 
nearby Watertown using the vehicle’s GPS anti-theft system. At 12:41 a.m., Cambridge PD con-
tacted Watertown PD to inform them of the location of the carjacked SUV. A Watertown officer 
responded to the location and quickly identified the vehicle. Before the officer could approach 
the vehicle, the first suspect exited the SUV and began shooting at the officer. As a second officer 
arrived on scene, a second suspect joined the first, launching homemade IEDs. 
A firefight ensued between the suspects and responding officers. As the shooting continued, addi-
tional officers arrived on scene from Watertown, BPD, MSP, Cambridge PD, and Transit PD. Over 
200 rounds of ammunition were expended between the two sides. In the course of the firefight, 
the first suspect was wounded. When he ran out of ammunition, he threw his gun and charged at 
a Watertown officer who subsequently wrestled him to the ground in the street. Meanwhile, the 
second suspect was able to enter the SUV and put the vehicle in gear. While fleeing the scene in 
the stolen vehicle, he struck the first suspect and dragged him a short distance with the vehicle, 
compounding his injuries. 
As the second suspect fled the scene, a responding officer from the Transit PD was shot and 
critically wounded. The officer was transported to Mount Auburn Hospital, where medical pro-
fessionals resuscitated him and performed life-saving surgery.  
The first suspect was transported to Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital, where attempts were made 
to resuscitate him. He was pronounced dead a short time later. Fingerprints taken at the hospital 
identified the suspect as Tamerlan Tsarnaev. Law enforcement officials were then able to identify 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Tamerlan’s brother, as the second suspect. 
The stolen SUV was located a half-mile down the street from the firefight, and it became clear 
that the suspect had fled on foot. A perimeter was established in the area where the suspect was 
believed to be located. 
A Unified Command (UC) was formed to manage strategic decision-making.3 The UC gathered 
3 UC included the Governor, EOPSS Secretary, Mayor of Boston, Executives from Watertown PD, BPD, Cambridge PD, Transit PD, 
MSP, MANG, MEMA and the FBI. 
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in the parking lot of the Arsenal Mall in Watertown, which would later also serve as the staging 
area for incoming mutual aid law enforcement. In the early morning hours, a shelter-in-place 
request was issued to the Town of Watertown, with notifications made through WatertownALERT, 
the Town’s emergency notification system.  
The UC requested that tactical law enforcement commanders develop a grid search plan to 
conduct house-to-house searches within the secured perimeter. Interagency, inter-jurisdictional 
Specialized Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams were deployed to support this mission. 
As the hours continued and the suspect remained at large, the UC made decisions to suspend 
all service on the MBTA transit system, and to expand the shelter-in-place request to include 
Newton, Waltham, Belmont, Cambridge, and Boston, as well as Watertown. These decisions were 
communicated at a 5:45 a.m. press conference, as well as through several local and state public 
alerting tools.4
The shelter-in-place request had cascading effects on area hospitals, including impacts on staff 
shift changes, discharge of patients, and delivery of critical supplies. MDPH coordinated with 
BPHC and law enforcement to address inquires received from hospitals and other healthcare 
venues, and issued clarifying information to hospitals through various platforms.5  
Thousands of law enforcement officers arrived in Watertown from across Massachusetts, other 
New England states, and New York. Many of these law enforcement officers did not come in re-
sponse to a mutual aid request, but self-deployed to the area once it became widely known that one 
of the Marathon bombing suspects was at large in the town. These officers staged at the parking 
lot of the Arsenal Mall in Watertown; although officers received basic logistical support, including 
food, water, and toileting, few were provided oversight, situational awareness, or guidance. While 
most officers did not deploy into the field from the staging area on their own, there were a sig-
nificant number of occasions when officers responded based on information or calls they heard 
on their radios, at times placing themselves and the officers with the authority to respond at risk.
A Joint Information Center (JIC) was not established to support the events of the day. Although 
the coordination with the media who had arrived on scene seeking to capture the live, real-time 
footage of the investigation as it unfolded was well-coordinated, the management of information 
relayed through social media was not. Messages provided through various organizations’ social 
media platforms were at times erroneous and in contrast to one another.
As the house-to-house search began to near its conclusion, law enforcement officials became 
increasingly concerned that the suspect had escaped the area. If the suspect were no longer in the 
4 Notification systems included WatertownALERT, ALERTBoston, ping4alerts!, and the Health and Homeland  
Alert Network (HHAN).
5 WebEOC, HHAN
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area, the shelter-in-place request would put unnecessary burdens on residents and businesses in 
the affected communities. Given these circumstances, the UC decided to lift the shelter-in-place 
request and resume MBTA transit service. The Governor announced these decisions at a 6:03 p.m. 
press conference, thanked the public for their cooperation, and cautioned them to remain vigilant, 
asking individuals to report any suspicious activity to law enforcement. 
At 6:42 p.m., Watertown PD received a 911 call from a resident reporting a sighting of the suspect 
in a winterized boat parked in his yard at 67 Franklin Street. Officers immediately responded 
to the home. The first officers on scene requested support from tactical teams and EOD units. 
A large number of law enforcement officers self-deployed to the scene after overhearing radio 
traffic about the location of the suspect. Within moments, more than 100 officers had gathered 
in front of and behind the home. 
Several moments later, a responding officer fired his weapon without appropriate authority in 
response to perceived movement in the boat. Other officers then opened fire on the boat under 
the assumption the initial shot was fired at them by the suspect. Shooting continued for several 
seconds until a senior officer ordered a ceasefire. 
After the MSP Airwing’s infrared camera confirmed that the suspect was alive, law enforcement 
officials made several attempts to coerce the suspect from the boat. After a nearly two-hour 
standoff, at 8:41 p.m., the suspect emerged from the boat. He was arrested and transported by 
ambulance under heavy guard to Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. A press conference was 
held announcing the capture of the suspect.
On the evening of Monday, April 22, a ceremony was held to mark the FBI’s returning of control 
of Boylston Street to the City of Boston. Under the leadership of Boston OEM, the City worked 
through the night and into the next day to restore the area. On Tuesday, residents and businesses 
were provided access to the area. That evening, a private ceremony for survivors, their families, 
and the families of the victims was held at the two bombing sites. At 3:00 a.m., Wednesday, April 24, 
Boylston Street was re-opened to the public.  
Following the Presidential Emergency Declaration on April 17, MEMA coordinated with the 
impacted communities and FEMA over the next several months to implement the federal Public 
Assistance Program, seeking millions of dollars in reimbursements for eligible activities associated 
with the responses to the incidents of the week.6 
6 The Public Assistance program was activated when the President issued the Emergency Declaration; under the Stafford Act, 
the PA program allows eligible public and private nonprofit organizations to receive 75% reimbursement for FEMA-approved 
response activities occurring from April 15 through April 22, 2013.
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The Findings
A number of best practices and lessons learned were identified during the after action review 
process. Highlighted below are several key best practices and areas for improvement contained 
in the report. It is important to note that public safety, public health, EMS, and healthcare part-
ners have been working collaboratively since the day of the bombings to address areas needing 
improvement, and many corrective action measures were implemented prior to the 2014 Boston 
Marathon.   
Key Best Practices
• Strong Relationships and Successful Unified Command. Strong relationships created and 
maintained by key leaders were paramount to ensuring commanders, agency heads, and 
political leaders came together quickly to form Unified Command and facilitate collabora-
tive decision-making after the bombings in Boston and during the manhunt in Watertown. 
Key leaders had the necessary trust and rapport that allowed for Unified Command to make 
effective, collaborative decisions, execute mission-tasking, maintain situational awareness, and 
coordinate public messaging. These relationships also contributed to leadership knowing where 
to obtain resources, whom to task with missions, how to mobilize mutual aid, how to coordinate 
communications, and effectively make bold decisions such as suspending transit service and 
issuing a shelter-in-place request. 
• All-Hazards Medical System for Marathon Day. The all-hazards medical system in place on 
Marathon Day ensured that the capabilities and capacity to quickly triage and transport the 
injured from the scene of the incident were immediately available. Under the leadership of the 
BAA, an enhanced, all-hazards medical system was put in place for Marathon Day with the 
intent of taking pressure off the area hospital system by minimizing the number of patients who 
needed to be transported to hospitals. 
 On the day of the bombings, medical personnel supporting Alpha Medical Tent near the Finish 
Line immediately transitioned to a mass casualty response. They established triage and treatment 
groups and designated the tent as a casualty collection point. All critically injured patients were 
transported to area hospitals within 50 minutes. Although many patients sustained grave injuries, 
every patient who was transported to area hospitals survived.7 This can be directly attributed to 
the rapid triage, transport and treatment these patients received on scene and at hospitals.   
• Well-Planned and Organized Re-Opening of Boylston Street. The City had to await the con-
clusion of the FBI’s evidence collection and crime scene processing before it could begin work 
7 Injuries included traumatic amputation, shrapnel wounds, burns, head trauma and hearing loss. The three individuals who lost 
their lives immediately died at the scene as the result of their injuries. 
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to restore and reopen this vital economic and social area. The restoration of Boylston Street 
required extensive cleaning, debris removal and rebuilding. Because the City would have very 
short notice as to when the area would be accessible to them, a great degree of planning and 
preparation was required. The Mayor assigned the responsibility for planning the re-opening of 
Boylston Street to Boston OEM, and tasked all other City departments to support this critical 
mission. The restoration of Boylston Street was extremely organized; residents and proprietors 
were able to access their homes and businesses within 18 hours after the area was released to 
the City and the street was re-opened to the public in less than 36 hours. The ability to restore 
and reopen Boylston Street so quickly after the area was released back to the City by the FBI is 
a testament to the strong planning undertaken by the City. 
Key Areas for Improvement
• Lack of Coordination and Management of Mutual Aid within the Watertown Incident.
 Throughout the day on Friday, April 19, over 2,500 law enforcement officers converged onto 
the staging area at the Arsenal Mall and surrounding neighborhoods in Watertown. Officers 
that were requested as mutual aid assets were properly folded into the operation. However, a 
significant portion of the officers that arrived in Watertown had self-deployed. 
 There was no command or management structure formally assigned to manage incoming 
mutual aid personnel. Officers were not assigned roles within the operation or provided brief-
ings on the situation or command structure. This caused logistical issues, command and control 
issues, and officer safety issues.
• Lack of Weapons Discipline. Weapons discipline was lacking by the multitude of law enforcement 
officers in the field during both the firefight with the two suspects near Dexter and Laurel Streets, 
and the standoff with the second suspect who was hiding in a winterized boat in a residential 
back yard. Although initial responding officers practiced appropriate weapons discipline while 
they were engaged in the firefight with the suspects, additional officers arriving on scene near the 
conclusion of the firefight fired weapons toward the vicinity of the suspects, without necessarily 
having identified and lined up their target or appropriately aimed their weapons. Officers lining 
both sides of the street also fired upon the second suspect as he fled the scene in a vehicle.   
 Shortly after the firefight, an unmarked MSP black pickup truck was erroneously reported as 
stolen. This vehicle, with two occupants in it, was then spotted driving on Adams Street, near 
the scene of the shootout, and fired upon by an officer. Upon further inspection, it was deter-
mined that the occupants of the vehicle were a BPD officer and MSP trooper in plain clothes, 
both of whom were unhurt.
 Weapons discipline was again an issue during the operation to capture the second suspect who 
was hiding in a boat parked in a residential backyard. An officer fired his weapon without 
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appropriate authority in response to perceived movement in the boat, in turn causing many 
officers to fire at the boat in the belief that they were being shot at by the suspect. Each of these 
incidents created dangerous crossfire situations.
• Lack of a Joint Information Center. The need to utilize a Joint Information Center (JIC) was 
evident during all phases of the week. While the UCC worked together to coordinate messages 
and host press conferences on the day of the bombings and the day the suspects were appre-
hended, a JIC would have better supported the management of the media requests necessitated 
by a 24/7 news cycle throughout the course of the week.  
 After the UCC stood down on Tuesday morning, public messaging became less coordinated. 
Agencies and organizations, which still had a need to provide public information, pushed out 
information over the remaining course of the week without having fully vetted and/or coor-
dinated the messaging with one another. At times, this led to conflicting information in the 
domain of the media.
 On the day of the search for the at large Boston Marathon bombing suspect, information was 
well coordinated when provided through press conferences, but various agencies utilized social 
media to provide information. In contrast to the press conferences, there was no coordination 
or validation of messages delivered by numerous agencies and organizations through social 
media. This led to some misleading or incorrect information being widely distributed through 
social media outlets. 
Overall, the response to the Boston Marathon bombings must be considered a great success. 
All the patients who were transported to the hospitals survived—a credit to the emergency medical 
system, the swift triage and transport of the most critical patients, and the care they received at 
area hospitals.8 Throughout the week, police agencies worked together incredibly well, coordi-
nating resources, assets, and sharing information. The suspects were identified and apprehended 
within five days, which can be directly attributed to this cooperation and coordination among 
local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Comprehensive mental health and human 
services were provided not only to survivors and their families, but also to any member of the 
public who had been impacted by the events. Boylston Street was re-opened to the public only 
nine days after the bombings. 
The community that makes up the Greater Boston area has re-defined the events of that difficult 
week. The acts of cowardice rendered by two individuals have been surpassed with acts of valor, 
highlighting the community’s tenacity and resilient spirit. The community’s response to these 
tragedies has been recognized worldwide as STRONG.  
8 The three individuals who lost their lives immediately died at the scene as the result of their injuries.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
APRIL 15, 2013 WAS A PERFECT DAY FOR RUNNING. The air was cool, the sun was shining, 
and the complex logistics supporting the 117th Boston Marathon were operating smoothly. Every 
participant, be they mobility impaired, wheelchair racer, hand-cyclist, or runner, made their way to 
the Start Line with the emotions that are typically part of Marathon Day: excitement, nervousness 
and a heartening spirit of perseverance. By 11:00 a.m., all 27,000 runners were on the course; by 
12:36 p.m., the winners for each race category had been declared. 
The heart of the Boston Marathon is not about the winners; it is about the less renowned runners 
who seek their own personal victories as they make their way to Boston; it is about the hundreds 
of thousands of spectators who flock to the course to cheer them on; it is about the spirit of com-
munity, and commitment, and sacrifice so well reflected in the Patriots’ Day holiday on which 
the Marathon takes place each year. The heart of the Boston Marathon is why so many people 
were still on the sidelines cheering on runners as they reached the Finish Line in the afternoon 
hours of April 15. 
At 2:49 p.m., the race was forever changed. Two homemade improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
were detonated on Boylston Street in two separate locations near the Finish Line. These explosions 
took the lives of three spectators: eight-year-old Martin Richard, 29-year-old Krystle Campbell, 
and 23-year old Lu Lingzi. An additional 264 spectators were injured, many critically.
This tragic event initiated a week-long response of the public safety, public health, and medical 
communities, which culminated in the death of one suspect, and the capture of another. In spite 
of the malevolence of the perpetrators of these actions, countless extraordinary acts of heroism, 
bravery and community triumphed. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this report is to describe the events related to response to the Boston Marathon 
Bombings and associated incidents; constructively evaluate and assess the public safety, public 
health, and medical response actions; and identify the unique issues and challenges faced by the 
responders during the week of April 15, 2013, with the goal of providing agencies and organiza-
tions involved in the incident with practical recommendations to address them. 
Scope
The After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings is the culmination 
of a review of the multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional response, recovery and coordination 
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activities of public safety, public health, emergency medical services (EMS), and healthcare agen-
cies and organizations. The report focuses on the following five key areas:
• Race Day preparation and planning; 
• Initial response to the April 15 bombings (Day 1); 
• On-going response activities (Days 2-4); 
• Apprehension of the suspects (Day 5); and 
• Recovery efforts. 
The review process did not include an assessment of activities related to the investigation of crimes 
associated with these events, nor did it include intelligence sharing activities before, during or 
after the events. Rather, this report provides an overview of the incidents that occurred during 
the week of April 15, 2013; discusses the response activities of the public safety, public health, 
EMS, and healthcare communities during that timeframe; and details both best practices and 
areas needing improvement as identified through the review process. 
Methodology
The After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings was guided and 
developed by a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary Project Management Team (PMT) chaired by 
the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and comprised of senior represen-
tatives from the Massachusetts State Police (MSP), Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 
(MBTA) Transit Police Department (Transit PD), Massachusetts Department of Public Health 
(MDPH), Massachusetts National Guard (MANG), City of Boston Mayor’s Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM), Cambridge Police Department (Cambridge PD), and Watertown Police 
Department (Watertown PD). The PMT contracted with the TriData Division of Systems Planning 
Corporation to assist with the review. 
To obtain as much understanding as possible on the true depth and breadth of preparedness, 
response, and recovery actions, TriData interviewed more than 150 individuals.9 Interviews were 
conducted with the following individuals and organizations:
• Governor Deval Patrick, Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
• Mayor Thomas Menino, City of Boston 
• Unified Command members 
• State, regional and local law enforcement 
• State, local and private emergency medical services  
• Federal, state and local public health  
9 These interviews were primarily conducted in small groups organized by discipline or role. A small number of executive 
interviews were conducted one-on-one.  
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• State and local emergency management  
• Massachusetts National Guard 
• State, local and nonprofit human services agencies  
• Healthcare administrators and medical personnel  
• Boston Athletic Association
The assessment process also included a review of pertinent plans, reports, and documentation. 
Organization of the Report
The report is organized into the following sections:
 • Executive Summary
 • Introduction 
 • Section 1: Incident Timeline, which chronologically lists key events related to the  
  Marathon bombings beginning on April 15, 2013 at 7:00 a.m. through April 24, 2013; 
 • Section 2: Overview of Incidents, which provides a narrative detailing of the incidents  
  and response and recovery activities that took place during the week of April 15, 2013. 
 • Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities, which provides an analysis of the actions and  
  capabilities of responding agencies and organizations, and identifies best practices,  
  areas requiring improvement, and associated recommendations to address these areas.  
  Where applicable, the associated Public Health Preparedness and/or Healthcare  
  Preparedness Program (PHEP/HPP) capability is identified.
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S E C T I O N  1
INCIDENT  TIMELINE
THIS SECTION DETAILS THE TIMES OF KEY EVENTS related to the Boston Marathon (Mar-
athon) bombings. The events included in this timeline were selected by the After Action Project 
Management Team as those that were most significant from a public safety and health perspective 
and would provide a condensed chronology of the incidents that took place throughout the week. -
The timeline focuses on the actions of four disciplines: command, law enforcement, emergency 
medical and medical services, and human services. It provides an indication of the complexity 
of the events that unfolded, the coordination of decisions being made, and activities of over 20 
agencies that often were proceeding simultaneously on parallel tracks.----- 
Every effort was made to be as accurate as possible with timestamps; however, many timestamps 
are approximate, having been pulled from various sources. 
Major Events Timeline 
6:42pm 
Watertown 
resident 
reports that  
an individual  
is hiding in  
his boat. 
6:03pm
Shelter-in- 
place request  
is lifted.
10:31pm 
MIT Police 
Officer Sean 
Collier is 
fatally shot. 
Friday,  
April 19, 2013
Monday,  
April 15, 2013
Thursday,  
April 18, 2013
9:00am  
Marathon  
begins. 
3:28pm  
All remaining 
marathon 
runners are 
stopped on 
course.
12:19am  
Cambridge PD 
responds to 
carjacking on 
Memorial Drive.
12:44am  
Firefight  
between 
Watertown  
police and  
two suspects 
begins. 
8:41pm 
Second 
suspect is  
taken into 
custody. 
5:45am 
System- 
wide transit 
shutdown  
and shelter- 
in-place  
request is 
announced.
 
2:49pm 
First bomb 
detonates. 
Second bomb 
detonates  
13 seconds 
later. 
3:37pm 
Last critical 
patient 
transported 
from scene.
8:39pm  
Castle is 
opened as 
an assistance 
center for 
runners.
Tuesday,  
April 16, 2013
5:20pm 
FBI releases 
photos of 
suspects.
11:00pm 
Castle closes.
1:06am
First suspect  
is pronounced
dead at hospital. 
12:49am 
Second suspect 
flees the scene.
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MONDAY, APRIL 15, 2013 
7:00 a.m. Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC) is activated with partial staffing at the Massachusetts  
 Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Headquarters in Framingham. 
 Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) Department Operations Center (DOC)  
 opens and is operational by 8:00 a.m.  
 
8:00 a.m. The City of Boston (the City) Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) is operational at  
 Boston Police Department (BPD) Headquaters, with representatives of BPD command staff,  
 Boston Fire Department (BFD), Boston Emergency Medical Services (Boston EMS),   
 Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA) Transit Police (Transit PD), Massachusetts State  
 Police (MSP), and Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC).10  
  MDPH staff arrive at their assigned medical tents along the route to provide situational  
 awareness.  
8:10 a.m. MDPH conducts bed counts for Boston-area hospitals through the MDPH WebEOC.11 
 Boston Medical Intelligence Center (MIC) is operational.  
9:00 a.m. The Marathon begins in Hopkinton with mobility-impaired athletes starting down the course,  
 followed by wheelchairs (9:17), hand-cycles (9:22), elite women (9:32), elite men and Wave 1 of  
 9,000 runners (10:00), Wave 2 of 9,000 runners (10:20) and Wave 3 of 9,000 runners (10:40).   
 MACC is fully operational, staffed with more than 80 personnel representing police and fire  
 departments from Hopkinton, Ashland, Framingham, Natick, Wellesley, Newton, Brookline and  
 Boston, MEMA, MSP, MBTA Transit PD, Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC), Massachusetts  
 Department of Fire Services (DFS), Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT),   
 MDPH, MDPH Office of Emergency Medical Services (OEMS), Massachusetts National Guard  
 (MANG), Office of Technology and Information Services (OTIS), American Red Cross (ARC), AMR  
 Ambulance, Cataldo Ambulance, Fallon Ambulance, Boston EMS, the Boston Athletic  
 Association (BAA), the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of  
 Investigation (FBI), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Emergency  
 Management Agency (FEMA), the National Weather Service, and Amateur Radio.  
10:45 a.m. MDPH staff arrive at Newton Wellesley Hospital and the medical tents at the Finish Line to  
 provide situational awareness. 
11:00 a.m. MDPH conducts initial pre-planned conference call with hospitals to check in and provide  
 situational awareness.  
 Approximately 27,000 runners are now on the Marathon course. 
11:05 a.m. Start of Red Sox game at Fenway Park in the Kenmore Square area of Boston. 
12:00 p.m. MDPH conducts initial pre-planned conference call with staff in medical tents along the route  
 to obtain situational awareness regarding the level of activity in the tents related to providing  
 support to injured runners.  
10 The LECC was called the Unified Command Center at the time, and was renamed to the Law Enforcement Coordination 
Center in 2014. To avoid confusion with the Unified Command Center that was activated at the Westin Hotel following 
the bombings, this facility will be referred to as the LECC throughout this report.
 11  WebEOC is an online information-sharing tool used by many public safety partners. On the day of the 2013 Boston 
Marathon, the MACC used the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (WebEOC) system and the MDPH WebEOC 
system. These systems were integrated for Marathon Day. 
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12:36 p.m. Elite runners have finished the race; winners are declared.  
1:00 p.m. Updated hospital bed count is conducted by MDPH. 
1:32 p.m. Roads re-open in Hopkinton, Ashland, Framingham and Natick. 
2:00 p.m. MDPH conducts another pre-planned conference call with route hospitals to check in and  
 provide situational awareness. 
2:08 p.m. Red Sox game ends. 
2:24 p.m. Course medical stations 1 through 8 are closed.  
2:49 p.m. The first bomb detonates in front of 671 Boylston Street (Marathon Sports store) near the  
 Finish Line. The second bomb detonates 13 seconds later in front of 755 Boylston Street  
 (Forum restaurant), approximately 180 yards up the course from the first bombing site.  
 There are reports of multiple injuries. 
 
 Triage and treatment start immediately at both explosion sites by nearby fire, police, EMS,  
 medical personnel, and bystanders, who rush to help the injured.   
2:50 p.m. Multiple radio transmissions from BPD, BFD, Boston EMS and MSP begin to transmit over  
 the airwaves. 
 Alerts start coming into the MACC from field personnel including fire, police, public health,  
 emergency medical services (EMS) and other agencies through radio networks, phone calls,  
 and emails. Available information is immediately shared with respective chains of command.  
2:51 p.m.  The BRIC shares situational awareness information about the explosions to its intelligence  
 distribution list, which includes local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. 
2:52 p.m. BPD Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Teams, BPD Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams, 
 Cambridge PD EOD Teams, Cambridge PD SWAT teams, MBTA Transit PD and MSP EOD Teams,  
 SWAT Teams, and Airwing units are deployed. 
    The BRIC issues first of what will be 61 alerts for suspicious packages over the next five hours,  
 which are ultimately checked and cleared by law enforcement EOD teams. 
2:53 p.m. Hospitals receive radio and email notification that a mass casualty incident has occurred at  
 the Finish Line. 
2:54 p.m. BFD and the MANG CST complete their initial review of handheld and stationary air monitoring  
 devices in the area of the Finish Line for chemical and radiological contamination near the  
 Finish Line. Results are negative. Mobile measurements continue at bomb sites.  
 Some area hospitals receive initial estimates of the number of patients to expect. 
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2:55 p.m. Boston EMS broadcasts a request over the Boston EMS Area Mutual Aid (BAMA) radio system  
 to private EMS ambulance companies for available ambulances; nine companies respond  
 (Action, AMR, American, Armstrong, EasCare, Fallon, LifeLine, McCall, and Professional).  
 They commit a total of 73 ambulances. As part of the Marathon operations plan, a staging area  
 had already been established at the rear of the Alpha Tent. A secondary ambulance staging is  
 set up at Boylston and Fairfield Streets, but is relocated several times when areas are deemed  
 to be at risk.  
2:56 p.m. BFD receives reports of an explosion and fire at the John F. Kennedy (JFK) Presidential Library  
 in the Columbia Point area of Boston. This event is initially considered to be a possible terrorist  
 incident related to the bombings.  
2:57 p.m. Most Boston hospitals fully activate and staff their emergency operations centers (some had  
 been activated earlier in the day for the Marathon).  
  MDPH and the Boston MIC send additional alerts to Boston area hospitals through the Health  
 and Homeland Alert Network (HHAN) and the Central Emergency Medical Direction (CMED)  
 network.12  
2:58 p.m. First ambulance leaves scene with critically wounded patient, headed to Massachusetts General Hospital. 
 
3:00 p.m. On scene commanders are informed that there is no chemical or radiological contamination  
 associated with the bombs. Hospitals do not receive this information.  
3:02 p.m. MDPH broadcasts information on bombing to additional hospitals outside of Boston through  
 the HHAN.  
 
3:16 p.m. Boston EMS advises via BAMA that ambulances are to obtain hospital destinations from CMED  
 system. Shortly thereafter, patient distribution is transferred to on scene Boston EMS loading 
 officers. 
3:20 p.m.  Ambulances are advised to move out of the area of 700 Boylston Street because of another  
 “confirmed” improvised explosive device, one of many false alarms that occur. 
3:22 p.m. Boston Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is operational. 
3:28 p.m. All Marathon runners from Boston through Newton have been stopped on the course, and  
 impacted communities begin working to open pre-identified temporary shelters. In Boston,  
 runners east of Massachusetts Avenue are directed to the Boston Common; runners west of the  
 street are directed to Kenmore Square. 
 The Westin Hotel is established as the ad hoc location for a Unified Command Center (UCC).  
 Initially present at the UCC are BPD, BFD, Boston EMS, MEMA, MSP, Transit PD, and FBI, joined  
 shortly thereafter by MANG.  
3:30 p.m. Law enforcement mutual aid begins to arrive on scene to assist with investigations and  
 response to suspicious packages. Mutual aid units will continue to arrive from local, regional,  
 and federal law enforcement agencies. 
3:37 p.m. Last critical patient transported from scene.  
12 The Health and Homeland Alert Network is a statewide network that delivers warnings and emergency information to 
the public safety, public health and healthcare communities.
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3:42 p.m. ARC “Safe & Well” website begins to be promoted to facilitate family reunifications. Individuals  
 are encouraged to register themselves online and to use the website to search for loved ones.  
3:56 p.m. Boston, Brookline and Newton police request buses from MBTA to evacuate spectators, and  
 move police into the area.  
3:59 p.m. Shelters are opened at Newton City Hall and at St. Ignatius Church and More Hall on the Boston  
 College campus. Another shelter at La Salle College is opened 20 minutes later.  
4:05 p.m. The President contacts the Mayor of Boston and the Governor by phone.   
4:25 p.m. Boston Bruins game is cancelled. 
4:30 p.m. BPD Detectives are deployed to area hospitals for interviews and evidence collection. 
 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) establishes temporary flight restriction of three  
 nautical miles around and 3,000 feet above Boston.   
4:31 p.m. BPD Commissioner announces 12-hour shifts for all sworn personnel in BPD, and cancels all  
 leave.  
4:32 p.m. Governor arrives at the Westin Hotel/UCC and is briefed by UCC leadership. They discuss the  
 option of suspending service across the MBTA transit system because of security concerns, but  
 a decision is made to keep much of the system open so that remaining spectators can travel  
 home. However, service between Park Street and Kenmore stations is suspended. 
 Transit PD increases security at MBTA stations, and begins conducting sweeps for suspicious  
 packages at transit stations. MANG soldiers are later deployed to assist Transit PD in providing  
 security at various transit stations. 
4:47 p.m. The first news conference is held with the Governor and UCC leadership at the Westin Hotel to  
 convey initial information available about the bombings.   
4:54 p.m. The Mayor of Boston arrives at the Westin Hotel/UCC and meets with BPD Commissioner and  
 other City of Boston department heads.13 
 Tufts Medical Center declares Code Black (no further emergency patients accepted) because  
 of suspicious package found in their emergency department. Code is soon lifted. Several other  
 hospitals have similar false alarms over the next few days. 
  Boston PD requests MANG soldiers to assist in securing crime scene perimeter. The request is  
 approved by MEMA and the Governor.  
5:00 p.m. Boston Office of Emergency Management (Boston OEM) delivers phones, phone chargers,  
 computers, and radios to resolve communications capability issues at the UCC. 
5:11 p.m. Brookline opens a shelter at 1187 Beacon Street. 
5:49 p.m. The second press conference is held with the Governor, Mayor, BPD Commissioner, BFD  
 Commissioner, Boston EMS Chief, US Attorney, and other UCC leadership and elected officials.  
 Updated information is shared.  
13 The Mayor checked himself out of Brigham and Women’s Hospital where he had been recovering from recent surgery.
After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings 23
5:52 p.m. A request is made to major cellular carriers to provide mobile infrastructure for expanded  
 cellular service coverage at the Westin Hotel. 
5:58 p.m. MBTA Green Line service resumes incrementally.  
6:00 p.m. Boston OEM and the Boston Centers for Youth and Families (BCYF) opens a facility at the Castle  
 at Park Plaza (Castle) to provide immediate assistance to runners and others requiring shelter,  
 counseling or other support. BPHC, Salvation Army, ARC, and other agencies help provide  
 services. BPD and MANG provide security. The Castle remains open overnight. 
6:10 p.m. The President holds a press conference in Washington, D.C. 
6:30 p.m. UCC leadership conducts a strategy meeting at the UCC which includes the Governor, MEMA  
 Director, BPD Commissioner, BFD Commissioner, Boston OEM Director, MSP, MANG, MDPH,  
 FBI Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) and others. Consensus is reached that the incident is likely a  
 terrorist attack, and that the FBI will serve as the lead investigative agency.14  
 The third press briefing is held at the Westin Hotel/UCC with the Governor, BPD Commissioner,  
 US Attorney, FBI SAC, and other UCC leadership and elected officials. At this press conference,  
 it is announced that the FBI will be the lead investigative agency for the incident. In addition,  
 the BPD Commissioner states that the BFD has confirmed that the fire at the JFK Library was  
 accidental in nature, and therefore unrelated to the bombings.  
6:54 p.m. The perimeter of the crime scene perimeter is defined as a 12-block area.15  
8:00 p.m. Runners’ bags are secured, scanned by BPD EOD teams, and placed under guard by MANG until  
 the following morning.   
8:39 p.m. The fourth press conference is held. The Governor announces that Boston would be “open  
 for business” the next day, though it would not be business as usual. He provides updates on  
 the incident, describes actions being taken, and announces the establishment of a support  
 center at the Castle for runners. 
8:50 p.m. Last patient with incident-related injuries is transported to a hospital.16  
 
 
 
14 At the time of the bombings, the Director of MEMA also served as the Undersecretary for Homeland Security and  
Emergency Management for the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security (EOPSS).
15 The 12-block area had been reduced from a previous 15-block area.
16 These patients were typically those who had left the scene, gone to their hotel or homes, and later required transport  
to facilities due to their injuries.
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TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013 
MEMA prepares a written request for a Presidential Emergency Declaration, which is signed by the Governor 
and submitted to FEMA.
BPD, MSP, MBTA Transit Police, MANG and mutual aid law enforcement agencies continue to provide support 
for bombing investigation, increased security at MBTA stations, other infrastructure and landmarks, and 
response to numerous calls of suspicious packages. 
The Governor, Mayor and public safety officials conduct individual interviews with various media outlets 
throughout the course of the day. The hospitals that received patients injured as a result of the bombings hold 
various press conferences.
The Governor and Mayor visit a number of survivors being treated in area hospitals.  
 
12:00 a.m. The UCC at the Westin Hotel is stood down.17 
 MACC transitions to a partial activation of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).    
9:00 a.m. Runners are allowed to begin retrieving bags at Berkley and Stuart Streets in Boston.  
9:40 a.m. A press conference is held at the Westin Hotel with the Governor, Mayor, FBI SAC, Bureau of  
 Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), US Attorney, BPD Commissioner, MSP  
 Superintendent, MEMA Director, Transit Police Chief, and other public safety and elected  
 officials. The FBI confirms that the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), with support from local  
 and state police, is working to solve the crime, asks for assistance from the public, and requests  
 that the public provide information to the FBI tip line. The FBI confirms that two devices were  
 detonated, and that no additional devices were present. The Mayor and Governor announce  
 that the support/resource center at the Castle remains open for affected individuals.  
10:00 a.m. Runners’ bags are moved to the Castle and sorted by MANG.  
5:07 p.m. A media briefing is held at the Westin Hotel with the Governor, Mayor, FBI SAC, U.S. Attorney,  
 BPD Commissioner, MSP Superintendent, MEMA Director, Transit Police Chief, and other public  
 safety and elected officials. The FBI provides an update on the investigation and evidence  
 recovery and states they are looking for individuals that may have been carrying black, heavy  
 bag(s) or backpack(s) that may have contained pressure-cooker type device(s). Details of  
 the interfaith service are announced, including the participation of the President. The Mayor  
 and Governor announce formation of the One Fund Boston where donations for victims and  
 survivors could be sent.    
7:00 p.m. The SEOC returns to normal operations for the overnight shift.  
11:00 p.m. The Castle closes as an assistance center for runners and others affected by the bombing. The  
 assistance center is moved to another location within the headquarters of City Year. Unclaimed  
 runners’ bags are transferred to BAA headquarters.  
17 The Westin Hotel continued to be used for press conferences.
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2013 
A Presidential Emergency Declaration is issued. The President plans to visit Boston on Thursday to  
participate in the interfaith service.18 
The Governor, Mayor and public safety officials conduct individual interviews with various media outlets to 
provide updates on the incident, ongoing efforts to identify the perpetrators, and ongoing recovery efforts. 
The hospitals caring for patients injured as a result of the bombings hold various press conferences.
The Governor and Mayor visit a number of survivors in area hospitals. 
Investigation into the bombing continues. As a result of the public request for tips and leads, the FBI has 
received a large number of photos and videos. Heightened security continues for key infrastructure and 
selected locations. Mutual aid resources and MANG continue to assist BPD and Transit PD with security.19  
The SEOC is at a partial activation for the daytime shift and resumes normal operations overnight. 
 
9:00 a.m. Boston opens a Business Assistance Center at the Park Plaza Hotel. 
 The City of Boston, American Red Cross, Massachusetts Office of Victim Assistance, and  
 Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office open a Family Assistance Center dedicated to  
 providing information and services to survivors, their families, and the families of the  
 deceased.   
9:30 a.m. City of Boston Cabinet meeting is held at Brigham and Women’s Hospital with the Mayor.  
 The Mayor sets recovery priorities for the City.   
 18 A presidential visit necessitates increased security presence and law enforcement detail assignments. 
19 Military police are now included as part of the complement of MANG personnel providing support.
After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings26
THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 2013 
As on Tuesday and Wednesday, intense investigation continues. Calls regarding suspicious packages and 
people continue to be received and investigated.   
9:00 a.m. Boston OEM increases Boston EOC staffing from City agencies to support the Presidential visit.  
 
11:00 a.m. Interfaith service is held at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Boston, with the President,  
 Governor, Mayor and many other public safety and elected officials present.   
12:54 p.m. President and Governor visit survivors and families at Massachusetts General Hospital. 
1:01 p.m. First Lady visits survivors and families at Brigham and Women’s Hospital. 
4:00 p.m. President’s flight departs Logan Airport; security activities associated with the presidential visit  
 are concluded. 
4:01 p.m. Boston OEM initiates a planning session to develop the City’s plan for the recovery and  
 restoration of Boylston Street. This planning session includes 13 City agencies, American Red  
 Cross, Interstate Rental, and the BAA.20  
5:20 p.m. Press conference is held at the Sheraton Boston Hotel with FBI SAC, US Attorney, MSP  
 Superintendent, BPD Commissioner, Transit PD Chief and other public safety officials.  
 FBI releases photographs of suspects at press conference, and appeals for public’s help in  
 finding them. 
   
10:28 p.m. Armed robbery occurs at a convenience store located at 750 Massachusetts Avenue in  
 Cambridge.  
  
10:31 p.m.  Massachusetts Institution of Technology (MIT) Police Officer Sean Collier is fatally shot while  
 sitting in his marked cruiser parked on the MIT campus. Officers from MIT Police Department  
 (MIT PD) and Cambridge Police Department (Cambridge PD) respond.21 The location of the  
 shooting is in close proximity to the convenience store robbery, and the two incidents are  
 initially thought to be related. They are subsequently determined to be unrelated. 
 A notification of the shooting is broadcast over the Boston Area Police Emergency Radio  
 Network (BAPERN).   
11:16 p.m. Cambridge PD issues a “Be On the Look Out” (BOLO) for suspect of armed robbery.22  
11:20 p.m. A sports utility vehicle (SUV) is carjacked on Brighton Avenue in the Allston neighborhood  
 of Boston.  
11:45 p.m. Watertown Police officers are briefed at roll call on Officer Collier’s murder. 
20 Interstate Rental is the BAA’s primary equipment vendor for the Marathon.
21 Cambridge police officers who were en route to respond to the convenience store robbery were rerouted to MIT when 
the shooting took place three minutes later. It was not until the MIT scene was secured that Cambridge PD was able to 
send officers to the armed robbery call, obtain information, and generate the BOLO. 
22 An official BOLO report is shared across the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services system. The information must 
be entered into the system, which often takes some time to complete. 
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FRIDAY, APRIL 19, 2013  
12:00 a.m. Cambridge PD provides a supervisor and four officers to assist MIT police.23   
12:13 a.m. Watertown PD dispatch center puts out a BOLO on Cambridge armed robbery.   
12:19 a.m. Cambridge PD receives a 911 call from the victim of the SUV carjacking and responds to  
 a gas station at 820 Memorial Drive in Cambridge where the victim had escaped his captors.  
 Approximately 20 minutes into the interview process, the carjacking victim provides  
 information that associates the carjackers with the Marathon bombings. The victim also  
 informs responding officers that his vehicle has a manufacturer tracking system, which is  
 subsequently activated.24  
12:26 a.m. Cambridge PD issues a BOLO for the black Mercedes SUV and the carjackers, noting that the  
 suspects are armed.  
 A BAPERN broadcast is made regarding the two male, armed carjackers that are at large.  
12:41 a.m. The manufacturer tracking system in the carjacked SUV locates the vehicle at 81 Dexter Avenue  
 in Watertown. Cambridge PD dispatch center contacts Watertown PD dispatch center with  
 information on the location of the carjacked SUV.    
 Watertown PD dispatch center puts out a call over the radio with the location of the vehicle,  
 and advises that a response should be treated as a felony stop.  
 An officer responds to Dexter Avenue. As he drives down the street, he observes the SUV and  
 radios in that he has located the car on Dexter Avenue. He observes the SUV, makes  
 eye contact with the operator of the vehicle, and radios in that he has located the car on  
 Dexter Avenue. As the officer then turns around to drive back toward the vehicle, the  
 supervisor, who was only seconds away, instructs the officer to wait to approach the operator  
 until he arrives on scene. 
 The SUV and a Honda sedan turn left onto Laurel Street, and the officer follows at a distance  
 behind. The operator of the SUV suddenly stops, exits the vehicle, and walks towards the  
 officer’s cruiser while firing a gun. At this time, the supervisor arrives in his police cruiser. The  
 suspect fires his weapon at the arriving supervisor, shooting through the windshield and  
 narrowly missing the officer. The second suspect emerges from the Honda sedan, and begins  
 tossing homemade improvised explosive devices (IEDs).     
12:44 a.m. The responding officers relay a radio transmission indicating shots fired. Upon hearing the radio 
 call of shots fired, Watertown PD dispatch center calls for immediate assistance from other  
 police departments.  
 A firefight between Watertown police and the suspects ensues on Laurel Street. The suspects  
 throw several additional homemade IEDs and a larger pressure cooker bomb at responding  
 officers. While the shootout continues, officers from BPD, Cambridge PD, Transit PD, MSP, and nearby 
 communities respond to the scene. Within the hour, several hundred police officers have arrived.25 
 
23 This assistance continues through the memorial service for Officer Collier on April 24, 2013.
24 There was a significant language barrier between the responding officers and the victim. 
25 Many were already en route from the Officer Collier murder scene in Cambridge.
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 12:49 a.m.  The first suspect is tackled by responding police officers and subsequently struck by the vehicle  
 the second suspect is driving while fleeing the scene. The first suspect is taken into custody and  
 loaded into an ambulance for transport to Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital.   
 As the second suspect flees the scene, shots are fired and an MBTA Transit PD Officer is severely  
 wounded. The second suspect drives approximately a half mile, abandons the SUV on Spruce  
 Street in Watertown, and flees on foot.   
12:51 a.m. The wounded officer is loaded into an ambulance that had been staged nearby. The ambulance  
 transports the wounded officer to Mount Auburn Hospital in Cambridge.  
 An unmarked black MSP pickup truck is incorrectly reported as a stolen vehicle. The occupants  
 of the pickup truck are a MSP Trooper and a BPD officer, both of whom are in plainclothes. As  
 the vehicle drives down Adams Street in Watertown, a few blocks from the scene of the  
 shootout, an officer on scene fired at the vehicle and its occupants. No one is injured. 
12:56 a.m.  Dexter Avenue, Laurel Street, and adjacent Cypress Street in Watertown are initially restricted as  
 an active crime scene. A larger perimeter is later established to search for the suspect at large.  
 This perimeter is held until a comprehensive grid search of the area is completed at  
 approximately 6:00 p.m.   
1:00 a.m. Mutual aid EOD technicians begin to assist Watertown in rendering safe the unexploded IEDs 
 remaining in the street after the gunfight.      MEMA Director notifies the Governor and the Secretary of EOPSS about the events unfolding in  
 Watertown. BPD notifies the Mayor of Boston.  
   Multiple police units continue to arrive in Watertown at various locations.   
1:06 a.m. The first suspect is pronounced dead at the hospital after resuscitation attempts. He is  
 identified by fingerprinting, which aids in the identification of the second suspect, his younger  
 brother. 
1:11 a.m.  Watertown PD receives a report of a suspicious individual behind a house on Spruce Street. The  
 individual is questioned and released. Numerous reports are received by law enforcement  
 officials throughout the course of the night and following day, and are subsequently confirmed  
 to be unrelated.  
1:12 a.m. Watertown PD designates the Arsenal Mall in Watertown as a staging area and location for a  
 command post. Command post trailers from six public safety agencies are subsequently set up  
 there.    
1:30 a.m. Watertown PD requests that all responding officers report to the Arsenal Mall parking lot for  
 staging.  
 Watertown PD brings in two extra dispatchers to help handle the surge of 911 calls, which will  
 total over 500 before the day ends.26   
1:57 a.m.  Watertown PD sends an emergency alert message to Watertown residents asking them to  
 remain in their homes because of an active incident, and to report any suspicious activity.  
2:05 a.m. The FBI releases enhanced photos of both suspects with front view of faces.  
26 Typical call volume is 30 calls per day.
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2:30 a.m. A Unified Command Center (UCC) is established in a mobile command trailer at Arsenal Mall.  
 Initially, Unified Command (UC) consists of Watertown PD, Cambridge PD, MSP, BPD, MBTA  
 Transit PD, FBI, MANG and MEMA. Unified Command grows over the next few hours as  
 additional agencies, including the FBI, arrive at the command post. A decision is made to  
 conduct house-to-house searches.  
 MEMA initially coordinates necessary resources and supplies to support the care and feeding of  
 officers gathering at the Arsenal Mall staging area.   
4:00 a.m. The Massachusetts Department of Fire Services assists MEMA with logistics for the care and  
 feeding of more than 1,000 law enforcement personnel gathered at Arsenal Mall staging area.  
4:15 a.m. MANG receives authorization from the MEMA Director to deploy and arm military  
 police to Watertown.  
4:30 a.m. UC begins discussing the potential need to cease operations of the transit system and  
 formulates a recommendation to suspend service on the MBTA and issue a shelter-in- 
 place request. The MEMA Director telephones the Governor and Watertown Town Manager,  
 and the BPD Commissioner telephones the Mayor of Boston. 
5:00 a.m. MANG sends 21 armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMVEEs) and  
 120 armed military police to help establish an outer security perimeter in Watertown and to  
 assist in house-to-house searches. 
5:15 a.m. A conference call is conducted with UC, the Governor and the Mayor of Boston. The UC initiates  
 the conference call to recommend that all MBTA service be suspended and that a shelter- 
 in-place request be issued for Watertown, Newton, Waltham, Belmont, Cambridge and the  
 Allston-Brighton neighborhood of Boston. After a brief discussion, the recommendations of the  
 UC are accepted and a press conference is planned to announce these decisions. 
 Amtrak train #2151 leaves South Station heading to New York City and Washington, D.C.  
5:30 a.m. UC finalizes tactical plans to conduct systematic door-to-door searches for the suspect at large.  
 The searches begin to be conducted by law enforcement and SWAT personnel from the FBI,  
 MANG, BPD, Cambridge PD, MSP, Transit PD, Metro Law Enforcement Council (MetroLEC),  
 and Northeast Law Enforcement Council (NEMLEC). A Watertown PD officer is assigned to each  
 team. The searches continue across 20 streets throughout the majority of the day.   
5:39 a.m. All MBTA transit service is suspended, including buses, commuter rail, and rapid transit. 
5:45 a.m. First press conference is held with the Watertown PD Chief, MSP Superintendent, BPD  
 Commissioner, MEMA Director, MBTA Transit Police Chief, and other public safety officials  
 to announce that all MBTA transit system service has been suspended, and to request that  
 residents and businesses in Watertown, Newton, Waltham, Belmont, Cambridge and the  
 Allston-Brighton neighborhood of Boston shelter-in-place, remain indoors and not  
 congregate outside.   
6:00 a.m. The Watertown PD broadcasts a radio request for all responding officers to stage in the parking  
 lot at the Arsenal Mall. Over the course of the day, more than 2,500 officers from 116 federal,  
 state, and local law enforcement agencies arrive at the staging area. 
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6:21 a.m. MEMA issues an emergencey alert message to smartphones regarding the manhunt in  
 Watertown, the MBTA closure, and the shelter-in-place request for Watertown, Newton,  
 Waltham, Belmont, Cambridge and Allston-Brighton.27  
6:23 a.m. MEMA issues a HHAN alert to the public safety community regarding the manhunt in  
 Watertown, the MBTA closure, and the shelter-in-place request for Watertown, Newton,  
 Waltham, Belmont, Cambridge and Allston-Brighton. 
6:30 a.m. MDPH activates its Department Operations Center (DOC).  
6:37 a.m. MDPH issues a HHAN to hospitals to inform them that a shelter-in-place request is in effect  
 and that the MBTA transit system has stopped operations. During the course of the morning,  
 several area hospitals activate their emergency operations centers when they learn of the  
 suspect at large, the shelter-in-place request, and the suspension of service across the MBTA  
 transit system. 
7:15 a.m. A suspicious person carrying a package is reported to the UCC as having been picked up in  
 Watertown by a taxi driven by a person of Middle Eastern descent. The taxi driver’s name  
 appears to be on the federal JTTF Terrorist Watch List, which heightens the concern. The  
 destination of the taxi is reported to be South Station, a transit station serviced by both the  
 MBTA and Amtrak. 
7:49 a.m.  Transit PD subsequently lock down and secure all entrances and exits to passenger traffic at  
 South Station.  
7:59 a.m. A second press conference is held across the street from the Arsenal Mall with the Governor,  
 Watertown PD Chief, BPD Commissioner, MSP Superintendent and other public safety officials  
 to provide information on the search for suspects, the murder of the MIT police officer and  
 the status of the injured Transit PD officer. Also announced is the extension of the shelter-in- 
 place request to include all of Boston—in addition to Cambridge, Watertown, Waltham,  
 Newton, and Belmont—and the continued suspension of service across the MBTA transit  
 system. 
8:15 a.m.  All taxi service in Boston is suspended based upon the terrorist alert, investigative leads and  
 the reported information on taxi driver and passenger allegedly en route to South Station. 
 MEMA issues a HHAN message to the public safety community with information on the  
 expanded area of the shelter-in-place request.  
8:22 a.m. MSP issues a HHAN message to the law enforcement community describing the suspect  
 at large.  
8:36 a.m. The Amtrak train that departed South Station is stopped in Norwalk, Connecticut by law  
 enforcement officials (Metropolitan Police Department and Norwalk Police Department) and  
 searched for taxi suspect. 
8:51 a.m. A HHAN alert is sent to hospitals from MDPH notifying them to be on the lookout for the  
 second suspect, who may be injured.  
  27MEMA uses a free smartphone application, now known as Massachusetts Alerts, as a means of sending emergency 
notifications and information to individuals who have downloaded the application.
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9:00 a.m. The Amtrak train is cleared by the law enforcement officials after no suspect is found on board.  
 The taxi driver is subsequently found not to be a person of interest. The driver’s name had been  
 misspelled and is not the individual listed on the JTTF Terrorism Watch List.   
12:34 p.m. BPHC sends a message to area hospitals to clarify that essential healthcare personnel are  
 allowed to travel to work to relieve healthcare staff currently on duty.   
12:35 p.m. A third press conference with the Governor, Mayor of Boston, MSP Superintendent, Watertown  
 PD Chief, BPD Commissioner, Transit PD Chief, MEMA Director, and other public safety officials is 
 held to reinforce that the shelter-in-place request remains in place; that individuals should  
 remain indoors; that the search, which is now 60–70 percent complete, continues and that the  
 investigation is ongoing.  
12:49 p.m. MDPH sends an update on the security situation and guidance on staffing for hospitals via the  
 Statewide Hospital Listserv. 
2:00 p.m. At request of MSP and BPD, MANG provides three UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to transport  
 MSP SWAT teams to the second suspect’s dormitory at UMass Dartmouth.  
 Unified Command cancels that evening’s Red Sox game.    
2:05 p.m. MEMA issues a HHAN message to the public safety community to clarify that although the  
 shelter-in-place request remains in effect, individuals are allowed to travel home from work.  
2:23 p.m. MEMA issues an emergencey alert message to smartphones to clarify that although the shelter- 
 in-place request remains in effect, individuals are allowed to travel home from work.  
2:44 p.m. Boston sends an email to City employees to clarify that individuals are allowed to travel home  
 from work. 
3:24 p.m. MDPH sends revised guidance via the Statewide Hospital Listserv to hospitals with information  
 regarding patient discharges, staffing and dispensing of pharmaceuticals (many local  
 pharmacies are closed). 
3:35 p.m. FEMA issues a Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) on behalf of MEMA to clarify that although the  
 shelter-in-place request is still in effect, employees are allowed to travel home from work. 
4:30 p.m.  UC begins to evaluate the continued need for the shelter-in-place request. The majority of  
 door-to-door searches have been completed, and law enforcement officials believe there is a  
 possibility that the suspect has escaped the area. Given these circumstances, officials do not  
 wish to continue shelter-in-place restrictions unnecessarily.  
5:30 p.m. MBTA resumes limited service. 
6:03 p.m. A fourth press conference is held with the Governor, Mayor of Boston, MSP Superintendent,  
 Watertown PD Chief, BPD Commissioner, MEMA Director, Transit PD Chief, FBI SAC, US Attorney,  
 and other public safety and elected officials. An update about the search for the suspect is  
 provided, and the shelter-in-place request is lifted. The public is asked to remain alert and is  
 reminded that a dangerous individual remains at large.  
6:25 p.m. MEMA issues an emergencey alert message to smartphones stating the shelter-in-place request 
 has been lifted.  
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6:42 p.m.  Watertown PD receives a 911 call from a resident at 67 Franklin Street who reports that an  
 individual who is bleeding is hiding in his boat, which is shrink-wrapped with a winterized tarp  
 and parked in his yard. Multiple police units respond, and SWAT teams and EOD teams are  
 dispatched and arrive on scene. A security perimeter is established.  
6:54 p.m. An officer fires a shot at the boat followed by multiple shots from other officers. A senior law  
 enforcement official on scene orders a ceasefire. 
7:05 p.m. Movement is reported under the tarp covering the boat. 
7:43 p.m. Law enforcement officials make a tactical decision to deploy flashbangs to coax the individual  
 out of the boat. Watertown FD is placed on standby to respond to any subsequent fire.  
7:46 p.m. Flashbangs are deployed, but the suspect does not emerge from the boat. Law enforcement  
 units continue to maintain a perimeter around the boat. 
8:02 p.m. An FBI Hostage Response Team is deployed to communicate with the individual and bring  
 about his surrender.  
 MSP Special Tactical Operations (STOP) Team deploys a Bearcat armored vehicle with a remote  
 arm to pull back the tarp covering the boat. The FBI Hostage Response Team communicates  
 with the suspect, but the suspect does not immediately surrender.  
8:41 p.m. The suspect emerges from the boat and is taken into custody. The suspect appears to be injured 
 and is transported by ambulance under heavy guard to Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. 
9:32 p.m. A final press conference is held with the Governor, Mayor of Boston, MSP Superintendent, BPD  
 Commissioner, Watertown PD Chief, MBTA Transit PD Chief, the US Attorney, FBI SAC, ATF SAC,  
 and other public safety and elected officials to announce the apprehension of the second  
 suspect.     
10:04 p.m. The President holds a press conference regarding the capture of the suspect.  
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SUNDAY, APRIL 21 
2:00 p.m. The City of Boston holds a press conference at Engine 33 on Boylston Street to announce that  
 the ad hoc memorial, which had developed over the previous days, is being moved from  
 Boylston Street to Copley Square. The Boston OEM Director announces the overall plan for the  
 restoration and reoccupation of Boylston Street once it is released back to the City.     
 
 
MONDAY, APRIL 22 
12:00 p.m.  The One Fund begins registration of victims, survivors and families. 
2:50 p.m.  A moment of silence is held to honor victims. 
5:00 p.m. The FBI conducts a flag lowering ceremony on Boylston Street in preparation of releasing  
 Boylston Street back to the City.  
5:02 p.m. FBI returns Boylston Street to the City of Boston.  
5:03 p.m. City agencies begin to execute the Boylston Street recovery plan, including cleaning streets and 
 sidewalks, removing debris, and making safety checks of buildings.  
 
 
 
TUESDAY, APRIL 23 
10:00 a.m. The City provides access to Boylston Street to businesses and residents of the cordoned off  
 crime scene area. City agencies provide assistance to them on insurance and loans, and facilities 
 the conduct of inspections needed prior to reopening. 
7:00 p.m. Survivors and families visit the bombing sites under City escort. 
 
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24 
City and state agencies continue assistance to businesses to help them reopen. 
3:00 a.m. Boylston Street is opened to the general public.  
12:00 p.m. Memorial service held for Officer Sean Collier at MIT in Cambridge, with the Vice President in  
 attendance. Extensive security and security measures are implemented in support of the  
 service. 
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S E C T I O N  2
O V E R V I E W  O F  I N C I D E N T S 
This section provides a narrative overview of the preparedness, response and recovery activities 
of public safety, public health and emergency medical response professionals related to the events 
associated with the 2013 Boston Marathon. This narrative does not aim to detail every activity 
of every organization involved in the events associated with the bombings and apprehension of 
suspects; rather, it has been developed to provide a high level overview of events of the week of 
April 15, 2013, and to give the account of the response and recovery efforts.   
Background
The 26.2-mile Boston Marathon is an annual event held on Patriots’ Day, a Massachusetts holi-
day that commemorates the anniversary of the April 19, 1775 Battles of Lexington and Concord. 
Unlike other large city marathon courses that run circuitously within a single jurisdiction, the 
Boston Marathon course is a straight-line course that crosses eight cities and towns: Hopkinton, 
Ashland, Framingham, Natick, Wellesley, Newton, Brookline, and Boston.
Because of this, a great deal of public safety planning is required each year for the Marathon to 
ensure streamlined coordination among public safety partners at the local, regional, state and 
Official Boston Marathon Course Map
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federal levels. A multi-disciplinary public safety committee begins meeting each January to plan 
for the upcoming Marathon. Representatives from state and local police, fire, emergency medical 
services (EMS), public health, the Massachusetts National Guard (MANG), and the Massachu-
setts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) work in conjunction with the Boston Athletic 
Association (BAA) to review, update, and modify each jurisdiction’s Marathon Day operational 
plan. This planning effort is coordinated by MEMA, which hosts the Multi-Agency Coordination 
Center (MACC) on race day.
Each year, the public safety committee reviews and incorporates lessons learned from previous 
years into Marathon Day operational plans. For example, unseasonably high temperatures in 2012 
led to medical tents being inundated with large volumes of patients with heat-related injuries and 
illnesses, stressing the race’s medical system. In response to this, the medical plan for the 2013 
Marathon was further enhanced to ensure that medical tents had the capabilities to handle a 
higher medical surge along the route.  
This multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional planning process culminates each year with a tabletop 
exercise, which allows the incident commanders within the host communities and key supporting 
state agencies to discuss how to respond to various scenarios. In fact, the 2012 tabletop included 
a scenario on responding to a mass casualty incident at the Finish Line, resulting from a collapse 
of the spectator grandstands. In addition to the Marathon tabletop exercise and discussion, public 
safety officials participate throughout the year in numerous other tabletop and full scale exercis-
es, all of which provide an opportunity to build relationships and test and improve capabilities. 
These include the multi-day, regional Urban Shield full scale exercises, coordinated by the City 
of Boston Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which focuses on testing Metro 
Boston’s response capabilities for complex scenarios.
On Marathon Day, local, regional, state and federal law enforcement, fire services, EMS, public 
health and transportation representatives gather with the BAA, American Red Cross and MEMA 
at the MACC to facilitate the coordination of public safety activities. Approximately 80 individuals 
typically staff the MACC in support of the Marathon. 
Marathon Monday 2013
The Race 
The 117th running of the Boston Marathon took place on Monday, April 15, 2013, with 27,000 
registered runners participating in the race. The Marathon kicked off at 9:00 a.m. with the start of 
the mobility impaired participants, followed by wheelchair racers (9:17 a.m.), hand-cyclists (9:22 
a.m.), elite women (9:32 a.m.), elite men and Wave 1 of 9,000 runners (10:00 a.m.), Wave 2 of 9,000 
runners (10:20 a.m.), and Wave 3 of 9,000 runners (10:40 a.m.). By 11:00 a.m., all 27,000 runners 
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were on the course. By 12:36 p.m., the wheelchair, female and male winners had been declared.
The MACC, located at MEMA headquarters in Framingham, was activated at 7:00 a.m., and by 
9:00 a.m., was fully staffed with more than 80 representatives from host community police, fire 
and EMS agencies, MDPH, the Massachusetts State Police (MSP), MANG, MEMA, American 
Red Cross, the BAA, other supporting state agencies, and key federal agencies. Additionally, in 
Boston, the Boston Police Department (BPD) 
stood up the Law Enforcement Coordination 
Center (LECC) to coordinate the public safety 
and security operation for the City.28 Present 
at the LECC were senior officials from BPD, 
Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA) 
Transit Police Department (Transit PD), MSP, 
Boston Fire Department (BFD), Boston EMS, 
the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC), 
and Boston University Police Department. 
As part of its standard procedure, the Massa-
chusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) 
activated its Department Operations Center 
(DOC). Throughout the day, MDPH conduct-
ed pre-planned conference calls with its staff 
assigned to the medical tents along the route 
to gain situational awareness on the activity 
level of the tents and their saturation with in-
jured or ailing runners. Although the number 
of runners needing treatment was lower than in 
years past, MDPH continued to conduct pre-planned conference calls with course hospitals and 
hospital bed counts to ascertain the current capacity of area hospitals. 
As runners cleared the cities and towns along the course, security and medical resources were 
dismissed. By 1:00 p.m., operations had ceased in Hopkinton, Ashland, and Framingham. MANG, 
which had deployed personnel to augment law enforcement in all of the host cities and towns 
except for Boston, began to release soldiers from duty. 
The annual 11:05 a.m. Patriots Day Red Sox game ended at 2:08 p.m., and thousands of fans 
walked the short distance from Fenway Park to the Marathon route to cheer on the runners. While 
2013 Winners
28 The LECC was called the Unified Command Center at the time, and was renamed to the Law Enforcement Coordination 
Center in 2014. To avoid confusion with the Unified Command Center that was activated at the Westin Hotel following the 
bombings, this facility will be referred to as the LECC throughout this report.
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the elite runners had long finished by this time, crowds were still thick in Newton, Wellesley, 
Brookline and Boston with spectators who were enjoying the event. 
The Bombings
At 2:49 p.m., the Finish Line area was rocked 
by an explosion at 671 Boylston Street, in front 
of the Marathon Sports store (Site 1). Thirteen 
seconds later, a second explosion occurred 180 
yards up course at 755 Boylston Street, in front 
of the Forum restaurant (Site 2). It was later 
determined that the explosions were caused by 
homemade improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
that were hidden in backpacks and placed by 
perpetrators in these densely populated spec-
tator viewing areas. The two explosions im-
mediately took the lives of three individuals: 
eight-year-old Martin Richard, 29-year-old 
Krystle Campbell, and 23-year-old Lu Lingzi. 
An additional 264 spectators were injured—
many critically, including 16 individuals who 
suffered traumatic amputations. While the ex-
plosions damaged several buildings and caused 
an initial flash of fire, no buildings collapsed or suffered significant structural damage, nor did 
any fires burn beyond the initial explosions.  
The explosions prompted an immediate mass casualty incident response. Information and alerts 
began to come in to various operation centers including the MACC, MDPH DOC, BPD LECC, and 
BRIC from the response agencies on scene, including BFD, BPD, Transit PD, MSP, and Boston EMS. 
It was quickly evident to many on scene first responders that this was an intentional act of violence. 
While they are trained to be mindful of the threat of ancillary attacks specifically targeting first 
responders, firefighters, law enforcement officers, and EMS personnel did not hesitate to rush 
forward to help the survivors. Spectators, BAA volunteers, and runners, including MANG soldiers 
who had just completed the 26.2 mile route as part of a rucksack march, also acted immediately 
to help those who had been injured. 
Finish Line Hours before the Bombings
Moments after the first explosion at Site 1.
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Unified Command
Unified Command began to form moments after the explosions when senior law enforcement offi-
cials from BPD, MSP, and Transit Police, as well as the MEMA Director, came together on Boylston 
Street and rapidly started to establish priorities and coordinate response activities. It was quickly 
decided that a command post needed to be established away from the scene where a Unified Com-
mand could collectively direct response operations. At 3:28 p.m., less than 40 minutes after the 
bombings, an ad hoc Unified Command Center 
(UCC) was established at the nearby Westin 
Hotel with key leadership already in place un-
der Unified Command and actively coordinat-
ing response efforts. Unified Command would 
ultimately include the Governor, Mayor, Sec-
retary of the Executive Office of Public Safe-
ty and Security (EOPSS), Director of MEMA, 
Superintendent of MSP, BPD Commissioner, 
BFD Commissioner, Boston Emergency Med-
ical Services (Boston EMS) Chief, Director of 
the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management 
(OEM), Adjutant General of the MANG, Transit 
PD Chief, and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) Boston Special Agent in Charge (SAC). 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear Material Monitoring 
Joint Hazard Assessment Teams (JHATs), 
comprised of members of BFD, MSP, and the 
MANG Civil Support Team (CST), immedi-
ately checked pre-deployed air monitoring devices in the area of the Finish Line for potential 
contamination from the IEDs. The initial readings showed no presence of contamination from 
the bombs. This information was communicated quickly to on scene commanders, but was not 
relayed to hospitals. Though initial readings were negative, the JHATs continued to monitor the 
air to ensure the explosions were not “dirty” bombs.
Emergency Medical Services 
By design, the Finish Line has a large number of medically trained personnel assigned to the area 
in support of the BAA’s two medical tents, including Alpha Medical Tent. Alpha Medical Tent 
is located in Copley Square just after the Finish Line and is an “enhanced” medical tent for the 
Smoke from Site 1 billows as the explosion  
at Site 2 (seen in the center of the photo, in the  
distance up the street) occurs.
Site 2 – Second Explosion
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Marathon, staffed with medical professionals who volunteer their time to support the race’s medical 
operations.29 Alpha Medical Tent is designed to be equipped with more advanced medical tech-
nology and has authority to conduct more advanced medical treatment so that larger numbers of 
runners can be medically cared for in the tent rather than be transported to hospitals.  
At the time the bombs were detonated on 
Marathon Day, there were 16 ambulances pre-
staged in Copley Square. In response to a 2:55 
p.m. Boston Area Medical Alert (BAMA) radio 
broadcast by Boston EMS requesting additional 
ambulance assets, an additional 73 ambulances, 
including assets from private ambulance 
companies, staged within minutes to support 
the incident. Thirty Boston EMS ordered all 
EMS units via radio to stay at their locations 
until the exact location of the blasts and scope 
of the incident could be determined. EMS units 
that had staged outside the blast area maintained 
discipline, standing fast until ordered to 
respond to the scene.
Many critically injured survivors were quickly 
given essential life support services at the scene, 
such as tourniquets to stop excessive bleeding, 
and then rapidly transported to hospitals. These efforts were described by a paramedic as “scoop 
and go,” with Boston EMS identifying the most critically injured and loading them into ambu-
lances. Ambulances loaded with patients were en route to hospitals within nine minutes of the 
first detonation. 
While some patients were triaged and loaded into ambulances directly on Boylston Street, large 
numbers of patients were brought into the Alpha Medical Tent through the Boylston Street 
entrance. Critically injured patients were immediately brought to the ambulance loading area 
located at the rear of the tent and transported to hospitals. A medical tent volunteer repeatedly 
messaged to medical tent staff and responders over the tent’s public address system to keep the 
center aisle clear, allowing critically injured patients to be carried directly to the ambulance load-
ing area without impediment. All critically injured patients were quickly transported from the 
scene. Less critically injured patients were triaged, prioritized, and staged near the ambulance 
29 Certified medical physicians, physician assistants, nurses, emergency medical technicians and paramedics. 
30 The ambulance companies included AMR, American, Armstrong, Fallon, McCall, EasCare, and Professional Ambulance.
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loading area to await transport. Some individuals with serious, but not critical injuries were taken 
by private cars to hospitals. Efforts were made to keep roadways leading into the vicinity of the 
impact area clear to allow ambulances to respond promptly. BPD made repeated radio broadcasts 
reminding responding officers to not block roadways with their vehicles. 
Because Site 2 was farther up the street from 
Alpha Medical Tent, the first to respond to this 
scene were generally firefighters, law enforce-
ment officers, and spectators who were nearby 
at the time the explosion occurred. The area 
was also difficult to access, with large crowds 
fleeing the area, interlocking metal barricades 
that were difficult to disassemble, and working 
fire apparatus and active ambulances in the 
street contributing to the access challenges. 
One critical patient had to be transported in 
a BPD patrol wagon. Despite these challenges, 
Boston EMS arrived on scene within minutes, 
assumed control of the triage and transport 
process, and established a second ambulance 
loading area.  
Boston EMS assigned loading officers at three 
locations: Site 1, Site 2, and the rear of Alpha 
Medical Tent. These loading officers, in coordination with MetroBoston Central Medical Emer-
gency Direction (CMED), coordinated patient transports by directing ambulances to certain 
hospitals. CMED is the coordination dispatch center, located in Boston EMS Dispatch, that assigns 
patient transports to hospitals based on patient condition, specialty needs, and citywide hospital 
capacity to ensure no one hospital emergency department is overloaded.31 Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital received 23 patients, the most bombing survivors of any hospital. The distribution of 
patients across hospitals prevented any one hospital from becoming overloaded. 
Although many patients sustained grave injuries, every patient that was transported to area 
hospitals survived. A total of 118 individuals were transported by ambulance in the aftermath of 
the bombings. In the hours and days that followed, more than 260 patients would seek medical 
treatment.
31 Injuries included traumatic amputations, shrapnel wounds, burns, head trauma and hearing loss. The three individuals who 
lost their lives immediately died at the scene as the result of their injuries.
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Hospitals 
At 2:53 p.m., area hospitals received alerts via radio, email and the Health and Homeland Alert 
Network (HHAN) notifying them of the mass casualty incident.32 Once patients arrived at hospi-
tals, they were triaged upon intake and then again in surgical units, to determine the priority of 
surgeries. Although it was known at the scene 
that the IEDs did not contain contaminants, this 
information was not transmitted to the hospi-
tals. This slowed down the intake process, as 
hospitals had to make determinations about 
whether or not to decontaminate incoming 
patients. Ultimately, each hospital decided not 
to conduct decontamination activities, as they 
assumed the absence of notification meant no 
contamination, and the gravity of the patients was 
so severe they did not want to delay treatment. 
Since many hospitals already had their Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) partially or fully 
activated, they were able to quickly coordinate surge capacity activities, adding staffing to their 
emergency divisions, stopping shift changes, and/or calling in additional staff. This enabled 
hospitals to provide the level of treatment and care the survivors required. Because of the critical 
and traumatic nature of the injuries endured by the survivors, a large percentage of emergency 
patients were admitted to the hospital. Many of these patients spent days, weeks, and months in 
the hospital receiving additional medical care and recovering from their injuries.
Because of the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 
hospitals faced significant challenges in communicating information about survivors, such as 
their location and the criticality of their injuries, to concerned family members. HIPAA regula-
tions require patients to affirmatively allow their medical information to be shared. Because of 
the condition of some patients, hospitals could not obtain this authority from them. Ultimately, 
hospital officials worked together with city and state public health officials to coordinate the 
sharing of information.  
Security also continued to be a concern for the hospitals. In the hours after the bombings, it 
was uncertain if the bombings were merely one component of a larger plot. To provide added 
protection for critical infrastructure, law enforcement officers were assigned to hospitals to 
bolster security. Several hospitals were concerned about ancillary attacks. In fact, just before 
5:00 p.m., Tufts Medical Center issued a Code Black in response to a suspicious package found 
32 The Health and Homeland Alert Network is a notification tool used by MEMA and MDPH to alert public safety, public health 
and healthcare partners about emergency incidents and provide information about ongoing emergency situations.
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in the Emergency Department.33 Although the suspicious package was quickly cleared, it added 
to the uneasiness of hospital personnel. 
In addition to providing an increase security presence, BPD and MSP officers and detectives were 
deployed to the hospitals to interview witnesses and collect evidence. Many hospital staff found 
the large numbers of heavily armed police officers and investigators in their halls to be intim-
idating. Although law enforcement officials never hindered the medical treatment of patients, 
some hospital staff and patients reported they were frightened by police questioning patients and 
family members and collecting cell phones, patient belongings, clothing and shrapnel removed 
from wounds as evidence. Some feared that these actions would add to the emotional trauma the 
patients and staff had already experienced from the bombing. 
It was also not made clear to witnesses, family members, and survivors why police needed to 
take their cell phones. Boston PD did have a web portal which investigators could use to upload 
cell phone data and subsequently return the phones to their owners, but the website was soon 
overloaded from large amounts of data and files, and some cell phone brands were incompatible 
with the available software. Because of this, Boston PD needed to retain many phones for a period 
of time to view their contents, copy photos and videos, and maintain the chain of custody for 
evidence. However, this was not explained to patients, family members, witnesses or hospital staff.
Law Enforcement Response 
Law enforcement officers in the area of the bombings were among the initial first responders 
who provided aid to survivors. Many rendered medical aid, applying tourniquets and calming 
the injured as they awaited medical support. Even as the most seriously wounded survivors were 
triaged and transported from the scene, law enforcement diligently investigated the possibility of 
additional threats and began securing Boylston Street. BPD began establishing an initial 15-block 
perimeter around the scene (the area was later reduced to 12 blocks). To ensure the area was 
effectively cordoned off and cleared of people, BPD had to evacuate all remaining individuals in 
buildings and businesses along Boylston Street who had not initially fled the area. 
Law enforcement officials were concerned that the bombings could be part of a larger plot. This 
was compounded by reports that surfaced minutes after the bombings of additional explosions 
at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFK Library), only five miles from Boylston Street. 
The JFK Library fire was later found to be an accidental electrical transformer fire and not an 
intentional explosion, but these initial reports greatly increased the concern of law enforcement 
officials that additional acts related to the bombings were imminent. 
33 Code Black requires the closure of an Emergency Room to new patients because of an imminent threat.
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EOD 
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel responded to the area to sweep for additional 
devices. A Transit PD EOD unit, assigned to the Copley MBTA station approximately 500 yards 
away from the Finish Line, was one of the first teams to respond. Ultimately, an EOD command 
structure was created to coordinate the multiagency EOD response, which included teams from 
BPD, MSP, Transit PD, Cambridge Police Department (Cambridge PD), New Hampshire State 
Police, Connecticut State Police, Rhode Island State Police, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives (ATF), and the FBI.34 EOD teams worked collaboratively to clear the scene of all 
suspicious packages. Each of these EOD units had had a similar base of training in procedures, 
use of equipment, and terminology, which facilitated their coordination.
EOD personnel had to inspect the enormous quantity of backpacks, purses, and bags that were 
abandoned by spectators fleeing the area. Each bag had to be treated as a potential IED. Over the 
five hours following the explosions, the BRIC received 61 reports of suspicious packages, each 
requiring an EOD unit assessment. As these reports were received, EOD teams inspected and, in 
some instances, conducted controlled detonations of suspicious packages. Given the large number 
of packages in the area, and the number of additional reports, it was 12 hours before EOD units 
could clear the scene and release it for evidence collection and crime scene activities.
Specialized Weapons and Tactics 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) resources were deployed for a variety of missions, includ-
ing protection of critical infrastructure and high-value targets such as hospitals, government 
buildings, and hotels. A SWAT command and staging area was stood up at the Boston Common 
to coordinate incoming tactical mutual aid support, which included teams from the MSP, Cam-
bridge PD, Transit PD, Revere Police Department, Everett Police Department, the North Eastern 
Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council (NEMLEC), Metropolitan Law Enforcement Council 
(MetroLEC), and the South Eastern Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council (SEMLEC). The law en-
forcement councils (LECs) were able to assist with crime scene perimeter security and bolstering 
police presence in and around the City of Boston in the days that followed the bombings. 
Infrastructure Protection
Given the concern for ancillary attacks and potential on-going threats, law enforcement officials 
designated resources to create lists of critical infrastructure within and around the City of Boston. 
MBTA facilities were identified as one of the most important assets in need of heightened security 
measures. As the Transit PD Chief joined the UCC, discussions regarding the need to shut down 
the transit system ensued; however because the transit system was essential to getting people 
34 MSP requested resources from other State Police organizations in New England through the New England State Police 
Compact. 
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out of the impact area as quickly as possible, the closing of the transit system was not a feasible 
option. Officials focused instead on increasing security measures at key transit stations to ensure 
the safety of all riders. Implementing increased security measures required calling in additional 
members of the Transit Police Department, and requesting mutual aid support from Amtrak 
Police Department, Everett Police Department, and Chelsea Police Department, which were able 
to deploy additional canine units and bomb dog handlers, and augment security at South Station. 
The Transit PD also requested security support from the MANG. After a discussion among the 
Unified Command, the Governor approved this request and deployed 1,000 MANG soldiers to 
support security missions at MBTA stations across the City of Boston.35 These MANG soldiers, 
though unarmed, served as a force multiplier by increasing the presence of security personnel in 
transit stations and assisting Transit PD officers in performing random bag checks. 
Investigation
By 7:40 p.m., the lead investigative responsibilities for the incident had transitioned from BPD to 
the FBI, as the FBI has jurisdiction for all terrorism related incidents. The central coordination 
center for investigative actions was relocated to the FBI’s Boston Office. The FBI brought in hun-
dreds of agents and specialists from throughout New England to work the investigation. Strong 
collaboration and coordination was evident from the outset among investigators from MSP, BPD, 
Cambridge PD, Transit PD, ATF, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the FBI. 
Management of Remaining Runners on Course 
When the Marathon was officially stopped by public safety and race officials, approximately 
5,000 runners were still on the course throughout Newton, Brookline and Boston. These runners 
needed to be directed off the course to temporary shelter locations, but shelter facilities had not 
been formally activated in support of the race. Referring to a temporary shelter list that had been 
developed years prior, the MACC worked with communities to identify buildings that could 
potentially support evacuated runners. The MACC then coordinated with communities to open 
these facilities and to assist in the transportation of runners to these shelters and subsequently 
from these shelters back into Boston.
Runners in Newton and Brookline were directed to Newton City Hall, as well as to St. Ignatius 
Church and More Hall on the Boston College campus. An additional shelter at the Student Center 
of Lasell College in Newton was later opened. In Boston, runners stopped east of Massachusetts 
Avenue were directed to the Boston Common, and those west of Massachusetts Avenue were 
directed to Kenmore Square. All the runners were off the course by 4:45 p.m.  
35 The Governor authorized 2,000 MANG soldiers to support marathon bombing response missions. Of these, 1,000 were 
assigned to support MBTA security missions. 
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These shelters were intended only to provide a temporary safe haven for runners to gather until 
they could be transported to Boston and minimal or no services were provided at these locations. 
A centralized location where runners could collect their belongings, and where runners and any 
other impacted individuals could be provided overnight shelter accommodations, counseling and 
other support services was required. Within an hour of the bombings, Boston OEM began working 
with Boston Centers for Youth and Families (BCYF) to open the Castle at Park Plaza (Castle) as 
a reunification center. By 6:00 p.m., the Castle was operational with support from OEM, BCYF, 
American Red Cross, Boston Public Health Commission (BPHC), BPD, MEMA, and MANG, 
and offered counseling, food and water, help for the runners, family reunification services, and 
overnight shelter accommodations.36 Media access to the Castle was restricted to ensure privacy 
for impacted individuals and survivors seeking services at this center. The Castle remained open 
through 9:00 p.m. on Tuesday, April 16, after which time the nonprofit organization City Year, 
located on Columbus Avenue several blocks from the Castle, became the new location for pro-
viding counseling and support services.  
Substantial challenges existed with reuniting runners with their personal belongings. Some run-
ners had been lodging at hotels that were now located within the secure crime scene perimeter, 
and could not access their belongings contained in those hotel rooms. These individuals were 
able to obtain assistance at the Castle, where OEM staff coordinated with BPD and the FBI to 
provide escorted access to these rooms. 
An even more complicated issue was reuniting runners with their BAA-issued “yellow bags.” On 
the morning of Marathon Day, the majority of runners load onto buses in Boston and ride out to 
Hopkinton, the location of the Start Line. To assist runners with maintaining their belongings, 
the BAA issues runners a bag that is tagged with their race number. Runners can place their per-
sonal belongings that they do not wish to carry along the course into the bag, and check the bag 
in Hopkinton at the Athletes Village. Bags are then transported back by bus to the area near the 
Finish Line, where they are staged until picked up by runners.   
When the explosions occurred, the normal process for retrieving runners’ bags was disrupted. The 
bags had to be relocated away from the impact area and swept by EOD teams to ensure there were 
not additional devices hidden in them. Boston OEM coordinated with the BAA to have the bags 
transported to Berkeley Street, where they were swept by EOD teams and then guarded by MANG 
soldiers to ensure their security. The following morning, the Boston Department of Transportation 
transported the bags to the Castle, where they were unloaded outside and organized by MANG 
soldiers to expedite the distribution process. Runners were informed by the BAA that they could 
pick up their belongings outside the Castle. With this announcement came an influx of media, 
trying to capture stories from impacted runners. After some discussion, it was determined that 
36 Eight individuals who had been displaced stayed overnight at the Castle. 
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the bags should be moved into the Castle to limit the exposure of runners to the media as they 
arrived at the Castle. 
Public Information 
Senior leadership realized the importance of communicating with the public, and decided early 
on that the public needed to hear from the City and Commonwealth leadership as often as pos-
sible. Key leaders within the UCC worked together to craft clear, concise, and unified messages. 
Over the course of the first day, four press con-
ferences were held by the members of the UCC. 
The first press conference was held at 4:47 p.m. 
It was relatively brief, with the Governor and 
Boston Police Commissioner making well-co-
ordinated and informative statements. During 
this press conference, information about the 
incident was confirmed, including: two bombs 
had been detonated near the Finish Line and 
a large number of people had been injured; all 
injured parties had been transported from the 
scene; no additional devices had been found 
in the vicinity of the Finish Line, but packages 
left behind by spectators fleeing the area were 
still being assessed; a third explosion, suspected 
to be related, had occurred at the JFK Library; 
officers had been deployed to hospitals to speak 
with families and witnesses; and all available 
city, state and federal resources were on scene or en route to the scene to assist in the response.37 
The public was asked to go home or to their hotel rooms and not congregate around the City. 
Lastly, it was announced that two hotlines had been established: the first, the Mayor of Boston’s 
24-hour constituent Help Line, could be used by individuals looking for family members; the 
second, a law enforcement tips hotline, could be used by those who may have witnessed anything 
around the time of the bombings.38 
A second press conference was held an hour later at 5:49 p.m. with the Governor, BPD Commis-
sioner and Mayor, who had arrived earlier at the UCC after checking himself out of the hospital. 
During this press conference, these officials shared updated information with the public, in-
Second Press Conference
First Press Conference
37 The explosion at the JFK Library was later determined to be an accidental fire and not related to the Marathon bombings.
38 Within minutes, the hotlines began receiving hundreds of calls. 
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cluding: information that the explosion at the JFK Library, located 5 miles from the Finish Line, 
was an incendiary device and not yet linked to the bombings; confirmation that there had been 
fatalities as a result of the bombings, although the number of fatalities was not disclosed; that a 
15-block area around the Finish Line had been secured and cordoned off; and that no suspect 
was in custody. In addition, the public was reminded that the two hotlines were operational and 
that officials were working to open a center where individuals could receive assistance in looking 
for family members or could serve as a meeting location for family members.  
A third press conference was held at approximately 6:30 p.m., which included a large number of 
elected officials and dignitaries. During this press conference, it was announced that the lead for 
the investigation was being transitioned from BPD to the FBI, and it was also confirmed that the 
fire at the JFK Library was accidental in nature and unrelated to the Marathon bombings. 
The last press conference on April 15 was held at 8:39 p.m. The Governor announced that the City 
of Boston would be open for business on April 16 but it would not be business as usual. Leaders 
at the UCC also used this opportunity to request that the public provide photographs or videos 
they may have taken before, during or after the bombings. The response from the public was 
overwhelming and ultimately proved to be invaluable in identifying the two suspects. 
Ongoing Activities
In the days following the bombings, a great deal of coordination and activity continued. Although 
the Westin Hotel stood down as the UCC on Tuesday, key agencies involved in response, inves-
tigative and recovery activities continued to operate command posts and emergency operations 
centers to coordinate these efforts.39 
The public also wanted to provide assistance and offer tributes to those who had been greatly 
impacted by the bombings. Many visited Boylston Street, creating an impromptu memorial to 
survivors and victims. In addition, to harness the generosity of so many who wanted to give, the 
Mayor of Boston and the Governor formed the One Fund, a single repository to collect donations 
for the survivors of the bombings. 
Law Enforcement 
The FBI headquartered the investigation of the incident at its Boston office, where they contin-
ued to form and deploy taskforces focused on various aspects of the investigation. BPD and MSP 
were integral components to the investigation and provided personnel to support interagency 
investigative teams to track down leads and coordinate with the FBI. 
39 The Westin Hotel continued to be used through Tuesday for press conferences.
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In addition to supporting the investigation, BPD and MSP also had to focus on providing policing 
services to an understandably shaken community. To assist supporting BPD with ongoing security 
missions and suspicious package checks, MSP established an operations center at Troop F (Logan Air-
port). In addition to MSP field commanders, the MSP operations center included representatives 
from MANG, Transit PD, United States Coast Guard (USCG) and Massachusetts Port Authority 
(Massport). MSP field commanders at the Troop F barracks operations center coordinated closely 
with BPD, FBI and Unified Command.
BPD increased its uniformed police officer presence by bringing in mutual aid resources from 
surrounding communities and law enforcement councils (LECs), including MetroLEC and 
NEMLEC. The City also worked with MEMA and the Governor to deploy MANG soldiers within 
the City of Boston to continue and expand its security mission. MANG missions included support-
ing traffic control points in the Back Bay, security support along the crime scene perimeter, and 
continuing support for the Transit PD with security and bag checks at MBTA stations throughout 
the transit system. 
BPD also coordinated EOD teams from the City of Cambridge, MSP, Transit Police and other New 
England State Police agencies to bolster their capabilities to respond to the tremendous increase 
in suspicious package calls. While no additional devices were discovered, the volume of these calls 
greatly stressed EOD capabilities as each package had to be assessed, and in some cases, disposed 
of through a controlled detonation, before they could be deemed inert.
Public Information 
Federal, state, and local leaders were cognizant of the need to periodically update the media. On 
April 16, two coordinated press conferences were held at the Westin Hotel. The first press con-
ference included the Governor, Mayor, FBI SAC, US Attorney, BPD Commissioner, MSP Super-
intendent, MEMA Director, Transit PD Chief, and other local, state and federal public safety and 
elected officials. The FBI provided an update on the status of the investigation, confirmed that 
two devices were detonated, and asked the public to provide any relevant information to the FBI 
tips hotline. The Mayor and Governor announced that the support/resource center at the Castle 
remained open for affected individuals.
A second press conference was held on Tuesday evening. The FBI once again provided an update 
on the investigation and stated that they were looking for individuals that may have been carrying 
black, heavy bags or backpacks that may have contained pressure-cooker type devices. The Mayor 
and Governor announced the details of the interfaith service and the formation of the One Fund. 
A press conference was planned for Wednesday, but it was cancelled. The Governor and Mayor 
conducted numerous interviews with local and national media outlets throughout the day to 
update the public on the status of the investigation and to reassure the public of coordination and 
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collaboration among the UCC organizations to find the individuals responsible for the bombings. 
Calls from the public continued to pour into the Mayor’s Help Line.  
Various hospitals held their own press conferences to discuss the status and condition of the 
patients they had received.  
Healthcare and Mental Health Services 
The health and medical needs, both physical and emotional, of survivors, witnesses, responders, 
and the community as a whole required substantial coordination in the days, weeks, and months 
that followed the bombings. In the short-term, hospitals focused on providing the survivors the 
medial care they required, which included in some cases, several subsequent surgeries, rehabili-
tation, and physical therapy for their primary injuries and treatment for secondary injuries such 
as hearing loss. 
Hospitals continued to grapple with patient reunification and information sharing. The hospitals 
struggled to find the balance between providing information to loved ones and interested par-
ties, such as the One Fund, and protecting the patients’ privacy. The consulates and embassies of 
numerous countries contacted hospitals, public health, and public safety agencies to determine 
if any of their citizens were among the injured. Ultimately, city and state public health officials 
worked with the hospitals to create ad hoc systems to facilitate patient information sharing, which 
included a centralized list of patients maintained by the BPHC Medical Intelligence Center (MIC). 
Boston OEM, BPHC, MDPH and the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health continued to 
assess the needs for and coordinate the provision of mental health services for survivors, their 
families, runners, volunteers, first responders, hospital staff and others in the community that 
had been impacted in some way by the events. An abundance of public and private practitioners 
wanted to help, but coordinating these assets presented substantial challenges. There was uncer-
tainty about who was deploying which groups, and what each agency’s responsibilities were. It 
was eventually decided that the MIC would handle all requests and associated logistics for these 
services, and a central email address and phone number was designated to streamline coordination 
of requests and offers for providing services. Although it took two days to effectively streamline 
the process for coordinating in-coming mental health personnel and services, these services were 
made available very quickly. Mental health services were available to the general public, and in-
formation on where to obtain these services was provided through the Mayor’s Help Line. One 
resource that was especially helpful during the early days was the federal Mental Health Team 
that arrived through coordination with the regional United States Department of Health and 
Human Services staff. Since this resource arrived as a team, they were able to deploy quickly to 
meet initial requests for mental health assistance while allowing state and local entities the time 
needed to develop a more coordinated process.
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The Castle
The Castle remained operational through Tuesday evening, serving an estimated 1,500 individuals 
over the course of its operations. OEM worked with the BAA to limit media access to the Castle 
to ensure the privacy of individuals seeking services or obtaining their belongings. The staff sup-
porting Castle operations also helped resolve other issues for the runners, such as providing a 
van shuttle service to transport runners to their 
hotels, the airport and to Hopkinton (the Mar-
athon Start), where some had left rental cars. 
To provide an opportunity for runners who 
were still on the course when the explosions 
occurred and the race was stopped to “finish” 
their Marathon, the BAA created a ceremonial 
Finish Line where runners could “finish” the 
Marathon and collect their medal when they 
arrived at the Castle to gather their belongings. 
In spite of the anger and grief that many felt, 
this act of “finishing” the Marathon created a 
positive environment for many. 
By the end of the day on Tuesday, about 90 
percent of the runners’ bags were reunited with 
their owners. When the Castle stood down its 
operations, the unclaimed bags were trans-
ferred to BAA headquarters. 
Once the Castle operation stood down, services were transferred to the City Year Program 
headquarters in Boston. City Year opened one of its function rooms for counseling services, and 
organized other services, including bringing in a nurse. BCYF worked with the Mayor’s press 
office to announce this change, posted notice at the Castle, and distributed information through 
social media and on the websites of City departments and agencies.  
Family Assistance Center
By Wednesday, April 17, the City of Boston opened a Family Assistance Center (FAC) exclusively 
for survivors who required medical care. This FAC was created to streamline access to services 
and programs for the survivors, their families, and the families of the three victims who lost 
their lives, and was staffed by the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office, Massachusetts Office 
of Victim Assistance (MOVA), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, American Red 
Cross, Boston OEM, and BPHC. The FAC assisted the families in communicating with hospitals, 
A runner receives a Finisher’s Medal.
Runners’ bags at the Castle
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offered mental health services, and researched and provided information on survivor services, 
including compensation, benefit information, and legal services. Because there was a concerted 
effort not to publicize the location of the FAC to limit press access to survivors and their families, 
officials made targeted outreach to impacted individuals and families to make the existence of 
the FAC and its services known to them. The FAC stood down its operations on April 26, and its 
services were relocated to the BPHC’s main office on Massachusetts Avenue. 
Memorial Service and Presidential Visit 
Following the bombings on Monday, the Governor proposed that an interfaith memorial service 
be held to provide the community an opportunity to grieve together and begin the healing process. 
That service was planned for Thursday, April 18 at 11:00 a.m. at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in 
Boston. The interfaith service 
would include a number of 
religious and public dignitar-
ies as speakers. 
On Tuesday, April 16, city and 
state officials were notified 
that the President and First 
Lady would attend the inter-
faith service being planned for 
Thursday. This event required 
a substantial planning effort 
for the City, in particular for BPD and Boston OEM, whose resources were already strained. The 
need for security planning was compounded, as the suspects were still at large. 
On Thursday, Boston OEM activated the Boston EOC to serve as the primary operations center for 
the interfaith service. At 11:00 a.m., the President arrived at the Cathedral in Boston. The Gover-
nor and Mayor spoke at the service, sharing thoughts and prayers for the survivors, and reiterating 
the importance of healing, carrying on, and helping each other get through this difficult time. 
The President echoed this message and talked about the resilience of the City of Boston and the 
members of the community. After the service, the President and First Lady met for several hours 
with survivors and their families at Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital. They departed Boston at approximately 4:00 p.m.
Interfaith Memorial Service
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Recovery Planning 
On Tuesday, April 16, the Governor requested a Presidential Emergency Declaration to activate 
a variety of federal public assistance programs to assist in the recovery effort. The Emergency 
Declaration was granted on Wednesday.  
At 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, April 17, the Mayor held a Cabinet meeting at Brigham and Women’s 
Hospital to set recovery priorities for the City and discuss the upcoming Presidential Visit. The 
Mayor was eager to get the impacted area back to normal as soon as possible. During the course 
of the Cabinet meeting, the Mayor asked the OEM Director to take the lead in developing and 
executing a plan for reopening the Boylston Street area for residents, businesses and the general 
public as quickly as possible after the FBI completed its investigation activities and released the 
area back to the City.  
On Thursday, the Boston EOC coordinated activities in support of the President and First Lady’s 
visit. As soon as the visit concluded, OEM conducted a planning meeting at the EOC with BPD, 
BFD, Boston EMS, BPHC, Inspectional Services Division, Mayor’s Office of Neighborhood Ser-
vices, Boston Transportation Department, Department of Neighborhood Development (DND), 
Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston Parks and Recreation Department, Public Works 
Department, the Office of Constituent Services, ARC, the BAA, and Interstate Rental. Together, 
these agencies planned for several hours, and by the next day the City had developed a plan for 
the recovery and restoration of Boylston Street.  
The Recovery Plan for Boylston Street had three primary objectives: 
• Removing debris, cleaning streets and sidewalks, and disassembling the bleachers and 
overhead infrastructure near the Finish Line; 
• Providing access to residents and business owners prior to the general public. Businesses 
needed to clean up and restock, and had to pass several inspections before obtaining 
occupancy permits and officially reopening; and
• Providing an opportunity for survivors and family members of the deceased to return to the 
incident sites, if they wished, before Boylston Street was reopened to the general public. 
This plan would later be executed by the City.
As part of their operations, the FBI wanted access inside the commercial buildings and apart-
ments within the crime scene perimeter to ensure there were no other unexploded devices. DND, 
working in cooperation with OEM and the Mayor’s Help Line, identified the owners and renters 
of these properties and developed a list of them. These individuals were given information about 
the status of the crime scene and the FBI’s request. They were asked to provide a key to their office 
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or residence, which was secured and later used by police and a representative from the City to 
ensure the premises were safe.
Business Assistance 
As a core component of the City’s recovery planning, DND took the lead in developing an 
assistance plan for businesses. DND worked closely with the Office of Constituent Engagement/
Mayor’s Help Line and OEM to identify all businesses in the affected area, and reached out to the 
owners with information about status of the area and the plan for reopening the area, including 
actions businesses would be required to take as part of the re-entry process such as obtaining 
required health and occupancy permits. 
MEMA worked to quickly obtain a Small Business Administration (SBA) Economic Injury 
Disaster Loan (EIDL) declaration for impacted businesses. The City opened a Business Assis-
tance Center, where the SBA was co-located, to provide information on available resources for 
businesses and assist them with navigating the insurance claim process and obtaining EIDL 
loans. In addition, DND sought out options for small business loans that some merchants need-
ed to cover losses during the period of forced closure, negotiating with banks on their behalf. 
DND also answered questions about insurance coverage and served as ombudsman with the 
SBA on its EIDL program. 
Apprehension of Suspects
The Photos 
Through the investigative process, law enforcement officials obtained photos from surveillance 
cameras that captured digital images of the suspects. On Thursday, the FBI, US Attorney’s office, 
and other law enforcement personnel deliberated about whether to release the photos to the public, 
weighing concerns about the suspects fleeing and the general safety of the public. A decision was 
made to release the photos, and a 5:20 p.m. press conference with the FBI, BPD, MSP, ATF, US 
Attorney and Transit PD was held at the Sheraton Boston to show the images to the public and 
request their assistance in identifying the suspects. 
The FBI SAC made a statement and showed surveillance footage of two males, one with a black 
baseball cap (Suspect 1) and one with a white baseball cap (Suspect 2), carrying heavy backpacks 
down Boylston Street near the intersection of Gloucester Street, and walking in the direction of the 
Finish Line shortly before the explosions. The FBI also displayed fairly clear, static images of the 
suspects showing their faces. The FBI SAC stated that Suspect 2 had been seen placing a backpack 
down on the ground in front of the Forum restaurant (Site 2) moments before the explosions. 
The FBI requested the public, and in particular witnesses who were near the bombing locations, 
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to contact the FBI through the FBI tips hotline or through a website that had been established 
for the investigation. The FBI SAC cautioned that the public must consider these individuals as 
armed and dangerous, must not approach them, and must contact law enforcement individuals 
should they be identified or seen. 
Immediately after the press conference, the FBI’s tip hotline was inundated with calls from peo-
ple who thought they could identify the suspects or had information about their location. This 
press conference also generated an increase in suspicious activity and suspicious packages calls 
to BPD and MSP. 
Events Precipitating the Manhunt
At 10:28 p.m. on Thursday, April 18, Cambridge 
PD responded to an armed robbery at a conve-
nience store located at 750 Massachusetts Ave-
nue. Nearby, on the campus of the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (MIT), MIT Police 
Department (MIT PD) Officer Sean Collier was 
on duty in his cruiser parked between the Koch 
Institute Building and the Stata Center Building 
facing out toward Vassar Street. Around this 
time, it is believed that an individual or individ-
uals approached Officer Collier from the rear of 
the vehicle and fatally shot him in his vehicle in 
an attempt to take his weapon. Initially, it was 
thought that the robbery was related to the ho-
micide of Officer Collier. It was later determined 
that the two were unrelated.
At 10:31 p.m., MIT PD put out a broadcast over 
the BAPERN radio network that one of their 
officers had been fatally shot on their campus in 
Cambridge. Cambridge PD and MSP responded 
to the scene.40 At 11:16 p.m., Cambridge PD 
issued a “Be On the Look Out” (BOLO) for the 
armed robbery suspect.41 Transit PD received 
40 The Middlesex County District Attorney has jurisdiction over the investigation of homicides in Cambridge. The District 
Attorney exercises this jurisdiction through a State Police Homicide Unit assigned to its office.  
41 An official BOLO report is shared across the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services system. The information must be 
entered into the system, which can take some time to complete. 
FBI Unveils Images
Photos of Suspect #1: “Black Hat”
Photos of Suspect #2: “White Hat”
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information that the perpetrator may have entered the Red Line, and additional Transit PD 
officers were dispatched to Red Line stations and began searching the stations and trains. 
At 11:20 p.m., a Mercedes sport utility vehicle (SUV) was carjacked in Allston, a neighborhood 
within Boston. The perpetrators of the carjacking drove around for some time with the owner of 
the vehicle held captive in the car before stopping at a gas station on Memorial Drive in Cambridge. 
With the vehicle stopped, the victim seized this moment to flee the vehicle and run to across the 
street to another gas station located at 820 Memorial Drive. At 12:19 a.m. on Friday, April 19, Cam-
bridge PD received a 911 call from the victim of the SUV carjacking and responded to the scene. 
At 12:26 a.m., Cambridge PD issued a second BOLO describing the SUV and the two male perpe-
trators of the carjacking, noting that the suspects were armed with guns. In addition, a BAPERN 
broadcast was issued with details of the suspects. Cambridge PD began to coordinate with the 
vehicle manufacturer to activate the vehicle’s GPS anti-theft tracking system.
Approximately 20 minutes into the police interview with the victim, Cambridge PD learned 
that the victim had reportedly overheard the carjackers claim to be associated with the Mara-
thon bombings, and were discussing the possibility of going to another major city to conduct 
a similar crime.42 
Watertown Firefight
The Watertown Police Department (Watertown PD) overnight shift is staffed to manage a tradi-
tionally low call volume. At 11:45 p.m. on April 18, roll call was conducted for the overnight shift 
which included a briefing on the murder of MIT Officer Sean Collier. A Lieutenant, a Sergeant, 
and four patrol officers were on duty for this overnight shift. 
On Friday, April 19 at 12:41 a.m., Cambridge PD contacted Watertown PD to inform them that 
the tracking system of the carjacked SUV indicated that the vehicle was located near 81 Dexter 
Avenue in Watertown. At this time the responding officers were unaware that the perpetrators 
of the carjacking were potentially associated with the Marathon bombings. The Watertown PD 
dispatch unit relayed the information over the radio and advised officers that the response should 
be treated as a felony stop. 
A patrol officer in the area responded to the call, driving down Dexter Avenue. He drove past the 
SUV, and identified it as the vehicle in question, noting it was occupied by one individual at the 
time. The responding officer put out a radio transmission stating that he had the SUV in sight. 
The on-duty Sergeant radioed the officer, advising him that he was nearby, and instructed the 
officer to wait for his arrival before approaching the vehicle.
 42 There was a significant language barrier between the responding officers and the victim.
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In the meantime, the SUV continued to drive down Dexter Avenue and turned left onto Laurel 
Street, with a Honda sedan occupied by another individual driving immediately behind the SUV. 
The responding officer trailed the vehicles without his blue lights on to keep them in his line of sight. 
As the officer turned onto Laurel Street to follow the SUV, the first suspect emerged from the 
SUV and began firing his weapon at the cruiser while walking toward it. The Sergeant drove 
around the corner seconds later, and also took fire from the first suspect. Shots struck both offi-
cers’ police cruisers, narrowly missing the two officers. The officers unsuccessfully attempted to 
remove their patrol rifles from the secure mounts in their vehicles, and returned fire with their 
handguns. The second suspect emerged from the Honda and began throwing homemade bombs 
at both police officers. Two pipe bombs and a large pressure-cooker bomb exploded; two more 
pipe bombs landed in the street nearby but did not explode. The officers radioed that shots had 
been fired, prompting the Watertown PD dispatch to request assistance from surrounding police 
departments and to stage a Watertown Fire Department ambulance at a nearby convenience store.
A firefight between Watertown PD and the suspects ensued. While the shootout continued, 
additional officers from Watertown PD, as well as officers from BPD, Cambridge PD, Transit PD, 
MSP and nearby communities responded to the scene.43 Over 200 rounds were fired between the 
two sides. 
During the firefight, the first suspect was shot as he stood outside the SUV. When he ran out 
of ammunition, he charged at a Watertown PD officer who was approaching the suspects from 
behind a residence. This officer tackled the suspect to the ground, and a second Watertown PD 
officer joined in to assist the officer and attempt to get the suspect in handcuffs. 
The second suspect entered the SUV and drove directly toward the officers struggling with the 
first suspect on the ground. The officers were barely able to roll out of the way of the oncoming 
vehicle; however, the first suspect was not able to get out of the way and was struck and dragged 
a short distance as the vehicle continued driving down the street. The first suspect was taken 
into custody and transported by Boston EMS ambulance to Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital.44 
The second suspect ultimately drove out of the area, while being shot at by the numerous law 
enforcement officers lining the streets. The multitude of police vehicles parked in the roadway 
delayed the pursuit of the second suspect, and he was able to make it approximately one-half mile 
down the road before abandoning the vehicle on Spruce Street and fleeing on foot. 
Transit PD Officer Richard Donohue, Jr. was shot and critically wounded during the firefight. 
Officers on the scene tended to Officer Donohue to slow the bleeding with pressure and a tourniquet. 
43 Many had already been en route from the Officer Collier murder scene in Cambridge. 
44 By protocol, Boston EMS units respond along with BPD SWAT units whenever they are deployed. In this case, Boston EMS had 
sent both a basic and advanced life support ambulance and shift commander to the Watertown incident, and they were 
staged a safe distance away during the shootout.  
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At 12:51 a.m., Officer Donohue was loaded into the Watertown Fire ambulance for transport, but 
egress from the area was challenging given the numerous police vehicles parked in the vicinity and 
blocking street access. To circumvent the congestion made by the multitude of police vehicles and 
allow for the two paramedics to remain in the rear of the ambulance with the patient, a Watertown 
PD officer drove the ambulance to Mount Auburn Hospital, the nearest medical facility. Mount 
Auburn Hospital was approximately two miles away from the shooting scene, but did not have a 
trauma center. Nevertheless, the EMTs aiding Officer Donohue believed he would not survive a 
longer ride to a facility with a trauma center, and directed that he be brought to Mount Auburn. 
Officer Donohue had to be resuscitated upon arrival at the hospital, but the medical team at Mount 
Auburn was able to save his life. 
At 12:51 a.m., immediately after the gunfight, an unmarked MSP black pickup truck was incorrectly 
reported as stolen. The truck was then spotted driving on Adams Street, a few blocks from the scene 
of the firefight, with two occupants. The moving vehicle with unidentified occupants was fired upon 
by an officer. Upon further inspection, it was determined that the occupants of the vehicle were a 
BPD officer and MSP trooper in plain clothes, who were unhurt.
At 12:56 a.m., Dexter Avenue, Laurel Street, and adjacent Cypress Street in Watertown were 
restricted as an active crime scene. EOD teams worked to clear the explosive devices that remained 
undetonated on the street. Many of the residents had been awakened by gunfire, bomb blasts and 
sirens during the firefight. Although some homes and cars were struck by bullets and shrapnel, 
none of the residents in the neighborhood where the firefight took place were injured. 
The Watertown PD dispatch center successfully handled the surge of more than 500 calls to 911.45 
They brought in two extra dispatchers, for a total of four, and ensured that calls were answered 
expeditiously, with few calls rolling over to overflow handling. Newton Police provided mutual 
aid personnel to Watertown to handle extra call volume not directly related to the search for the 
suspects. This assistance allowed Watertown PD to focus on searching for the suspect at large and 
managing the influx of mutual aid resources.
At 1:06 a.m., the first suspect was pronounced dead at the hospital after unsuccessful attempts to 
resuscitate him were made. Using fingerprints taken at the hospital, the suspect was identified as 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev. His records contained a picture of his younger brother, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, 
which appeared to match the photo of Marathon bombing “Suspect 2” that had been distributed 
by the FBI.
45 The Watertown dispatch center’s normal volume is approximately thirty calls per day.
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Search for “Suspect 2”
Around 1:00 a.m., BPD notified the Mayor of Boston about the events unfolding in Water-
town, and the MEMA Director notified the Governor and the Secretary of EOPSS. By 1:12 a.m., 
Watertown PD designated the Arsenal Mall in Watertown as a staging area and location for a com-
mand post. Command post trailers from six public safety agencies were subsequently set up there. Key 
leaders from Watertown PD, BPD, Cambridge 
PD, Transit PD, MSP, MANG, MEMA and the 
FBI established an initial Unified Command 
(UC). The UC later expanded to include the 
Mayor, the Governor and the Secretary of EOPSS. 
Given the suspect at large had escaped on foot, 
law enforcement officials believed there was a 
strong likelihood he remained in the area. Law 
enforcement cordoned off a 20-block area of 
Watertown and maintained that perimeter with 
the hope of containing the suspect. At 1:57 a.m., 
Watertown PD sent a WatertownALERT mes-
sage to residents asking them to remain in their 
homes because of an active law enforcement 
incident, and to report any suspicious activity.46 
Around 2:30 a.m., the UC ordered a house-to-
house grid search be conducted in the 20-block 
secured area to attempt to locate the second sus-
pect. MSP and BPD supervisors began to devise 
a tactical plan to conduct these searches. By 5:00 
a.m., MANG deployed 21 armored High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMVEEs) and 
120 armed military police to help establish an 
outer security perimeter in Watertown and to 
assist in house-to-house searches. 
By 5:30 a.m., tactical plans for the grid search were 
finalized and a systematic door-to-door search for 
the suspect at large began. A Tactical Operation 
Center (TOC) was stood up at the command post 
46 WatertownALERT is the Town’s public emergency notification system that provides emergency alerts via phone, text and 
email to individuals who opt to participate in the system. Publicly registered phone numbers of residents and businesses are 
automatically included in the system.
Members of Unified Command at the  
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to coordinate the tactical grid search. Using sectional maps to organize the searches, the area to be searched 
was divided into five sectors and SWAT teams, comprised of members from Watertown PD, BPD, MSP, 
Cambridge PD, Brookline PD, NEMLEC, and MetroLEC, and augmented with FBI agents and MANG 
soldiers, were assigned to each sector.  Each team operated under its own command structure. 
While the tactical grid search plans were being 
developed, the UC began having discussions 
about how to best ensure the safety of the public 
while law enforcement officials searched for 
the suspect. Because the suspect was on foot, 
there was potential he would seek access to the 
transit system, which, because the suspect was 
considered armed and very dangerous, could 
have placed the ridership of the transit system 
at great risk. Discussions initially focused on 
closing MBTA subway stations and suspending 
bus routes in the immediate area. However, the 
MBTA advised the UC that a targeted suspen-
sion of subway and bus services was not feasible. 
This led the UC to the conclusion that the safety 
of the public required the immediate suspension 
of all public transportation services. The UC 
also recognized that to maintain the safety of 
the public, all residents in Watertown and sur-
rounding communities should remain at home 
and indoors, and that a shelter-in-place request 
would be required. 
At 5:15 a.m., the UC conducted a conference 
call with the Governor and Mayor of Boston 
to recommend the following protective ac-
tions: suspension of all MBTA service and the 
sheltering-in-place of Watertown, Newton, 
Waltham, Belmont, Cambridge and the Allston-Brighton neighborhood of Boston. After some 
discussion, the recommendations of the UC were accepted and authorized. 
The UC was cognizant of the importance of communicating these protective action decisions prior 
to peak commuting times. At 5:45 a.m., a press conference was held with the MSP Superintendent, 
Watertown PD Chief, BPD Commissioner, MEMA Director, Transit PD Chief, and other public 
SWAT Team in Watertown
First Press Conference Announcing the Shelter-in-Place 
Request and Suspension of the Transit System
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safety officials to announce that all MBTA transit system service had been suspended, and to request that 
residents and businesses in Watertown, Newton, Waltham, Belmont, Cambridge and the Allston- 
Brighton neighborhood of Boston shelter-in-place by remaining indoors and not congregating outside. 
Shortly thereafter, the City of Boston issued an ALERTBoston message to the residents of Boston, 
and MEMA issued an emergency notification message through a smartphone application to the 
general public, as well as a HHAN alert to the public safety community regarding the manhunt 
in Watertown, the MBTA closure, and the shelter-in-place request.47  
At 6:30 a.m., MDPH activated its DOC in 
anticipation of support needs for the shelter-
in-place. At 6:37 a.m., MDPH issued a HHAN 
message to hospitals to inform them that 
a shelter-in-place request was in effect and 
that the MBTA transit system had ceased 
operations. 
Around 7:15 a.m., the UC received a report 
that a suspicious person carrying a package 
had been picked up in Watertown by a taxi. The driver of the taxi was a person whose name ap-
peared to be on the federal Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) Terrorist Watch List. The destination 
of the taxi was reported to be South Station, a transit station serviced by both MBTA and Amtrak. 
Understandably, this caused great concern for the UC. By 7:49 a.m., Transit PD had locked down 
and secured all entrances and exits to passenger traffic at South Station, but an Amtrak train 
departed South Station heading for New York City at 5:15 a.m., prior to the lockdown.
The UC agreed to extend the shelter-in-place request to all of Boston. At a 7:59 a.m. press confer-
ence, the Governor, Watertown PD Chief, BPD Commissioner, MSP Superintendent and other 
public safety officials announced the expansion of the shelter-in-place request to include all of the 
City of Boston. Officials also used this press conference as an opportunity to provide information 
on the search for the suspect, the homicide of the MIT police officer, and the status of the injured 
Transit PD officer. The continued suspension of MBTA services was also reaffirmed. 
The shelter-in-place request had cascading effects on area hospitals. Many of the hospitals did 
not know how to interpret the request and many treated it as a lockdown order for their facili-
ties. Many had questions about whether they could release their staff at the end of their shifts, 
whether staff expected to come on shift would be permitted to travel to work, and whether they 
47 ALERTBoston is the City’s public emergency notification system that provides emergency alerts via phone, text and email to 
individuals who opt to participate in the system. MEMA used a free smartphone application, now known as Massachusetts Alerts, 
as a means of sending emergency notifications and information to individuals who have downloaded the application.
Members of Unified Command meet with  
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could discharge patients. Secondarily, they had concerns about the impacts on delivery of some 
of their essential supplies, especially linens. Typically, these items are not stocked in hospitals and 
are delivered on a “just in time” basis.
When hospitals initially reached out to local police departments for guidance, they received con-
flicting information. To help reduce confusion about what the shelter-in-place request meant for 
healthcare employees, MDPH coordinated with BPHC and law enforcement to address inquiries 
received from hospitals and other healthcare venues. Clarifying messages were subsequently issued 
through the HHAN, the MDPH Statewide Hospital Listserv, MEMA’s emergency notification 
smartphone application and an email to all City employees.   
At 8:15 a.m., all taxi service in Boston was suspended based upon the terrorist alert, investigative 
leads and the reported information on the taxi driver and passenger allegedly en route to South 
Station. At 8:36 a.m., the Amtrak train that departed South Station at 5:15 a.m. was stopped in 
Norwalk, Connecticut and searched for the taxi suspect. By 9:00 a.m., the Metropolitan Police De-
partment and Norwalk Police Department cleared the train after no suspect was found on board. 
The taxi driver was subsequently found not to be a person of interest and, in fact, was not listed on 
the JTTF Terrorism Watch List; the driver’s name had been misspelled as it was entered into the 
database inquiry, and subsequently had been confused with that of another individual who was in 
fact on the list. 
As the hours went by, an overwhelming number of law enforcement officers arrived in Water-
town from across Massachusetts, other New England states, and New York. Many of these law 
enforcement officers had self-deployed to the area once it became widely known that a Marathon 
bombings suspect was at large in Watertown. In many cases, their supervisors were not aware 
they had responded to Watertown. Law enforcement officials from a wide array of local, state and 
federal agencies arrived, including many federal organizations that typically do not respond to 
local incidents. Over the course of the day, more than 2,500 officers from 116 federal, state, and 
local law enforcement agencies arrived at the staging area. Most had no specific assignments and 
remained at the staging area for much of the day.
At both 1:30 a.m. and 6:30 a.m., Watertown issued a radio broadcast to all responding officers 
requesting them to stage at the parking lot of the Arsenal Mall. As large numbers of self-deployed 
officers continued to arrive, the ability to manage them became increasingly difficult. The UC, 
which was very much focused on the activities associated with the search for the suspect and the 
protective measures for the public, did not formally designate a lead for managing these mutual 
aid assets. Incoming personnel were not provided briefings on the situation or the command 
structure of the response operation. In addition, there was no systematic way to track incoming 
officers, provide assignments, and/or deny access to unnecessary mutual aid support. This resulted 
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in confusion about who had overall authority in the field as ongoing law enforcement activities 
were conducted. Given this lack of oversight, many of the officers staged in the area self-deployed 
to calls based on radio transmissions regarding possible locations of the suspect. This self-deploy-
ment compromised officer safety.
From a logistics perspective, the thousands of 
officers present in Watertown for the duration 
of the operation required care and feeding. 
MEMA and the Department of Fire Services 
coordinated with nonprofit organizations, such 
as American Red Cross and Salvation Army, 
and private sector partners such as Target and 
Home Depot, to organize basic services for 
these individuals, including food, water, por-
table toilets, and other supplies.
As the search went on, a number of leads were 
identified, including one at the University of 
Massachusetts in Dartmouth, where the sus-
pect attended school. To quickly investigate this 
lead, the FBI needed helicopters to fly agents, 
BPD officers and MSP SWAT teams. MANG 
quickly coordinated the deployment of three 
Blackhawk helicopters to fly these assets to 
Dartmouth. 
Although the helicopters were flown by combat-trained pilots who were experienced in flying 
into tight spaces under combat conditions, finding a landing zone in Watertown large enough to 
safely put down the helicopter was challenging. MANG quickly searched for a landing zone near 
the Arsenal Mall parking lot where the bulk of the out-of-town police had staged, and identified 
an area that was just large enough for a helicopter to land. Several vehicles had to be towed from 
this area to make sufficient space available to land the helicopters. 
The helicopters arrived around 2:00 p.m. MANG personnel on the ground had to guide the 
helicopters into the landing zone via hand signals. SWAT teams and FBI agents loaded onto the 
helicopters within 20 seconds of landing to allow the helicopter to quickly get off the ground. 
Although SWAT teams had not trained for this situation, the airlift went well. However, in the haste 
to land the helicopters, the Watertown Fire Department was not notified in advance and therefore 
was not able to stage fire equipment nearby in the event of an accident. 
Officers at the Staging Area
Blackhawks Near Staging Area
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A third press conference was held at 12:35 p.m. to provide an update on the status of the on-
going search. The press conference included the Governor, Mayor of Boston, MSP Superin-
tendent, Watertown PD Chief, BPD Commissioner, Transit PD Chief, MEMA Director, and 
other public safety officials. Officials reiterated that the shelter-in-place request remained in 
place and reminded individuals to remain indoors. Officials provided an update on the grid 
search, indicating that it was 60–70 percent complete, but that the suspect remained at large. 
In addition to this press conference, later in the afternoon, officials pushed out messages to 
the public safety community and the public to provide clarifying information and guidance 
on the shelter-in-place request, which included statements that individuals were allowed to 
travel home from work. In addition, various agencies and organizations provided information 
through social media platforms. This information was not always coordinated and at times led to 
erroneous and conflicting messages about the status of the search being provided to the public.
As the majority of door-to-door searches were completed, law enforcement officials came to be-
lieve that there was a possibility the suspect had escaped the area. At 4:30 p.m., the UC began to 
contemplate the continued need for the shelter-in-place request. Residents had been confined to 
their homes for nearly 12 hours, and businesses were eager to get back to work. Given the proba-
bility that the suspect had fled the area, officials 
did not wish to continue the shelter-in-place 
request unnecessarily and restored service to 
the transit system at 5:30 p.m.
The Governor, Mayor of Boston, MSP Superin-
tendent, Watertown PD Chief, BPD Commis-
sioner, MEMA Director, Transit PD Chief, FBI 
SAC, US Attorney, and other public safety and 
elected officials held a press conference at 6:03 
p.m. to provide an update on the search, and inform the public that the shelter-in-place request 
had been lifted. After thanking the public for graciously complying with the shelter-in-place 
request, officials reminded them to remain vigilant as a dangerous individual remained at large, 
and to report any suspicious activity to law enforcement. 
Apprehension of “Suspect 2”
At 6:42 p.m., shortly after the shelter-in-place request was lifted, Watertown PD received a 911 
call from a resident living at 67 Franklin Street. The resident reported that when the shelter-in-
place request was lifted, he went to check a loose strap hanging from his winterized boat parked 
in his backyard. When he unzipped the tarp, he immediately observed blood, and—a moment 
later—saw a body laying in the boat. He immediately returned to his house and dialed 911. 
Third Press Conference in Watertown
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Officers immediately responded to the home, which was located in a residential neighborhood. 
Three Watertown PD officers and three BPD officers were first on scene, and not knowing whether 
the suspect was armed or still had explosives, requested support from tactical and EOD units.  
Once radio traffic about the location of the suspect was made, a large number of law enforcement 
officers self-deployed to the scene. Within moments, more than 100 officers had gathered in front 
of and behind the home. It was unclear who was responsible for the inner and outer perimeters.
At 6:54 p.m., an officer, without appropriate authority, fired his weapon in response to perceived 
movement in the boat and concern the suspect had a weapon. After this first shot, many other 
officers on scene opened fire at the boat, assuming they were being fired upon by the suspect. 
Weapons continued to be fired for several seconds even while on scene supervisors ordered a 
ceasefire. After the shooting stopped, the suspect did not emerge. At 7:05 p.m., movement was 
observed in the boat.
At 7:43 p.m., with no additional movement in the boat from the suspect, officials devised a plan 
to coerce the suspect from the boat by deploying flashbangs. After placing Watertown FD on 
standby to respond to any potential related fires, law enforcement officers deployed flashbangs at 
7:46 p.m., but were unsuccessful in driving the suspect from the boat. Using an MSP helicopter 
with infrared camera technology, police officials were able to confirm that the suspect was still 
alive and moving within the boat.
At 8:02 p.m., the UC deployed an FBI Hostage Response Team to communicate with the suspect in an 
effort to persuade him to surrender, and an MSP Special Tactical Operations (STOP) Team Bearcat 
armored vehicle pulled back the tarp covering the boat with a remote arm. The FBI Hostage Response 
Team then communicated with the suspect, but the suspect did not immediately surrender.
At 8:41 p.m., the suspect emerged from the 
boat and officers rushed in to make the arrest. 
The suspect, who had sustained injuries during 
his various encounters with law enforcement, 
was transported by ambulance under heavy 
guard to Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. 
A final on scene press conference was held at 
9:32 p.m. with the Governor, Mayor of Boston, 
MSP Superintendent, BPD Commissioner, 
Watertown PD Chief, Transit PD Chief, US 
Attorney, FBI SAC, ATF SAC, and other public 
safety and elected officials to announce that the 
Final Press Conference in Watertown Announcing 
Apprehension of the Suspect
After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings 65
second suspect had been apprehended and taken into custody. An impromptu celebration ensued 
with Watertown residents coming out of their houses to thank officers.
The areas around Franklin Street, where the boat was located, and Laurel Street, where the fire-
fight occurred, remained closed as crime scenes until the FBI and MSP could complete their 
investigative and evidence collection activities several days later. 
Memorial for MIT Officer Sean Collier
After consultation with the MIT Police Chief, the Cambridge Police Commissioner instructed his 
police department to assist with police operations at MIT to provide MIT PD a chance to recov-
er from the shock of having one of their officers killed. Cambridge PD provided this assistance 
beginning the last half shift on Friday, April 19 until Friday, April 26.
Cambridge PD assisted MIT PD Police in setting up a planning team for the massive April 24 
memorial service for MIT PD Officer Sean Collier. Although one suspect was dead and another 
in custody, it was not yet known whether there were additional accomplices at large, and therefore 
security for the memorial service was very tight. The planning team carefully coordinated with 
numerous public safety partners, including MSP, FBI, US Secret Service, and MEMA, to develop 
the public safety operational plan. 
The memorial service was held at Briggs 
Field, a large sports field in Cambridge 
on the MIT campus, under extraordinary 
security. Over 30,000 people attended the 
service to pay tribute to Officer Collier, 
including the Vice President, Governor, 
MIT students, staff and administrators, 
and thousands of law enforcement offi-
cers from across the country. 
Officer Sean Collier Memorial Service
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Recovery 
Reopening Boylston Street 
With the City’s plan to re-open Boylston Street well-developed and in place, Boston’s EOC began 
organizing and staging equipment for the restoration to ensure resources were readily available 
to deploy once the area was released to the City.  
Recognizing that the public may not fully understand the enormity of the tasks that had to be 
completed prior to re-opening Boylston Street, the Mayor and OEM publically released details of 
the recovery plan after it was finalized. On Sunday, April 21, the Mayor briefed the media at Engine 
33 on Boylston Street on the City’s plan for the restoration and re-occupation of the impacted area. 
On Monday, April 22, the City learned that the FBI wanted to have a ceremony the following 
evening, at which time a flag would be given to the Mayor signifying the formal return of the 
crime scene area to the City of Boston. Upon conclusion of the ceremony, the City would be 
permitted to allow work crews, residents, and businesses back into the area. OEM requested all 
EOC liaisons be at the EOC by 3:00 p.m. on Monday for a full activation of the EOC to ensure 
the readiness of resources and logistics to begin 
recovery activities. 
On Monday, April 22, a 5:00 p.m. ceremony 
was held to memorialize the return of Boylston 
Street to the City. At 5:22 p.m., OEM gave the 
go-ahead to Boston personnel and their part-
ners, who had been lined up at the ready, to 
enter the impacted area with their equipment 
to immediately begin executing the restoration 
plan. Efforts to take down the infrastructure 
that had been constructed for the Marathon, including VIP bleachers, the large media bridge 
over the Finish Line, and the medical tents, commenced. Activities for clearing debris from and 
sanitizing sidewalks, streets and business began, and building inspections were conducted.
On Tuesday, April 23, personnel from various city agencies activated the Hynes Convention Cen-
ter as a central coordination location for providing systematic access for residents and business 
owners to the area. Individuals registered here, and beginning at 10:00 a.m., one block in the 
impacted area was opened each hour. Depending upon the composition (residences, hotels, and 
businesses), density and population of the block being opened, the numbers of individuals seeking 
access at that hour ranged from 100 to 1,000. Each person was escorted by a city employee to his 
or her place of business or residence. By 4:00 p.m, all residents and businesses who wanted to 
Flag Ceremony Honoring the Return of  
Boylston Street to the City of Boston
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access their premises had been allowed to enter. In the evening, survivors, their families and the 
families of the deceased were provided an opportunity to privately visit the sites and participate 
in a small ceremony.  
After the private ceremony, city workers continued to prepare Boylston Street for public use. 
They worked through the night to replace street lights, continue cleanup, and ensure memorials 
had been carefully relocated to Copley Square. By 3:00 a.m., the job was completed and Boylston 
Street re-opened to the public quietly and without fanfare.  
Presidential Emergency Declaration 
On Tuesday, April 16, the Governor submitted a written request for a Presidential Emergency 
Declaration for the bombings. On Wednesday, April 17, the President issued the Emergency Dec-
laration, activating the Public Assistance (PA) Program for eligible public and private nonprofit 
organizations to allow up to 75 percent reimbursement for FEMA-approved response activities 
occurring from April 15 through April 22, 2013.48
The emergency declaration and PA Program involved complex issues. Because the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) and its associated poli-
cies and regulations were developed to address disasters resulting from natural hazards, some 
nuances to these policies and regulations were difficult to apply to manmade incidents such as 
acts of terrorism. In particular, the policies and regulations defining eligible emergency protective 
measures and requirements for mutual aid required a degree of interpretation and analysis to 
define applicability for this incident’s response activities.
It was identified early on that activities associated with the investigation of the crime were not 
eligible costs under the PA Program. Such activities included gathering and analyzing the thou-
sands of photographs and video feeds provided to and obtained by law enforcement, questioning 
witnesses and suspects, analyzing and sharing intelligence information and performing forensics 
and attribution tasks. In addition, enhanced security measures related to the visit of dignitaries 
such as the President, First Lady and Vice President were ineligible. 
Activities deemed to be eligible emergency protective measures included response to the bombings, 
securing crime scenes, response to additional threats, increased security because of heightened 
security risks not associated with enhanced security measures for dignitary visits, door-to-door 
searches, and EOC/command post operations. 
48 When the declaration was issued on April 17, 2013, the initial incident period was defined as April 15–22, 2013. MEMA 
appealed the incident period to include emergency protective measures that continued for several days after the 
apprehension of the suspects to include security for the Officer Sean Collier memorial service, as well as the enhanced 
security that continued until it could be confirmed that no other suspects were involved in the incidents. On July 19, 2013, 
FEMA approved the extension of the incident period through April 26, 2013.  
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Early on in the PA process, MEMA hosted a meeting with FEMA and key sub-applicant repre-
sentatives from Boston, Watertown, Cambridge, and MSP, to discuss mutual aid reimbursement 
requirements. Over the course of the incident period, more than 150 different municipalities 
and agencies had provided mutual aid to Boston and Watertown. The majority of mutual aid 
was provided through regional law enforcement councils (LECs); however, some direct mutual 
aid was provided to Boston by municipalities. In addition, MSP requested assistance from New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut for EOD units, K-9 teams and Search and Rescue teams 
through the New England State Police Compact. MEMA hosted this meeting to address issues 
and identify actions, such as amending mutual aid agreements or establishing post-event mutual 
aid agreements, which needed to be taken to ensure eligibility of mutual aid costs. Ultimately, 
the City of Boston took responsibility as the requesting authority for all mutual aid receiving by 
law enforcement councils, assuming the 25 percent cost share associated with these activities. 
To best be able to discuss and resolve the complex issues related to eligibility of costs associated 
with the emergency declaration and PA Program, FEMA embedded PA staff at MEMA Head-
quarters (HQ), establishing an informal Joint Field Office. To further ensure a continued open 
dialog to best address the complicated issues associated with the emergency declaration and PA 
Program, MEMA and FEMA hosted weekly coordination meetings with sub-applicants whose 
project worksheets were more complex, including Boston, Watertown, Cambridge, MSP and 
MANG. The meetings helped proactively address questions and issues related to the compiling 
of appropriate documentation to support project worksheets, and to assist sub-applicants through 
the PA process.  
While the restrictions on eligible activities seemed to be clearly defined, it was extremely difficult 
for PA sub-applicants to clearly differentiate and document which law enforcement officers were 
working on activities associated with the investigation or enhanced security for the dignitary 
visits versus activities associated with eligible emergency protective measures. In addition, certain 
specialized law enforcement equipment, such as SWAT vehicles, bearcats, and MSP helicopters, 
were not captured in FEMA’s standard equipment rates and required significant coordination 
time and resources with sub-applicants and FEMA HQ to identify reasonable reimbursement 
rates for equipment. 
Numerous hospitals, which are typically eligible private nonprofit sub-applicants, incurred signif-
icant increased operating costs for the unexpected surge in number of patients, overtime costs for 
medical surge staff, and holdover staff for the April 19, 2013 shelter-in-place request. However, 
although these increased operating costs were associated with the medical surge capacity they 
were required to implement in direct response to the bombings, costs were deemed ineligible 
under Recovery Policy 9525.4 (Emergency Medical Care).  
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Subsequently, FEMA carefully reviewed Recovery Policy 9525.4 and revised the policy in February 
2014 to deem certain emergency medical care activities eligible for reimbursement under the PA 
Program. Unfortunately, hospitals were not successful in their formal appeals to FEMA to have 
their costs deemed eligible because the provisions of the policy that were in place at the time the 
costs were incurred deemed these activities ineligible.
Months after the Presidential Emergency Declaration, MEMA learned of a Department of Justice 
(DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) reimbursement grant opportunity for law enforcement 
agencies that would cover 100% of costs associated with the law enforcement response to the Mar-
athon bombings.49 While this was good news for the eligible law enforcement agencies, the delay 
in communicating the availability of this grant opportunity caused a great deal of unnecessary 
time and resources to be spent on interpreting the PA Program policies for costs that were not 
eligible under the PA Program, but were eligible under the DOJ grant. Ultimately, law enforce-
ment agencies were able to take advantage of the DOJ grant to recoup investigative activities and 
mutual aid costs. 
49 Under the Stafford Act Public Assistance Program, applicants may receive up to 75% reimbursement for eligible costs. 
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S E C T I O N  3
 A N A LYS I S  O F  C A PA B I L I T I E S 
IN THIS SECTION OF THE REPORT, AN ANALYSIS OF the actions and capabilities of re-
sponding agencies is provided. This analysis is based upon information reviewed in documents 
and obtained during interviews with stakeholders, and identifies best practices, areas requiring 
improvement, and associated recommendations to address these areas.
The analysis is organized according to five focus areas: 
• Preparedness
• Day 1: Initial Response to Explosions
• Days 2-4: Ongoing Response to Explosions 
• Day 5: Apprehension of Suspects 
• Recovery 
Each focus area contains a discussion identifying best practices, a review of specific capabilities 
applicable to the respective focus area (such as command and control, law enforcement response, 
health and medical response, public information, etc.), and a related discussion about areas need-
ing improvement. Best practices and recommendations to address areas needing improvement are 
not listed by priority. For health and medical capabilities, the associated Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness/Hospital Preparedness Program (PHEP/HPP) Capability is identified. 
It is important to note that a great deal of progress has been made by all agencies involved in 
addressing the identified areas for improvement. Many of these improvements were adeptly 
displayed during public safety and medical operations supporting the 2014 Boston Marathon. 
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F O C U S  A R E A  1 
Preparedness 
BEST PRACTICES 
BEST PRACTICE 1.1 
Developing and Maintaining Pre-Existing Professional Relationships
The response to the Boston Marathon bombings and the incidents that ensued in the following 
days is an extraordinary example of how pre-existing relationships among local, state and fed-
eral leadership and public safety and public health partners enhance capacity and capabilities to 
respond to complex incidents in a manner that cannot tangibly be captured or addressed in a 
written plan. 
Pre-existing professional relationships among key leadership and front-line personnel, developed 
through years of planning for the Marathon and other special events, training and exercising 
together, and experience with prior large-scale incidents, proved to be critically important 
throughout the incidents that week. These relationships built the trust and rapport that allowed 
for Unified Command (UC) to come together organically and quickly and supported timely, 
effective, and collaborative decision making. These relationships also allowed leadership to call 
for resources, task missions, mobilize mutual aid, and coordinate communications effectively. It 
took just a few calls or personal conversations among senior leadership to obtain approval and 
arrange assistance for many aspects of the response. The relationships also supported the coor-
dination of providing assistance for runners, provided confidence in capabilities, and eased the 
sharing of information among city, regional, state and federal organizations. Even at the highest 
level, the relationship and coordination was evident: the Governor and Mayor knew each other 
well and were able to easily coordinate state and local resources as needed, and coordinate release 
of information at joint press conferences.
BEST PRACTICE 1.2 
Integrated Public Safety Planning Activities In Support of Marathon Day
Each year leading up to the Boston Marathon, the Boston Athletic Association (BAA), in part-
nership with the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), facilitates a robust 
planning effort with all public safety stakeholders that have a role in supporting the Marathon. 
Stakeholders include police, fire, and private and public sector emergency medical services (EMS) 
organizations from each of the eight cities and towns that host the Boston Marathon, MEMA, 
Massachusetts State Police (MSP), Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH), Mas-
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sachusetts National Guard (MANG), American Red Cross (ARC), area hospitals, and the BAA.50 
The planning meetings include a review of lessons learned from the most recent marathons and 
ensure modifications to plans and Marathon Day activities are developed to address them. 
Each of these entities provides a representative to the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) 
on Marathon Day to coordinate public safety response and provide situational awareness for 
activities along and impacting the course. These agencies are better prepared to respond to any 
incident impacting the Marathon because they plan together, have built relationships with one 
another, and know the plans well. 
BEST PRACTICE 1.3 
Implementation of a Comprehensive Medical System Supporting the Marathon 
The all-hazards medical system in place on Marathon Day ensured capabilities and capacity to 
quickly triage and transport the injured from the scene of the incident. Under the leadership of 
the BAA, an enhanced, all-hazards medical system is put in place each year for Marathon Day 
with the intent of taking pressure off of the area hospital system, allowing them to receive only 
critical patients. The 2012 Marathon took place on an unusually hot day, causing a large influx of 
patients with heat-related emergencies to the medical tents and hospitals. Although a very capa-
ble medical system was in place, this large influx greatly stressed the medical system and caused 
race, medical and public safety officials to re-evaluate the medical system for the following year’s 
Marathon. As a result, in preparation for the 2013 Marathon, these officials further enhanced 
medical protocols and capabilities to better enable the medical system to support larger numbers 
of patients on the course rather than requiring transport to hospitals. 
This medical system proved to be very advantageous in handling the surge of injured persons. This 
system was supported by the BAA, ARC, MDPH, Boston Emergency Medical Services (Boston 
EMS), Boston Public Health Commission (BPHC), hospitals, and private ambulance companies, 
and was designed to provide support to runners for all hazards—everything from cuts and blisters 
to heat injuries and cardiac arrest. This system included the activation of 26 medical tents along 
the course staffed with medical volunteers and ambulances staged nearby in support of them. 
Eight of these tents were enhanced medical tents and supported by advanced medical volunteers, 
equipment, and staged ambulances. Alpha Medical Tent was also an enhanced medical tent located 
just past the Finish Line, and was staffed with a large number of medical volunteers, as well as 
members of Boston EMS and ARC, and was supported by a number of ambulances staged nearby.51 
In addition, the hospitals take significant preparedness measures for Marathon Day. Hospital 
50 The Marathon route passes through Hopkinton, Ashland, Framingham, Natick, Wellesley, Newton, Brookline and Boston. 
51 Certified medical physicians, physician assistants, nurses, emergency medical technicians and paramedics volunteer their 
time to provide services at Marathon medical tents.
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preparedness included partial or full staffing of their Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs); 
monitoring WebEOC for information on events; conducting briefings for supervisors and ad-
mitting staff; implementing patient tracking systems; and preparing for patient surge by having 
emergency plans on hand and establishing caches of supplies, such as ice and immersion tubs 
for heat victims.52 Because Marathon Day always takes place on the Patriots’ Day holiday, hos-
pitals scheduled fewer surgeries and other medical appointments on race day, which allowed 
emergency departments, operating rooms, and other services to be ready to handle a surge. In 
addition, MDPH, under Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8 at the MACC, routinely obtained 
bed availability information from area hospitals throughout the course of the day prior to the 
bombings occurring.
Lastly, the Boston Fire Department had decontamination units ready on side streets and was 
prepared to decontaminate runners, spectators and first responders, if necessary.
PHEP Capability 1 – Community Preparedness   
HPP Capability 1 – Healthcare System Preparedness 
PHEP/HPP Capability 3 – Emergency Operations Coordination   
PHEP/HPP Capability 6 – Information Sharing 
HPP Capability 10 – Medical Surge
BEST PRACTICE 1.4 
Activation of a Multi-Agency Coordination Center in Support of Marathon Activities 
As has occurred for many years, a Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) was fully staffed 
and operational on race day to support related public safety and health activities. The MACC, 
located at the State Emergency Operations Center at MEMA Headquarters in Framingham, 
had over 80 representatives from the BAA, ARC, MEMA, MDPH, as well as state and local law 
enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management, public 
health and medical agencies and organizations with a role in supporting the Marathon. Because 
the MACC was fully staffed with multi-disciplinary partners, the MACC was able to play an in-
tegral role in coordinating with the Unified Command Center (UCC) to obtain assets in support 
of the response to the bombings and the management of runners and spectators.  
BEST PRACTICE 1.5 
Participation in Multi-Jurisdictional Exercises 
Participation in tabletop, functional and full scale exercises enhanced capabilities and proficiency 
to respond to the mass casualty incident generated by the bombings. The importance of practicing 
response and coordination roles and responsibilities, and collaboratively addressing identified 
52 WebEOC is a web-based situational awareness tool used by MEMA, MDPH and the City of Boston to exchange information 
about ongoing emergency incidents.
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issues during exercises was cited by numerous public safety and health professionals. Exercises 
such as the annual Boston Marathon tabletop exercise, the annual Urban Shield full scale exercise, 
and numerous other functional exercises that occur frequently among local, state and federal 
partners in Massachusetts, increased the skills, partnerships and understanding of the Incident 
Command System (ICS) among leadership and responders. This increase in skill sets made for a 
better prepared public safety, EMS and healthcare response system on the day of the bombings. 
Each year, local, state and federal public safety partners with a role in providing safety and se-
curity for the Boston Marathon participate in a tabletop exercise to discuss how to coordinate 
responses to a number of scenarios, ranging from severe weather to a mass casualty incident. In 
the 2012 tabletop exercise, participants exercised a scenario that included a mass casualty incident 
(collapsed grandstand) in the area of the Finish Line in Boston. Participants were able to work 
through how they would collaboratively respond to a mass casualty incident. Indeed, the initial 
response to the bombings was similar to what had been practiced during that scenario. 
Urban Shield is an annual full-scale exercise conducted in Greater Metropolitan Boston under 
the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program. This 24-hour exercise generally includes 
participants from the nine jurisdictions in the UASI, and also integrates specialized regional 
assets such as law enforcement councils.53 Prior to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, Urban 
Shield exercised response to terrorism-related mass casualty incidents. These exercises included 
the following goals and objectives: 
• Demonstrate the capability to provide management, direction, control, and coordination 
of response activities and multi-agency coordination. 
• Evaluate regional tactical capabilities related to law enforcement intervention/interdic-
tion operations.
• Evaluate the region’s ability to respond to and properly manage a Chemical, Biological,  
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) event, including the integration and  
effectiveness of localized police, fire, and Hazardous Materials (HazMat) services. 
• Assess the ability to utilize the Metro-Boston Emergency Tracking System with partici-
pating ambulatory care providers and hospitals.
• Establish proper command centers utilizing the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) and ICS principals to maintain on-site communications, direct and coordinate  
arriving regional, state, and federal first responders, and integrate regional Special Weapons 
and Tactics (SWAT) Teams and maritime units with fire, hospital and EMS personnel. 
53 The nine jurisdictions which comprise the Metropolitan Boston UASI region are Boston, Brookline, Cambridge, Chelsea, 
Everett, Quincy, Revere, Somerville and Winthrop.
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• Demonstrate the capability to successfully deter, detect, disrupt, investigate, and/or  
apprehend suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security.
• Assess the region’s ability to safely and appropriately deploy tactical personnel using a va-
riety of techniques and resources. 
• Assess the region’s ability to properly respond, assess and render safe explosive hazards.
• Test the ability of EMS personnel to provide mass casualty triage and expedient field 
treatment of multiple casualties while law enforcement tactical teams provide protection, 
resulting in intra-agency and multi-discipline integration and coordination. 
Many agencies interviewed for the After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Mar-
athon Bombings cited Urban Shield Boston as having directly contributed to their preparedness 
for dealing with the bombings, including exercising interagency communications, dealing with 
various contingencies, and promoting relationships among the key personnel who work together 
in an emergency. 
BEST PRACTICE 1.6 
Hospital Participation in Emergency Preparedness Planning and Exercises
Each hospital involved in the response to the Marathon bombings participates in coordinated 
emergency preparedness and response planning, has designated emergency managers, and main-
tains updated emergency operations plans. In addition, hospitals participate in internal drills and 
simulations as well as external inter-facility, multi-disciplinary exercises to ensure capabilities for 
mass casualty response and medical surge. This level of preparedness contributed to the hospitals’ 
ability to successfully receive and treat large numbers of critical and non-critical patients, and 
coordinate the sharing of information with healthcare, public health and public safety partners. 
BEST PRACTICE 1.7 
Formal Mutual Aid Agreements 
The initial response to the bombings required extensive coordination of mutual aid assets in-
cluding requesting and deploying Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams and increasing 
police presence throughout the City of Boston. An EOD command structure was quickly created 
to manage the coordinated multi-jurisdictional effort to assess and clear the scene, suspicious 
packages, and runners’ bags. The mutual aid was facilitated through existing relationships and 
agreements. For example, EOD assets from New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island State 
Police Departments were activated through the New England State Police Compact, which allows 
states to request and receive interstate law enforcement assets. 
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Additionally, Boston Police Department (BPD) was able to activate mutual aid from Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Transit Police Department (Transit PD), Cambridge Police 
Department (Cambridge PD), and assets from the Law Enforcement Councils (LECs) through 
pre-existing agreements. Metro Boston Law Enforcement Council (MetroLEC) and North Eastern 
Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council (NEMLEC) as recognized LECs have the authority, when 
requested, to deploy regionally-formed tactical and specialized resources such as EOD teams, 
SWAT teams, K-9 units, motorcycle units, and negotiators throughout the Commonwealth. These 
systems allowed the City of Boston to access additional EOD teams to assist with the surge of calls 
for suspicious packages. LEC units were also utilized to increase presence at identified critical 
infrastructure throughout the City. 
From an EMS perspective, existing mutual aid agreements and protocols greatly contributed to 
the speed of response from the EMS community. In the moments after the explosions, Boston 
EMS was able to contact each of their mutual aid partners through a dedicated radio channel to 
quickly summon aid to the scene.  
BEST PRACTICE 1.8 
Use of Notification Systems and Tools to Share Information
MDPH maintains the Health and Homeland Alert Network (HHAN) that is used by MDPH, 
BPHC and MEMA to issue alerts to healthcare and public safety communities, respectively. The 
HHAN is a tool that can provide rapid emergency notification through email and phone. It is 
also used by MDPH to provide information to and request information from hospitals such as 
resource availability, patient surge, and long-term needs. Use of the HHAN is well-established 
in Massachusetts, as MEMA and MDPH both use and test the system regularly. During the 
Marathon-related incidents, MDPH and the BPHC Medical Intelligence Center (MIC) used the 
HHAN as a direct communication link to provide critical information to hospitals; MEMA used 
the HHAN to provide critical information to the public safety community.
PHEP/HPP Capability 6 – Information Sharing
BEST PRACTICE 1.9 
Pre-Race Assessments of Route by Joint Hazard Assessment Teams (JHATs)  
For the 2013 Boston Marathon, monitoring for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and 
explosive (CBRNE) material was conducted by multi-disciplinary Joint Hazard Assessment Teams 
(JHATs). Each team within the City of Boston included representatives from the Boston Fire Haz-
ardous Materials Team, Boston Police EOD Team, the MANG Civil Support Team (CST), and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).54 These collaborative teams had extensive capabilities, and 
54 JHATs assigned along the route outside of the City of Boston included representatives from the MSP EOD, Massachusetts 
Department of Fire Services (DFS) HAZMAT Team, and the MANG CST. 
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conducted ongoing monitoring of contaminants in the area of the Finish Line on both mobile and 
fixed devices, and swept for explosive devices multiple times prior to the start of the race.55 After 
the bombings took place, JHATs were able to quickly determine that the bombs did not contain 
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials soon after the explosions took place.
  
AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT
IMPROVEMENT AREA 1.1 
Lack of an Integrated Public Safety Plan for Marathon Day
Although integrated, public safety planning was done well, a single, integrated, comprehensive 
operational plan for all public safety organizations was not developed for the 2013 Boston Mara-
thon. Stakeholders developed a number of individual plans focusing on specific disciplines and/
or jurisdictions, but these plans were not synchronized to form a single operational plan or to 
support the sharing of a common operating picture. The format and content of the individual 
plans were inconsistent and varied in substance and level of detail from community to community, 
and from agency to agency. In addition, although many plans identified potential locations that 
could serve as shelters for runners, none of the plans detailed how runners would be directed to 
shelters, or how they would be transported to a final destination. While there were some elements 
of capabilities to handle a course disruption, there were no specific details on how a response to 
a course disruption would be coordinated among disciplines and jurisdictions.   
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: All public safety agencies supporting the Marathon
Recommendation 1: Create an Integrated, All-Hazards Public Safety Operational  
Plan for the Boston Marathon Each Year. 
An integrated public safety operational plan that includes all disciplines and jurisdictions, 
addresses all hazards, and provides appropriate contingency planning should be developed for 
the Boston Marathon each year. 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 1.2 
Need for Enhanced Security for the Marathon Course 
Because the Boston Marathon is a large, public, family event, a majority of the course is open to 
the public. There are very few locations along the course that have hardened, secure viewing areas, 
such as the VIP seating area at the Finish Line, which was across the street from where the first 
55 The improvised explosive devices that exploded were brought to the area by the suspects just prior to detonation, and were 
not on site for an extended period of time.
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device was detonated in 2013. The areas surrounding the Finish Line in Boston and the Start Line 
in Hopkinton, which are deemed to be higher risk than other public viewing areas, are screened 
for the presence of contaminants and devices several times during the day, and are patrolled by 
law enforcement personnel. However, these areas are open to the public, are heavily populated, 
and no screening of persons or baggage is conducted.  
Given the public nature of the event, it was not difficult for the suspects to place portable impro-
vised explosive devices (IEDs) in densely populated spectator areas near the Marathon course 
with the goal of detonating them within moments of placing them. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: BPD, MSP, MANG, FBI, and local law enforcement in com-
munities along the route
Recommendation 2: Implement Strategies and Enhance Security to Limit Risk for Large,  
Public, Mass Gathering Events, While Maintaining a Family-Friendly Atmosphere. 
Because the Boston Marathon is a large, public, family event, there needs to be an appropriate 
balance between security protocols and the feel of the event. However, steps could be taken to 
enhance the overall security of the event, and thereby increase the sense of security felt by runners 
and spectators. Local and state law enforcement should re-evaluate existing security protocols and 
make determinations as to what security enhancements should be implemented along the course. 
These could include: prohibitions on bags along the course; screening of bags along the course; 
establishment of additional designated hardened, secure areas; increased numbers of staged law 
enforcement response assets along the course; increased capability to monitor and detect be-
havioral indictors; and other measures as deemed appropriate by law enforcement and security 
experts. However, these protocols should not be so intrusive as to change the feeling of the event. 
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F O C U S  A R E A  2 
Day 1: Initial Response to Explosions
BEST PRACTICES
CAPABILITY: COMMAND
BEST PRACTICE 2.1 
Swift Establishment of Unified Command and a Unified Command Center
Incident commanders came together quickly on Boylston Street, and within 30 minutes made 
a decision to stand up a nearby Unified Command Center (UCC). The Westin Hotel, which is 
located a block south of Boylston Street, became the ad hoc UCC location for the next 24 hours, 
housing various representatives from multiple agencies that comprised Unified Command (UC). 
The co-location of Unified Commanders created an environment for collaborative decision- 
making, streamlined execution of mission-tasking, and coordinated public messaging. 
CAPABILITY: LAW ENFORCEMENT
BEST PRACTICE 2.2 
Effective Communication to Prevent Emergency Vehicles from Blocking Access to 
Impacted Areas
Responders were cognizant of the need to keep roadways in the vicinity of the bombing clear to 
allow ambulances to respond promptly to the bombing sites. BPD helped to facilitate the rapid 
transport of the injured to hospitals by continuously reminding police officers via radio transmis-
sion to be mindful of where they parked their vehicles when responding to the scene to ensure 
roads were clear and open to ambulance access.
BEST PRACTICE 2.3 
Effective Collaboration to Secure the Perimeter of the Designated Crime Scene Area 
Measures were taken to preserve the crime scene as soon as possible after the injured were cleared 
from the scene. An initial 15-block crime scene area was cordoned off, centered on the area of 
Boylston Street where the bombs had been detonated.56 Streets surrounding the crime scene were 
secured by police and MANG, with public works sanitation trucks and street barriers used as 
56 The perimeter was later reduced to a 12-block area. 
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physical barriers to prevent vehicle access. Boston Department of Transportation set up electronic 
signs to divert traffic around the cordoned off area. The cordon was extremely effective and 
enabled the preservation and collection of evidence. 
BEST PRACTICE 2.4 
Security Rapidly Increased at Key Critical Infrastructure 
During the early stages of the incident, it was not clear how widespread the attack was, so prudent 
measures were taken to quickly increase security at iconic landmarks and key critical infrastruc-
ture, including hospitals and the transit system. Transit PD greatly enhanced security along the 
transit system, augmented by MANG. Security was increased sharply at hospitals that received 
individuals injured by the bombings, as it was unknown at the time whether any of the injured 
were also the perpetrators of the attack, or whether additional devices had been planted in their 
belongings. Hospital security personnel were augmented by BPD, MSP and other mutual aid 
law enforcement resources to screen entrances, safeguard the injured patients, and monitor for 
suspicious behavior.
CAPABILITY: CBRNE
BEST PRACTICE 2.5 
Swift Determination that the Bombs Did Not Contain Contaminants
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) monitoring systems pre-staged in the 
area near the Finish Line provided immediate negative results after the IED detonations. The 
monitoring was undertaken by Joint Hazard Assessment Teams (JHATs) using mobile and 
fixed monitoring equipment. The fixed monitor measurements determined immediately that 
no contamination was present after the bombs detonated. Additional monitoring continued with 
portable and static sensors to ensure the initial readings were accurate and to create a baseline 
should any further devices detonate. The ability to ascertain quickly whether the bombs contained 
contaminants was incredibly important, as decisions about personal protective gear for responders 
and decontamination of patients and spectators would have had to be made had contaminants 
been present.  
CAPABILITY: MUTUAL AID
BEST PRACTICE 2.6 
Organization of Mutual Aid EOD Assets and Deployments   
There were a large number of abandoned and suspicious packages and bags identified in the hours 
and days following the bombings. Many spectators left behind bags, backpacks and other items 
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on Boylston Street near the Finish Line in their haste to leave the area. Each of these packages 
had to be screened for potential devices and cleared from the scene as soon as possible. In addi-
tion, the runners’ bags, which were staged on buses near the Finish Line, also had to be screened 
and cleared, and bags of individuals riding the transit system were also randomly screened by 
Transit PD and MANG. Boston received 61 reports of suspicious packages in the hours after the 
bombings, each of which required an EOD unit assessment. In the days following the bombings, 
hundreds of additional calls were placed to 911 regarding suspicious and abandoned packages.
A large number of EOD assets were required to screen and clear the volume of abandoned and 
suspicious packages. The integration and deployment of EOD teams—which included assets 
from BPD, MSP, Cambridge PD, Transit PD, MANG, New Hampshire State Police, Connecticut 
State Police, Rhode Island State Police, FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF), United States Air Force and United States Navy—were well organized. BPD established a 
central EOD command center to coordinate EOD resources and issue assignments. Because most 
of the EOD personnel from the various agencies had received similar training, and had worked 
together in the past on exercises and incidents, they were smoothly integrated. 
CAPABILITY: USE OF MASSACHUSETTS NATIONAL GUARD
BEST PRACTICE 2.7 
Ability to Quickly Reassign Massachusetts National Guard Assets to Support Priority 
Security Missions
After the bombings, BPD and Transit PD requested MANG assets to support law enforcement 
missions by providing crime scene perimeter support, and conducting security missions in tran-
sit stations. The request for MANG resources was quickly approved on scene at the UCC by the 
MEMA Director and the Governor. 
The MANG swiftly reassigned personnel who were already in the area to provide traffic and 
crowd control support along the route to this mission. Within 30 minutes, 450 soldiers were made 
available, enabling BPD personnel to focus on the investigation and enhancing the ability of the 
Transit PD to provide security and conduct bag searches in transit stations. MANG continued to 
provide support for various missions such as security, EOD and CBRN monitoring over the next 
five days. These missions were swiftly organized and executed.  
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CAPABILITY: HEALTH AND MEDICAL
BEST PRACTICE 2.8 
Capability of the Marathon Medical System to Immediately Transition to Mass 
Casualty Incident Response
The medical system activated to support the 
Marathon, and in particular the medical tents 
located near the Finish Line, was able to quick-
ly adapt and transition from a system designed 
to support runner casualties to one that was 
able to respond to a mass casualty incident 
involving large numbers of critical patients.  
Triage and treatment groups were immediately 
established at the Finish Line. Alpha Medical 
Tent, staffed by Boston EMS and numerous medical volunteers, including licensed physicians, 
physician assistants and nurses, became a casualty collection point. Boston EMS immediately 
contacted Metro Boston Central Medical Emergency Direction (CMED) to initiate the Mass 
Casualty Incident Plan, and to be ready to assign patients to hospitals. While some patients were 
triaged and loaded into ambulances directly on Boylston Street, large numbers of patients were 
brought into the Alpha medical tent through the Boylston Street entrance. Critically injured 
patients were immediately brought to the ambulance loading area located at the rear of the tent 
and transported to hospitals. Less critically injured patients were triaged, prioritized and staged 
near the ambulance loading area to await transport.   
Ambulance assets that had been pre-staged for the Marathon were deployed, and additional 
mutual aid ambulances were requested by Boston EMS over the Boston Ambulance Mutual 
Aid (BAMA) radio system. Nine companies responded to the request, providing 73 additional 
ambulances. 
Sixty critical patients were quickly triaged and made ready for immediate transportation to hos-
pitals.57 Within 40 minutes, all critical (red) patients were identified and readied for transport. 
Although many patients sustained grave injuries, every patient that was transported to area 
hospitals survived.58 This can be directly attributed to the rapid triage, transport and treatment 
these patients received.   
Alpha Medical Tent (upper left white tent)
57 Boston EMS uses the SALT (Sort, Assess, Lifesaving Interventions, Transport/Treat) method of triage. 
58 Injuries to survivors included traumatic amputations, shrapnel wounds, burns, head trauma and hearing loss. The three 
individuals who lost their lives died immediately at the scene as a result of their injuries.  
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BEST PRACTICE 2.9 
Use of Incident Command in Controlling Resource Deployment for Emergency 
Medical Services Response
As part of the City’s Marathon operational plan, Boston EMS institutes ICS and assigns roles and 
responsibilities at the start of the event. One of the first orders after the bombings came from a 
Boston EMS captain assigned as the Logistics Officer when he initially instructed EMS transport 
units to hold position until Command advised on the initial strategic approach. He ordered all 
EMS units via radio to stay at their assigned locations until the exact location of the blasts and the 
scope of the incident could be determined. If units had initiated an immediate response, safety 
and efficiency could have been compromised. As it turned out, there was only a very short pause 
before strategic and tactical EMS directives were communicated, but this hold in place order is a 
best practice for ensuring responder health and safety. Initial directions provided responders with 
situational awareness for safety, rapid triage and treatment strategies, and an orderly method to 
initiate rapid transport of critically injured patients. 
PHEP Capability 3 – Responder Safety and Health
BEST PRACTICE 2.10 
Patient Distribution
For mass casualty incidents with more than 10 patients, Boston EMS relies on the Metro Boston 
Central Medical Emergency Direction (CMED) to assign patients to hospitals based on their 
condition, specialty needs, and citywide surge capacity. During the incident, ambulances were 
Source: Boston EMS
Patients Transported by EMS and Received by Hospitals 
Professional 
5 %
McCall 2 %
Lifeline 2 %
Fallon 3 %
EasCare  
12  %
Action  
1 %
American  
4 %
AMR 1 %
Armstrong 6 %
Boston EMS  64 %
MGH 14 %
STE  9  %
TMC 9  %
BI 14  %
BMC 16  %
BWH 20 %
CHMC  4 %
CRN  4 %
FLK 10  %
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advised to contact CMED for patient destination assignments until Boston EMS loading officers 
could be established. Loading officers then directed destinations for patient transport. This co-
ordination resulted in no one single hospital in the area being overwhelmed.  
HPP Capability 6 – Information Sharing 
HPP Capability 10 – Medical Surge
BEST PRACTICE 2.11 
Area Hospitals Were Well Trained On and Implemented Emergency Protocols 
Most area hospitals had either fully or partially activated their EOCs to support normal Mara-
thon activities. Having hospital EOCs already activated when the mass casualty incident (MCI) 
occurred enabled the hospitals to more quickly coordinate resources to support and implement 
medical surge activities to respond to the number of patients they received. Within an hour of 
the bombings, all hospitals receiving MCI patients had their EOCs fully activated. 
Hospitals also effectively implemented the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System 
(HEICS). The hospitals had practiced HEICS regularly to develop proficiency for use during 
normal Marathon Day activities as well as to respond to a mass casualty/medical surge capacity 
incident. Each hospital had buy-in for use of HEICS throughout their organizations, including 
medical providers, administrators, staff members and volunteers, and had enough depth of staffing 
to support the HEICS structure. 
Lastly, each of the Boston hospitals that treated bombing patients has a dedicated, full-time 
emergency manager that helps ensure the hospital has viable medical surge capacity plans and 
procedures, and the ability to effectively implement HEICS.59
HPP Capability 1 – Healthcare System Preparedness 
HPP Capability 10 – Medical Surge
BEST PRACTICE 2.12 
Effective Coordination Among Public Health and Healthcare Partners 
Local, state and federal public health agencies began immediately coordinating resources and 
sharing information related to the bombings. Key personnel knew each other well and used 
established information-sharing and communications systems to great advantage. The ESF-8 desk 
at the MACC had reach-back capability at the MDPH Department Operations Center (DOC), as 
well as with the MIC in Boston. When resource requests came in to the MACC, the ESF-8 desk 
was able to reach back to the MDPH DOC to confirm requests and work with area hospitals and 
the BPHC MIC to fulfill the requests when ESF-8 became overwhelmed with calls. 
PHEP/HPP Capability 3 – Emergency Operations Coordination 
PHEP/HPP Capability 6 – Information Sharing
59 Mass casualty procedures, such as declaring a pre-defined alert level for the hospital, ensured that the Emergency 
Department and operating rooms were prepared and staffed to handle the surge of critical patients.
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CAPABILITY: INFORMATION-SHARING/SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
BEST PRACTICE 2.13 
Effective Collaboration to Maintain Situational Awareness
Situational awareness and information sharing among state and city officials and agencies on the 
day of the incident was strong. Information sharing among public health and medical professionals 
was particularly strong. In addition to direct phone calls and face-to-face meetings, WebEOC and 
the HHAN were effectively used by public health, healthcare, mental health and human services 
personnel to share situational awareness and incident information. Designated systems, such as 
Boston’s WebEOC, MDPH’s WebEOC, and MEMA’s WebEOC, were used effectively used for 
sharing situational awareness about the incident. 
PHEP Capability 6 – Information Sharing
CAPABILITY: PUBLIC INFORMATION
BEST PRACTICE 2.14 
Frequent and Coordinated Public Messaging
The leadership of the organizations involved in incident response realized the importance of 
frequent and coordinated communications with the media and the general public and reached 
a consensus on the goal of providing information from key city and state leadership as often as 
possible. Key leaders worked together within the UCC to craft clear, concise, unified messages 
they could deliver to the public and the media regarding the incident, its impacts, and measures 
that were being taken in the aftermath. 
Over the course of the day of the bombings, four press conferences were held by the members of 
the UC. The first press conference was held within two hours of the explosions; it was relatively 
brief, with only the Governor and Boston Police Commissioner making statements. An hour 
later, a second press conference was held which included the Mayor of Boston, who arrived at 
the UCC after checking himself out of the hospital. During this press conference the leadership 
shared updated information with the public. At the third press conference, leaders announced 
that the lead for the investigation was being transitioned to the FBI, and relayed to the public 
that the John F. Kennedy Library incident was an accidental fire and not related to the Marathon 
bombings. During the last press conference, leaders announced that the City of Boston would be 
open for business on April 16, but it would not be business as usual. Additionally, leaders at the 
UCC used this opportunity to request that public provide photographs or video that they took 
before, during or after the bombings. 
Each hospital impacted by the incident also designated a public information officer to coordinate 
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information that could be released to the media and the public.  
In addition to traditional media outreach, key leaders designated the 24/7 Mayor’s Help Line as a 
central location to provide information to the public and respond to inquiries about the bombings. 
This single clearing house for public inquiry proved invaluable. The public was encouraged to 
call this primary call center to speak directly with a trained call-taker about Marathon bombing- 
related questions. More than 8,000 calls were received. 
Public information was also posted to city and state websites and extensive use was made of social 
media sites such as Facebook and Twitter. 
PHEP Capability 4 – Emergency Public Information and Warning
CAPABILITY: HUMAN SERVICES OPERATIONS
BEST PRACTICE 2.15 
Swift Establishment of Temporary Reunification Center 
The City quickly established the facility known as the Castle at Park Plaza (Castle) as a temporary 
shelter and human services center where counseling, food and water, assistance for the runners, 
and family reunification services could be provided. Displaced runners were the primary custom-
ers of the Castle in the early stages of the operation. International and out-of-state runners and 
their family members were a particular concern; many had to get to the airport for flights home, 
but did not have their identification cards, passports or personal belongings, because they were 
in their BAA-issued runners’ bags which were not yet available for retrieval, or were in the rooms 
of their hotels located in the cordoned off crime scene area. Through the Castle, OEM was able 
to coordinate assistance with BPD and FBI for these individuals to gain access to the hotels with 
appropriate law enforcement escort and enable them to retrieve their belongings.  
The Castle remained open Monday night as a shelter, hosting eight individuals displaced by the 
attack, and closed around 9:00 p.m. on Tuesday. After that time, the nonprofit organization City 
Year, located on Columbus Avenue several blocks from the Castle, became the new location for 
providing counseling and support services.  
PHEP Capability 7 – Mass Care
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AREAS NEEDING IMPROVEMENT
CAPABILITY: COMMAND
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.1 
Boston EOC Was Not Activated Prior to the Bombings
Boston’s EOC was not activated for the running of the 2013 Marathon. It had been the City’s 
standard practice to open only discipline-specific command posts to support Marathon Day 
activities, and not the Boston EOC.  
The EOC was operational 30 minutes after the bombings occurred. This delayed the activation 
of Boston’s WebEOC and sharing of situational awareness information through that portal. There 
was a longer delay in gathering several critical OEM personnel and personnel from other agen-
cies to staff the EOC; that delay would have been avoided had the EOC been open in support of 
the traditional Marathon Day, even if only partially. Although OEM personnel did maintain the 
ability to communicate internally, and began receiving and responding to requests even before 
the EOC was opened, the collection and dissemination of information through WebEOC and 
coordination with agency EOC liaisons was delayed.
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: City agencies with responsibility for planning for the Marathon
Recommendation 3: Activate Boston EOC in Support of the Marathon. 
The Boston EOC should be open and staffed with appropriate City agency liaisons as a precaution-
ary measure. The liaisons to the EOC should be individuals who are authorized to communicate 
with other senior agency personnel and to make decisions.
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.2 
Need to Clearly Define Emergency Response Roles and Responsibilities within the City 
On the day of the Marathon bombings, numerous operations centers and command centers 
were activated across the City. Once the bombings occurred, the existence of so many operations 
centers created confusion at times, and contributed to confusion about which City agencies were 
leads for which response efforts.
While many City departments rightfully organize an emergency preparedness component with-
in their respective missions, and establish agency-specific operations centers to support their 
agency’s response activities, the city-wide perspective for coordination of emergency response 
must be maintained by Boston OEM at the Boston EOC. To effectively maintain a common 
operating picture on city-wide emergency response activities, each City department with a role 
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in emergency response must have a representative at the Boston EOC to provide situational 
awareness and coordinate resources for the response. Each agency can still operate a department 
operations center as a reach-back capability for the Boston EOC and to tactically manage the 
department’s emergency response activities, but a city-wide common operating picture can only 
be maintained in one, centralized location—Boston EOC. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: City of Boston
Recommendation 4: Designate the Boston EOC as the City’s Lead EOC and Clarify Roles of 
All City Departments in Boston EOC. 
To eliminate confusion over roles and responsibilities and effectively maintain a common operat-
ing picture on city-wide emergency response activities, ensure that each City department with a 
role in emergency response designates a representative at the Boston EOC to provide situational 
awareness and coordinate resources for the response.  
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.3 
UCC Location was Not Pre-Identified or Well-Equipped 
Although the UCC was stood up fairly quickly, the physical location of the UCC had not been 
pre-identified and therefore the location was not well equipped to support such an operation. The 
Westin Hotel was very gracious and accommodating to representatives of the UCC, providing 
space, food, and available resources to support emergency operations. However, UCC leader-
ship soon learned that hotels do not necessarily have the capabilities and equipment on hand 
to support the activities of an emergency operations center, such as large quantities of phones, 
phone jacks, electrical outlets, computer equipment, and other resources necessary to support 
emergency operations.
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: City and state public safety partners with responsibility for 
planning for the Marathon
Recommendation 5: Pre-identify and equip location(s) in Boston that can serve as a UCC 
should a large-scale incident disrupt the Marathon.  
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.4 
Numerous Command Centers Not Uniformly Coordinated
Numerous command centers, operations centers and command posts were established to support 
the Boston Marathon. While large scale events and incidents often require and operate with mul-
tiple operational centers, the coordination and hierarchy of these various centers was not clear, 
especially after the bombings took place. The bombings resulted in additional command and 
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coordination centers being established as well, and there was confusion at times as to the role, 
responsibilities and authorities of each. Overall coordination of response could be strengthened 
under an ICS unified command structure, clearing articulating roles, responsibilities, relationships 
and authorizes of all operations centers and discipline-specific missions. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: All agencies and organizations with a role in supporting the 
Marathon 
Recommendation 6: Develop and Implement a Unified Coordination System for the Marathon. 
All agencies and organizations with a responsibility for supporting the Marathon should plan and 
design a unified coordination system that identifies roles, responsibilities, reporting relationships 
and missions for all organizations and operations centers supporting Marathon public safety and 
medical operations. 
CAPABILITY: MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION CENTER 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.5 
Early Release of Public Safety Assets 
Generally, public safety assets are relieved as soon as runners have cleared a community and 
roads are re-opened. However, crowds may still linger, especially at public transit system stations. 
The Transit PD relies on support from local police departments to maintain security at station 
locations. Nevertheless, in some cases, local officers were relieved of their duties while there still 
were thousands of people present in the area and/or waiting for transit. In addition, because the 
race was going so smoothly, the emergency buses that were staged in Hopkinton were dismissed 
around 2:00 p.m., and were therefore not immediately available to help transport runners still on 
the course after the bombs had detonated and the race was stopped. Having these buses readily 
available would have better supported transporting runners and spectators to shelters.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Local law enforcement, MSP, MEMA, Transit PD, MANG
Recommendation 7: Retain Public Safety Assets for a Longer Duration. 
Public safety assets should be maintained at an appropriate level until crowds have largely dis-
persed and the contiguous city or town is cleared of runners. Maintain emergency buses on 
standby until the race has successfully concluded. 
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CAPABILITY: LAW ENFORCEMENT 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.6 
Lack of Coordination and Communication Between Law Enforcement and Hospitals 
on Security and Investigative Protocols
Boston hospitals found the large numbers of heavily armed police officers and investigators in 
their halls, who were present to provide security, conduct victim interviews, and collect evidence, 
to be intimidating. Although law enforcement officials never hindered the medical treatment of 
patients, some hospital staff and patients reported they were frightened by police questioning 
patients and family members and collecting cell phones, patient belongings, clothing and shrapnel 
removed from wounds as evidence. Some feared that these actions would add to the emotional 
trauma the patients and staff had already experienced from the bombings. In addition, law en-
forcement officers assigned to protect hospitals did not always coordinate their presence with the 
hospital security department. 
It was also not made clear to witnesses, family members, and survivors why police would take 
their cell phones. BPD had a web portal which investigators could use to upload cell phone data 
and subsequently return the phones to their owners, but the website was soon overloaded from 
thousands of megabytes of pictures, and data from some cell phone brands could not be down-
loaded with the available software. BPD had only one technician in charge of this function to 
address issues, and therefore they were not able to be resolved quickly. Because of these factors, 
BPD needed to retain the phones for a period of time to be able to view their contents and main-
tain the chain of custody for evidence, but this was not explained to patients, family members, 
witnesses or hospital staff.
Conversely, as the hours and days wore on, the presence of law enforcement in hospitals greatly 
decreased even though the suspects remained at large. Hospitals security departments were left 
feeling understaffed and vulnerable as hospital security officers are generally unarmed.
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: BPD, MSP, Hospitals
Recommendation 8: Provide Additional Training to Hospitals on Investigative Protocols 
and Evidence Collection. 
Law enforcement officials should provide additional training to local hospitals to ensure their 
understanding of investigative protocols and evidence collection.
Recommendation 9: Establish Protocols for Integrating Local Law Enforcement into  
Hospital Security during Emergencies. 
Hospitals and local law enforcement should meet to discuss the circumstances under which law 
enforcement resources may be assigned to enhance hospital security, and establish protocols for 
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integrating local law enforcement into hospital security operations when an ongoing incident 
requires uniformed police presence. Protocols should include ensuring hospital security depart-
ments are aware of the arrival of local law enforcement, and the extent of their mission (enhanced 
security, investigation, evidence collection, etc.). 
Recommendation 10: Explore Mechanisms for Bolstering Hospital Security. 
Hospitals should consider options for contracting for additional security personnel when needed. 
HPP Capability 1 – Healthcare System Preparedness
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.7 
Safety Inspectors Restricted from Accessing Secured Incident Area 
Safety inspectors from Boston Fire Department (BFD) and the Boston Office of Inspectional 
Services (OIS) sought access to the restricted area to conduct safety assessments of infrastructure 
impacted by the blasts to ensure that personnel in the restricted area were not at risk of a sec-
ondary incident related to compromised infrastructure. The safety inspectors were not allowed 
access out of concern for maintaining the integrity of the crime scene, despite having experience 
with working in crime scenes alongside investigators. As a result, investigators working the crime 
could have been at risk and the City exposed to liability claims.
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: BPD, BFD, FBI, OIS
Recommendation 11: Identify or develop a process that could allow for safety inspections 
to be conducted while simultaneously ensuring the integrity of the crime scene. 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.8 
Lack of Adequate Relief for Law Enforcement Officers
Many law enforcement officials experienced critical incident stress associated with observing and 
responding to an incident of the magnitude of the bombings, and continued to serve long shifts 
in the days and weeks afterward, compounding this stress with fatigue.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Local and state law enforcement
Recommendation 12: Ensure Adequate Relief. 
Law enforcement command personnel should anticipate the potential relief needs of law enforce-
ment officers supporting a long-term incident, and ensure officers are provided adequate relief, 
using mutual aid resources as necessary. 
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CAPABILITY: HEALTH AND MEDICAL 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.9 
Limited Use of Triage Ribbons and Tags
Most of the first EMS personnel on scene had arrived by foot or golf cart, and were not equipped 
with triage tags. While one of the first orders was to bring triage tags to the scene, formal triage 
did not take place when it was determined the scene was still unsafe. Patients were quickly moved 
to Alpha Medical Tent, or directly to arriving ambulances.  
As a result, several hospitals reported having difficulty sorting and tracking patients. Although 
this did not hinder medical treatment, hospitals find the tags very helpful, aiding them in more 
quickly identifying the seriousness of injuries, obtaining patient history, and providing notifica-
tion to families.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: BFD, Boston EMS, mutual aid EMS providers, hospitals  
Recommendation 13: Provide Additional Training On and Exercise the Use of Triage  
Ribbons and Tags for Mass Casualty Incidents. 
EMS personnel should train and exercise using triage tags and ribbons during mass casualty 
incidents to ensure they are well practiced in efficiently implementing this system. Sweep triage 
teams should attach a triage ribbon to each patient. Triage or treatment units or EMS personnel 
during transport should attach triage tags to each patient. Initially, patient condition and identity 
(if available) should be recorded, with additional details provided as time and conditions permit. 
HPP Capability 1 – Healthcare System Preparedness 
HPP Capability 10 – Medical Surge
Sample Triage Ribbons and Tags
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IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.10 
Interlocking Crowd Control Barriers Created Challenges for First Responders 
Attempting to Access the Injured
Crowd control metal bicycle racking was used all along Boylston Street to create separation be-
tween spectators and runners. The racking was interlocking, meaning that rack segments were 
attached to one another via a hooking element. To disassemble the racking, each segment must 
be physically lifted beginning at the end of the 
full assembly to enable detachment. This type 
of racking is used to prevent spectators from 
easily disassembling segments and creating 
unpermitted access to restricted areas. 
While the racking was effective in assisting 
with crowd control during the race, it proved to 
be a challenge to responders when attempting 
to access the injured after the bombings. The 
interlocking rack created difficult access for responders reaching the sidewalks of Boylston Street 
from the course; responders had to either climb over the barricades or go to the end of the block 
to begin unlocking them. 
Racking was also used to restrict vehicular and pedestrian access to the course, and in the imme-
diately aftermath of the bombings, limited the access of response vehicles in some areas, albeit 
only for a very short period of time.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: BAA, BPD, MSP 
Recommendation 14: Identify an Alternative Mechanism to Secure Crowd Control  
Barriers that Allow for Easy Disassembly by First Responders During Emergencies. 
Although the challenges associated with the racking were able to be overcome, alternative mech-
anisms for securing racking that can be easily disassembled by responders during emergencies 
should be explored.  
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.11 
Clarification for Hospital Staff on Roles in Responding to Bomb Threats 
Bomb threats or identification of suspicious packages occurred at two hospitals in the days after 
the bombings. Hospitals have established protocols for responding to bomb threats that some-
times include hospital staff providing assistance in identifying items that look to be out of place. 
These actions are requested of hospital staff because hospital staff know their facilities better 
than outside agencies that may respond to a threat, and therefore they can more readily identify 
something that seems out of place. 
Interlocking bicycle rack.
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However, in the aftermath of the bombings, some hospital staff expressed concern about being 
asked to assist in searching areas to identify items that looked out of place. There was a misunder-
standing that hospital staff were being asked to respond to a suspicious item rather than merely 
identifying a suspicious item. However, hospital staff had not been—nor should they have been 
—asked to approach or assess suspicious or out-of-place items; rather, they needed only report 
them to authorities.   
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Hospitals
Recommendation 15: Ensure Hospital Staff are Familiar with their Facility’s Bomb Threat 
Procedures, Protocols, Roles and Responsibilities. 
Hospitals should ensure that all staff members understand their hospital’s protocols and proce-
dures, as well as their individual roles and responsibilities during a bomb threat or discovery of 
a suspicious package. Hospitals should regularly exercise these procedures in coordination with 
local police and fire departments.
HPP Capability 1 – Healthcare System Preparedness
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.12 
On-Hand Availability of Amputation and Vascular Kits
The large number of critically injured patients with traumatic amputations or requiring amputa-
tion stressed the availability of medical resources, in particular amputation kits and vascular kits. 
Although requests for these resources were made to the ESF 8 desk at the MACC, all requests for 
kits were able to be filled by neighboring hospitals.
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Hospitals, MDPH, BPHC
Recommendation 16: Evaluate Inventory for Responding to Mass Casualty Incidents. 
Hospitals and EMS agencies should evaluate options and contingencies for obtaining additional 
supplies and equipment in an MCI. In addition, each region should work to develop a listing of 
regional resources that can be accessed during emergencies, and detail steps on how to obtain 
such resources.
HPP Capability 1–Healthcare System Preparedness
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CAPABILITY:  
MULTI-AGENCY COORDINATION CENTER (MACC) COORDINATION
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.13 
Challenges with Evacuation of Runners and Spectators from the Course
There were approximately 5,000 runners on the course in Boston, Brookline, and Newton when 
the bombings occurred and the race was stopped. Subsequent to the stoppage of the race, there 
was a need to provide temporary shelter to stranded runners until they could be transported back 
to Boston to gather their personal belongings and reunite with family members. The manage-
ment of the evacuation of large numbers of runners off the course was not pre-planned and was 
therefore unsystematic.
Several years prior to the 2013 Boston Marathon, plans for opening and operating temporary 
shelters along the course were started. However, these plans were never fully developed and tem-
porary shelters were neither staffed nor unlocked during the 2013 Boston Marathon. In addition, 
coordination of buses to transport runners from the course to shelter locations, and from shelter 
locations to Boston, were not readily available, as emergency buses had been released about an 
hour prior to the bombings. 
Communication with runners and spectators along the course was non-existent. There were no 
public address systems in place to communicate with runners and spectators. Many learned of 
the incident by word of mouth, and many were distressed about family members that may have 
been near the bomb sites waiting to watch them finish the race. In addition, responders had no 
centralized way to communicate with runners on what to do and where to go other than through 
in-field personnel. In-field personnel did not always have adequate information available. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: MACC Agencies
Recommendation 17: Develop a Formal Course Evacuation Coordination Plan. 
MACC agencies with a role in coordinating response to course disruption or evacuation of the 
course should develop a formal course disruption and evacuation coordination plan that identifies 
temporary shelter locations, stages appropriate transportation assets, designates communications 
protocols and equipment, and assigns roles and responsibilities. 
PHEP Capability 1 – Community Preparedness
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.14 
Care and Feeding of In-Field Personnel
During the extended deployment of public safety personnel after the bombings, the care and 
feeding of personnel deployed in field and at remote command centers was not effectively orga-
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nized. Many times personnel, including MANG soldiers, were in field without food or relief for 
long periods of time. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: MANG 
Recommendation 18: Ensure In-Field Personnel Have Food and Relief. 
Plan for supplying food and other necessities for in-field personnel who may be activated for 
long periods of time. 
CAPABILITY: COMMUNICATIONS 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.15 
Lack of Cell Service in the Moments After the Bombings
Because of the volume of cell phone calls that were attempted or made in the minutes after the 
bombings, cell phone service became saturated and inaccessible in the moments following the 
bombings. However, texting remained available, and cell phones with Wireless Priority Access 
(WPS) service were able to successfully complete calls.60 
Many responders in the field did not have WPS active for their cell phones and were unable to 
complete cell phone calls during this time. Although many responders had radios and some also 
had satellite phones as redundant forms of communication, the disruption of cellular communi-
cation created challenges for providing situational awareness to key leadership, and making and 
communicating key decisions.
Within an hour, a Cell-On-Wheels (COW) was deployed to the area to provide additional cell 
service capacity.61
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Appropriate public safety personnel
Recommendation 19: Obtain WPS Access for Key Public Safety Personnel. 
Evaluate the need to obtain WPS for key public safety personnel, and obtain access to WPS as 
appropriate.
Recommendation 20: Obtain Redundant Communications Systems and Equipment  
for Key Leadership, and Create Protocols for Implementing Them. 
Evaluate the need to obtain redundant communications systems for key leaders. If obtained, 
develop protocols for implementing these systems.  
60 Wireless Priority Service (WPS) is a subscriber-based service for emergency personnel and officials managed by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) that provides priority cellular access 
to subscribers during an emergency or crisis situation. 
61 Cell on wheels (COW) is a portable cellular site that provides temporary wireless coverage to locations where cellular 
coverage is minimal or compromised. 
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IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.16 
Underutilization of Command Channel
When traditional communications systems were overloaded in the first moments after the 
bombings, radio systems remained operational. Many disciplines automatically deferred to their 
traditional radio networks and protocols, and some of the radio channels designated for the Mar-
athon under the communications plan went underutilized—in particular the designated Unified 
Command Channel. Some disciplines were unfamiliar with the Marathon communication plan 
and had difficulty initially accessing the designated channels and quickly reverted back to the 
internal systems that they felt most comfortable using. This limited the ability to coordinate across 
disciplines over interoperable communications systems.    
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: All disciplines
Recommendation 21: Conduct Additional Training on the Marathon Communications 
Plan and Use of Designated Radio Channels. 
Ensure all disciplines are aware of the Marathon Communications Plan and how to access all desig-
nated channels.
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.17 
Lack of Charging Equipment for Radios and Cell Phones
Because of the long duration of the event and incident, response partners worked far longer hours 
than anticipated, and used their communications equipment more than anticipated. The ability 
to obtain fresh radio batteries and charge radio and cell phone batteries became a critical need. 
Although resources were not stockpiled and ready for immediate deployment, Boston OEM and 
Massachusetts ESF 2 (Communications) worked with communications providers to set up radio 
charging banks in the UCC and other critical areas, and provide numerous cell phone chargers. 
However, this took some time to arrange.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: MA ESF 2, MEMA, Boston OEM
Recommendation 22: Maintain an adequate supply of or develop a streamlined  
process for obtaining radio and cell phone chargers and batteries. 
After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings98
CAPABILITY:  
INFORMATION SHARING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.18 
Lack of Communication Regarding Negative CBRN Results at the Finish Line  
Although senior leadership and the UC were quickly advised by fire and MANG CST personnel 
that there were no CBRN contaminants in the IEDs, this information was not widely relayed to 
other responders, the MACC, or the hospital community. Many assumed that there was no need to 
broadly distribute the information because the results were negative. However, as hospitals began 
receiving the injured, they were placed in the difficult position of having to make critical decisions 
regarding decontamination in the absence of information. Because the presence of contaminants 
was neither confirmed nor denied, it was entirely possible that hospitals reasonably might have 
implemented decontamination protocols and activities; in fact, many hospitals seriously debated 
the need to activate patient decontamination. If they had done so in this incident, treatment for 
critically injured patients would have been unnecessarily delayed. Ultimately, given the criticality 
of many of the wounded, and assuming that the absence of information meant no contaminants 
were present, decontamination units were not activated and patients were immediately moved 
into hospital facilities. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: BFD, MANG CST, UC leaders, hospitals 
Recommendation 23: Ensure That All CBRNE Results Information are Widely  
Communicated to the Public Safety, Public Health and Healthcare Communities During  
a Mass Casualty Incident. 
All CBRNE monitoring results—negative and positive—must be rapidly reported to all public 
safety, public health and healthcare partners as soon as possible. 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.19 
Challenges with Accessing Patient Information
Although the ARC “Safe and Well” website was promoted as a resource for obtaining information 
about friends and family members who may have been impacted by the bombings, this was not a 
suitable resource for this particular incident. The website is designed for information sharing in 
response to natural disasters; individuals can register themselves on the website as a means to let 
their loved ones know they are all right. Loved ones then search the website for posted informa-
tion. In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, most of the injured were not able to register 
themselves, and their family members had an immediate need for identifying information.
Another complication to obtaining patient information is the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA). HIPAA is designed to protect the privacy of healthcare patients, 
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but during a large-scale emergency, the provisions of HIPAA can often prevent hospitals from 
providing patient information to family members that are seeking to locate, identify the status 
of, and/or be reunited with their loved ones. Human services and victim assistance organizations 
also often seek patient information to make outreach to survivors and/or their families regarding 
available services.
Because hospitals did not receive strong guidance on possible emergency provisions to HIPAA, 
individual hospitals were left to interpret HIPAA requirements on their own. As a result, some 
hospitals withheld patient information, believing HIPAA requirements prohibited them from 
releasing it, while other hospitals interpreted HIPAA regulations to allow release of patient in-
formation in emergency circumstances, and provided patient information to family members 
and human services agencies. 
In addition, a centralized source from which family members of victims and human services orga-
nizations could obtain patient information could not be established because of HIPAA concerns. 
Family members and human services agencies had to make outreach to numerous organizations 
to try to access critical patient information.
Lastly, it was not clear whether HIPAA requirements pertained to foreign nationals. Patient in-
formation was generally not provided to the State Department, consulates and many embassies 
which were seeking information about the many international runners and spectators who had 
participated in Marathon activities. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Hospitals, MDPH 
Recommendation 24: Develop and Distribute HIPAA Guidance for Emergency Situations. 
MDPH should collaborate with appropriate federal authorities, legal counsel and hospitals to de-
velop guidance on emergency allowances to HIPAA to release patient information. This guidance 
should be distributed to all hospitals. 
Recommendation 25: Identify Whether a Central Resource of Patient Information Can  
Be Developed and Shared After Mass Casualty Incidents. 
MDPH should coordinate with legal counsel, hospitals and human services organizations to 
determine whether a centralized resource of patient information could be developed following 
mass casualty and other emergency incidents, and whether information contained in that resource 
could be shared with family members of victims and survivors and/or human services agencies. 
PHEP/HPP Capability 6 – Information Sharing 
HPP Capability 1 – Healthcare System Preparedness
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CAPABILITY: PUBLIC INFORMATION
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.20 
Lack of Emergency Alerting
Although there was vast media coverage of the bombings, no emergency alerts were generated for 
the public. MEMA did not issue an emergency broadcast message. In the City of Boston, the policy 
for issuing alerts through ALERTBoston requires that City officials provide initial information 
through news media, and ALERTBoston provides follow on information. As such, the City did 
not issue an emergency alert through ALERTBoston. The first public messaging did not come 
until the first press conference, nearly two hours after the bombings occurred. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: MEMA, Boston OEM
Recommendation 26: Review Protocols for Issuing Emergency Alert Messages. 
MEMA and Boston OEM should review protocols that would prompt and allow emergency per-
sonnel to issue emergency alerts during quickly-unfolding incidents.  
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.21 
Lack of Incident-Specific Pre-Scripted Message for Mayor’s Hotline
Call center staff were able to develop a frequently-asked-questions sheet to assist call-takers in 
providing consistent information to their callers. However, having a template to develop such 
information sheets would save time, ensure consistent messaging, and ensure all pertinent infor-
mation is being captured.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Boston Office of Constituent Services
Recommendation 27: Develop Information Sheet Templates for Call Center Staff. 
Develop ready-to-use templates including script outlines with basic responses and typical ques-
tions with answers that can be used by all call center staff during an emergency situation. Ensure 
call center staff are adequately trained on their use.  
CAPABILITY: HUMAN SERVICES OPERATIONS 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.22 
Lack of Disaster Mental Health Coordination Plan
Because there is no formal disaster mental health coordination plan, there was initial confusion 
among public health and mental health agencies regarding the availability of mental health re-
sources, what resources were needed where, and who was serving as the lead coordinating agency. 
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It was challenging to coordinate the many dozens of counselors, therapists, and other mental 
health specialists from numerous sources, and to identify the most relevant specialties to address 
the current needs. There was no centralized source that provided a detailed listing of credentialed 
mental health providers in the greater Boston area, so identifying available disaster mental health 
resources was challenging. 
In addition, the roles for managing mental health resources were not clear. Although some pro-
viders placed personnel on standby pending a request to deploy them, others activated personnel 
on their own. As such, there was some duplication in providing counselors at particular locations. 
There were also organizations that were frustrated because they were told they were not needed, 
even though the demand appeared to indicate differently. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: BPHC, MDPH, Massachusetts Department of Mental Health 
(DMH), mental health providers
Recommendation 28: Develop a Disaster Mental Health Coordination Plan. 
MDPH and DMH, in coordination with MEMA and ESF 8, should lead the development of a 
Statewide Disaster Mental Health Coordination Plan with all appropriate public health and disas-
ter mental health partners. The plan should delineate roles and responsibilities for coordinating 
the activation of a disaster mental health support system after a major incident or disaster. The 
plan should address the provision of services for an extended period of time and should recognize 
the roles of local, state, federal, and private sector entities. Such a plan would be useful for mass 
casualty incidents as well as major emergencies and disasters.  
PHEP Capability 3 – Emergency Operations Coordination 
PHEP Capability 7 – Mass Care
Recommendation 29: Develop a Centralized Source that Identifies Disaster Mental Health 
Specialists. 
MDPH and DMH should partner to explore the potential for developing a centralized source of 
information on available disaster mental health service providers, including contact information, 
credentials, specialized training, and other applicable details. If feasible, this source should be 
developed as a part of existing tools currently used to capture similar information for available 
disaster response personnel.   
PHEP Capability 3 – Emergency Operations Coordination 
PHEP Capability 15 – Volunteer Management
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IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.23 
Lack of Understanding of Mass Care Roles and Responsibilities 
Though the various agencies worked well together at the Castle, there were several instances 
where primary responsibility for a particular aspect of the operation was unclear. One such issue 
was the role of the ARC at the Castle. The ARC is the designated lead agency at Boston Logan 
Airport for family assistance center operations that are stood up for aircraft or airport disasters. 
At the Castle however, OEM was in charge overall, and BPHC was lead for physical and mental 
health services. The ARC assumed they were in charge of the shelter and had begun to operate at 
the Castle in accordance with their own system. Eventually OEM and BCYF were able to resolve 
the situation with the ARC, but it took time to arrive at an agreement.
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: BPHC, OEM, ARC
Recommendation 30: Clarify mass care and shelter roles in the City. 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.24 
Challenges with Coordinating the Return of Runners’ Personal Belongings
One of the biggest issues for runners who had just finished the Marathon or who were stopped 
somewhere on the route was reuniting them with their personal possessions, which were con-
tained in BAA-issued yellow bags tagged with their race number. On the morning of Marathon 
Day, the majority of runners load onto buses in Boston and ride out to Hopkinton, the location 
of the Start Line. To assist runners with maintaining their belongings, the BAA issues runners a 
bag that is tagged with their race number; runners can place their personal belongings that they 
do not wish to carry along the course into the bag, and check the bag in Hopkinton at the Athletes 
Village. Bags are then transported back by bus to the area near the Finish Line, where they stay 
staged until they are picked up by runners.   
Several thousand runners were still on the course or had just crossed the Finish Line when the 
explosions occurred, so the normal process for retrieving their bags was disrupted. The BAA 
had the primary responsibility for reuniting runners with their bags, but struggled with how 
to accomplish the task. Recognizing the urgency associated with the mission, OEM worked 
with BAA to establish a return plan at the Castle. The bags were relocated away from the im-
pact area and swept by EOD teams to ensure there were no additional devices in them. MANG 
soldiers guarded them overnight to ensure their security. The following morning, the Boston 
Department of Transportation transported the bags to the Castle and placed them on the 
sidewalk where members of the MANG were tasked with security and helping runners locate 
their bags. Runners were informed by the BAA that they could pick up their belongings outside 
the Castle. With this announcement came an influx of media, trying to capture stories from 
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impacted runners. After some discussion, it was determined that the bags should be moved 
into the Castle to limit contact between runners and the media.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Boston OEM, BAA
Recommendation 31: Develop Alternate Plan for Reuniting Runners with Personal Belongings.
Boston OEM and the BAA should develop a coordinated plan to reunite with their belongings 
should the race become disrupted.
CAPABILITY: USE OF NATIONAL GUARD 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 2.25 
Unarmed Soldiers Supporting Law Enforcement Missions
On the day of the incident, the policy of the Commonwealth and the MANG was not to arm 
MANG soldiers assigned to a disaster response mission. As such, all MANG soldiers deployed to 
support the bombing response were unarmed, even those assigned to support law enforcement 
missions. In addition, soldiers have the authority to use force only when protecting themselves.
Soldiers assigned to law enforcement missions have a greater likelihood of being involved in an 
escalating law enforcement situation. Unarmed soldiers in such situations are then dependent 
upon nearby police officers to ensure their protection, increasing risk to both the soldier and the 
officer.
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: MANG 
Recommendation 32: Explore Revising Policy to Allow Arming of Soldiers Assigned to Law 
Enforcement Missions. 
MANG and MEMA should develop a coordinated plan for arming soldiers assigned to law en-
forcement missions, under appropriate circumstances. 
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F O C U S  A R E A  3
Days 2–4: Ongoing Response to Explosions
BEST PRACTICES
BEST PRACTICE 3.1 
Continuation of Strong Mutual Aid
A large number of mutual aid assets remained in the City in the days following the bombings. 
These mutual aid assets continued to be well managed and well coordinated. An EOD command 
center was established to coordinate asset response to the large volume of calls received regarding 
suspicious and abandoned packages. 
A command center was also established to coordinate the large numbers of SWAT teams present 
in the City from MSP, Cambridge PD, Transit PD, Revere PD, Everett PD, NEMLEC, MetroLEC, 
and the South Eastern Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council (SEMLEC). These resources 
were deployed for a variety of missions including protecting critical infrastructure and high-val-
ue targets such as hospitals, government buildings, and hotels, assisting with securing the crime 
scene perimeter, and bolstering police in and around the City of Boston in the days following 
the bombings. 
BEST PRACTICE 3.2 
Establishment of “Walk-In” Disaster Mental Health Clinics for the General Public, 
Survivors and Their Families  
There was a surge in disaster mental health counseling needs the days following the bombings. 
Thousands of spectators were witnesses to the aftermath of the bombings, and were in need of 
crisis counseling services to help them process what they had witnessed. The BPHC, MDPH, 
DMH, and the Region I United States Department of Health and Human Services (USHHS) 
collaborated to quickly stand up clinics where members of the public could go and obtain initial 
crisis counseling services.   
To support this effort, USHHS, in consultation with BPHC and MDPH, activated a 20-member 
disaster mental health team which included personnel with specialized areas of disaster mental 
health expertise, including specialties in children, medical personnel, and eyewitnesses. The team 
deployed for two weeks and provided psychological first aid, helping determine what ongoing 
services individuals may need. 
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BEST PRACTICE 3.3 
Privacy for Impacted Individuals at the Castle 
The City of Boston went to great lengths to ensure the privacy of individuals arriving at the Family 
Reunification Center (the Castle) to obtain information and gather their belongings, including 
media restrictions near and in the Castle. This provided a level of comfort to individuals seeking 
guidance and services at the Castle.  
BEST PRACTICE 3.4 
Establishment of A Separate Family Assistance Center For Survivors, Their Families 
and the Families of the Victims
In coordination with ARC, the Massachusetts Office for Victim Assistance (MOVA), the Massachu-
setts Attorney General’s Office, and other city, state and federal agencies, BPHC opened a Family 
Assistance Center (FAC) on Wednesday, April 17, with the mission of coordinating services and 
resources for survivors, their families, and the families of the victims. The FAC was separate from the 
Family Reunification Center and the services being provided to runners and the general public at the 
Castle. FAC services included: mental health counseling; financial assistance, including emergency 
funds for travel and food while supporting hospitalized family members; provision of disability 
placards; and spiritual care. The location of the center was not publicly disclosed, and adequate 
security was in place to ensure privacy of all individuals arriving at and departing from the FAC.  
BEST PRACTICE 3.5 
The Mayor’s Help Line Staff Adjusted Well to the Rapidly-Changing Events and 
Related Information Needs. 
The staff of the Mayor’s Help Line fielded thousands of calls, emails, mail and social media in-
quiries in the days following the bombings, and were able to quickly adapt to the changing infor-
mation needs of the public. Initially, the majority of calls received were inquiries from the public 
about friends and family members who may have been in the area of the Finish Line when the 
bombings occurred. Information requests then began to shift to inquiries regarding how donations 
could be made, as well as residents and businesses within the crime scene area seeking recovery 
information. Later, the call center received inquiries about the planned memorial services for 
both the bombing victims as well as MIT Police Officer Sean Collier. 
Help Line personnel coordinated with the Boston OEM, the Department of Neighborhood 
Development (DND), the BAA, and the City of Cambridge regarding information that could be 
provided to the public, and shared with them trends on inquiries being received so that these 
agencies could gather appropriate information. Help Line staff also assisted in identifying and 
developing a list of impacted business and property owners that could be used by other City 
departments seeking to provide information and/or services to them.  
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AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
CAPABILITY: HEALTH AND MEDICAL
IMPROVEMENT AREA 3.1 
Lack of Tourniquet Kits for Responders
Many responders did not carry tourniquet kits on their person as standard-issue equipment. Many 
injured during the bombings required tourniquets to stop excessive bleeding; responders were 
quick in their thinking and were able to fashion tourniquets from materials they found or were 
made available, such as belts and shirts. The need to look for these resources placed an added 
burden on responders and increased the time for applying a tourniquet. Having tourniquets read-
ily available can help save not only members of the public who may be injured during a critical 
incident, but also other first responders who may become injured as well. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Law enforcement agencies, fire services agencies, EMS agencies
Recommendation 33: Issue and Train on Tourniquet Kits for All First Responders. 
First responders across the Commonwealth, in particular police, fire and EMS, should have a 
tourniquet kit issued to them as standard practice. Conduct training to ensure first responders 
know how to apply issued tourniquets on the injured.
IMPROVEMENT AREA 3.2 
USHHS Disaster Mental Health Team Required Logistical Support
The disaster mental health team activated by USHHS did not have a logistics officer who could 
make lodging and transportation arrangements for the team. BPHC was expecting the team to 
arrive with its own support and logistics capabilities. As this was not the case, BPHC staff had to 
devote time to locating lodging and transportation and to manage other administrative matters 
while simultaneously managing a high volume of other incident-related issues.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: USHHS, BPHC
Recommendation 34: Assign a Logistics Coordinator to Disaster Mental Health Team. 
USHHS should ensure that disaster mental health teams include administrative/logistical sup-
port personnel to coordinate on-site logistics so that these activities do not become an additional 
burden to the jurisdiction impacted by the incident.  
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CAPABILITY: PUBLIC INFORMATION 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 3.3 
Lack of Joint Information Center 
Although press conferences had been successfully conducted to provide coordinated public mes-
saging on the day of the bombings, a formal Joint information Center (JIC) was never established. 
The lack of a JIC was not an issue on the day of or the day after the bombings, as all leaders were 
present together in the UCC and/or at press conferences. When the UCC stood down, public 
messaging became less coordinated in the absence of a JIC. Agencies and organizations, which still 
had a need to provide public information, pushed out information over the remaining course of 
the week without having fully vetted and/or coordinated the messaging with one another, resulting 
in conflicting information in the domain of the media, and in particular, in social media outlets. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: All
Recommendation 35: Establish a Joint Information Center for Large Scale Incidents to  
Ensure Coordinated Public Messaging. 
Establish a JIC for large scale incidents or events to ensure that all public messages, including 
those disseminated through social media, are coordinated and validated.  
CAPABILITY: HUMAN SERVICES OPERATIONS 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 3.4 
Lack of a Family Assistance Center Plan
Neither the City nor the Commonwealth had a formal FAC Plan for coordinating services for 
survivors, their families and the families of the victims separate and distinct from plans for shel-
tering and other service needs of impacted members of the public. The organizations that stood 
up the FAC modified an existing ARC plan for aircraft disasters. Developing a plan would identify 
all considerations needed for establishing a FAC, including services, staffing, security, supplies 
and potential locations.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: MEMA, OEM, ARC, Centers for Youth and Families
Recommendation 36: Develop a Family Assistance Center Plan. 
Both the City and the Commonwealth should develop a FAC plan for providing services to sur-
vivors, their families and the families of victims after a major incident. 
PHEP Capability 1 – Community Preparedness 
PHEP Capability 7 – Mass Care
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F O C U S  A R E A  4 
Day 5: Apprehension of Suspects
BEST PRACTICES
CAPABILITY: COMMAND
BEST PRACTICE 4.1 
Shelter-in-Place Decision 
The UC utilized law enforcement information and expertise to weigh the pros and cons of request-
ing residents to shelter-in-place and suspending transit services. Based on the law enforcement 
information, which led the UC to believe that there was a large area of concern, they collectively 
made the decision that there was a need to request residents to shelter-in-place. The UC did not 
make this decision lightly, as they understood the impacts of this request. However, the UC agreed 
that the overarching objective was to maintain public safety and to capture the suspect. The UC 
was also cognizant of the importance of making this decision and communicating it prior to the 
peak commuting times. 
The UC, based on law enforcement information, also believed that it was necessary to suspend 
all transit services to limit the suspect’s ability to evade the police or jeopardize the safety of 
commuters. The UC discussed the impacts of this decision and ultimately determined that a 
shutdown of the system was necessary. Unlike the day of the bombing, the transit system was 
not currently being used as a mechanism to evacuate large crowds as it was after the bombings. 
Therefore, the UC determined that the public safety benefits temporarily outweighed the need 
for and convenience of public transportation. This decision was made with the input of state and 
local senior leaders, who collectively scripted the message that was shared with the public. This 
message was also directly shared with the other disciplines that would be most impacted by this 
decision, such as public health and hospitals.
The UC was cognizant of the burden this placed on residents and business owners. Several times 
throughout the day the UC assessed whether they should maintain the request by reviewing any 
current or new law enforcement information, the progress of the grid search, and duration of the 
request to ensure that it was not placing too large of a burden on the community. 
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BEST PRACTICE 4.2 
Decision to Conduct Grid Search
The Watertown Police Department (Watertown PD), with the assistance of MSP, BPD, and Cam-
bridge PD officers, were able to maintain the perimeter around the crime scene and the suspect’s 
potential location. This was done to impede his ability to escape the area successfully. The UC 
established a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and systematically coordinated assignments for 
the various SWAT teams that would support this search effort, including the MSP Special Tactical 
Operations (STOP) team, Watertown PD, BPD, Brookline PD, Cambridge PD and tactical teams 
from NEMLEC and MetroLEC. MSP and BPD supervisors divided the area to be searched into 
five sectors and created teams that consisted of local, state or regional tactical officers, FBI, and 
MANG. Each team was assigned a sector to search. As each search assignment was completed, 
uniformed personnel were assigned to provide perimeter security in the completed search area, 
and the SWAT teams moved on to a new assignment. This entire effort was systematic and 
well-managed, with strong command and control of all teams. 
BEST PRACTICE 4.3 
Unified Command Decision-Making was Well Coordinated
Key state and local officials assembled quickly as Unified Command (UC) at the Arsenal Mall 
parking lot to coordinate decision-making, strategize about the apprehension of the suspect at 
large, and maintaining the safety of those in the Metro Boston area. Together they made decisions 
on the strategy for the search for the suspect at large, the shelter-in-place request, taxi service 
suspension, and the transit shutdown.  
CAPABILITY: LAW ENFORCEMENT
BEST PRACTICE 4.4 
Effective Response by Watertown Police 
The two Watertown PD officers who were first to respond to the Watertown neighborhood where 
the suspects were located performed remarkably well, taking heavy fire while pinning the suspects 
in one location. Additional responding Watertown officers also took heavy fire, and were able 
to subdue one suspect by tackling him to the ground. All four officers demonstrated incredible 
bravery and discipline under pressure, maintaining communications with their dispatch center, 
and critically wounding the suspects. Their effective tactical response ensured the residents of 
the neighborhood were not hurt.  
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BEST PRACTICE 4.5 
Ability to Handle Increased 911 Call Volume
The Watertown dispatch center successfully handled the surge of more than 500 calls to 911; the 
typical call volume is approximately thirty calls per day. They brought in two extra dispatchers 
for a total of four, and ensured that calls were answered expeditiously. Only a few calls rolled over 
to overflow handling. 
In addition, Newton Police provided mutual aid personnel to Watertown to handle extra call 
volume not directly related to the search for the suspects. This assistance allowed Watertown PD 
to focus on searching for the suspect and managing the influx of mutual aid resources.
CAPABILITY: MUTUAL AID
BEST PRACTICE 4.6 
Ability to Utilize Tactical and Specialized Mutual Aid
While the number of officers that arrived to assist Watertown PD created many challenges, the 
initial mutual aid was managed well. Watertown PD was able to utilize incoming officers to assist 
with maintaining a perimeter around the area where it was thought the suspect might be hiding. 
This was done to ensure the suspect could not exit the area while the UC and TOC created a 
systematic plan to conduct the search. 
Through the City of Boston, the UC was able to mobilize LEC tactical support. The LEC units 
had been supporting BPD to increase police presence with saturated patrols. When requested 
in Watertown, the LECs were able to transition the existing command structure from Boston to 
Watertown. This allowed the tactical and EOD teams to fold into the grid search with a strong 
understanding of command. When they arrived for the house-to-house searches, the groups re-
ported to either BPD or the MSP commanders, depending on their assignment. Throughout the 
search operation the tactical units were organized, well managed and disciplined. 
CAPABILITY: HEALTH AND MEDICAL
BEST PRACTICE 4.7 
Staging of Ambulance Near the Initial Firefight
Watertown dispatchers staged ambulance and fire/EMS units near the initial firefight location 
as soon as they heard that shots were fired. The immediate availability of an ambulance directly 
contributed to saving the life of a Transit PD officer who was rapidly transported to Mount Auburn 
Hospital after being critically wounded.
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BEST PRACTICE 4.8 
Decision to Transport Wounded Officer to Nearest Hospital 
Given the criticality of his wounds, Watertown EMS personnel made the decision to transport 
the wounded officer to the nearest hospital, Mount Auburn, rather than to the nearest trauma 
center, which was located a few minutes further away. This decision placed the officer in a medi-
cal facility a few minutes sooner than if he had been transported to a trauma center, and enabled 
medical personnel to save his life.
BEST PRACTICE 4.9 
Ability of Mount Auburn Hospital Emergency Department to Receive Critically 
Wounded Patient
Although the hospital is not a trauma center, the Mount Auburn Hospital Emergency Department 
staff was prepared to receive, and able to save the life of the critically wounded Transit PD officer. 
CAPABILITY: COMMUNICATIONS
BEST PRACTICE 4.10 
Effective Use of Interoperable Communications
Interoperable communications worked well among the public safety partners in Watertown. As 
the incident began to grow, Watertown requested communications support through the MEMA’s 
Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC). Working with MSP, and activating the Com-
munications Unit Team (COMU), they were able to create a “super patch.” This patch enabled 
six radio systems to communicate seamlessly. Although a few agencies experienced difficulty 
with interoperable communications because their radios were not correctly programmed, any 
arriving federal, state or local law enforcement officer with a correctly programmed radio could 
communicate through this patch.  
CAPABILITY: PUBLIC INFORMATION
BEST PRACTICE 4.11 
Effective Use of Emergency Alerting
In addition to the traditional media sources, the public received information via emergency alert-
ing systems used by Watertown, Boston and MEMA. Just before 2:00 a.m., Watertown PD issued a 
WatertownALERT to its residents to request they shelter-in-place while a search for an suspect at 
large was conducted.62 Depending upon how individuals had opted to receive information, residents 
62 WatertownALERT is the Town’s public emergency notification system that provides emergency alerts via phone, text and 
email to individuals who opt to participate in the system. Publicly registered phone numbers of residents and businesses are 
automatically included in the system. 
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received this alert via landline phone, cell phone, text message and/or email. Additionally, the City 
of Boston issued an ALERTBoston around 6:30 a.m. to inform residents of the shelter-in-place 
request.63 Residents received additional alerts with updated information about the shelter-in-place 
request during the course of the day. Moreover, MEMA uses a smart phone app now known as 
Massachusetts Alerts as one means of communicating emergency information to the public. The 
app provides geographically targeted emergency alerts to end users by issuing a tone and providing 
an emergency message. The public received additional alerts through each of these notification tools 
with updated information about the shelter-in-place request during the course of the day. 
BEST PRACTICE 4.12 
Coordination of Information for the Mayor’s Help Line
Information was well-managed by the Mayor’s Help Line staff as the shelter-in-place request 
guidance evolved throughout the day. Initially, the Mayor’s Chief of Staff contacted the Help 
Line Director at 6:00 a.m. to advise him of the shooting in Watertown earlier that morning, the 
escape of the second suspect, and the shelter-in-place request from the Mayor and Governor. 
The Director was advised to again ramp up staffing at the Help Line in anticipation of increased 
call volume. As a result of the early alert, the Help Line was prepared for heavy call volume and 
effectively handled over 3,000 calls pertaining to the shelter-in-place request; 99% of the calls 
were answered within 30 seconds.
CAPABILITY: SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND INFORMATION SHARING
BEST PRACTICE 4.13 
Activation of BPHC MIC and MDPH DOC to Coordinate of Information for Hospitals
Because the impacts of the shelter-in-place request were significant for hospitals and healthcare 
providers, the BPHC MIC and the MDPH DOC were activated by 6:30 a.m. to coordinate related 
information needs. Personnel at the BPHC MIC and the MDPH DOC coordinated closely to 
provide situational awareness information to and respond to questions from hospitals about the 
implications of the shelter-in-place request. The shelter-in-place request generated a significant 
level of concern among healthcare facilities. Hospitals and healthcare providers needed to know 
if travel was allowed for: staff to return home when shifts ended; staff coming in for their shifts; 
deliveries of medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and other critical supplies such as linens and 
food to hospitals, clinics, and homes; non-emergency EMS transport of patients; and filling of 
prescription medication. The agencies assembled and represented at the MIC and DOC contrib-
uted greatly to communicating these concerns and seeking answers.  
PHEP Capability 3 – Emergency Operations Coordination 
PHEP/HPP Capability 6 – Information Sharing
63 ALERTBoston is the City’s public emergency notification system that provides emergency alerts via phone, text and email to 
individuals who opt to participate in the system.  
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CAPABILITY: USE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD
BEST PRACTICE 4.14 
Provision of Critical Resources
The MANG expeditiously coordinated key resources that helped law enforcement personnel to 
follow up on investigative leads. MANG provided helicopters to transport SWAT teams to key 
locations in the southeastern part of the Commonwealth where investigators believed the suspect 
had recently been and/or was currently located. In addition, the MANG provided military police 
and armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMVEEs) to assist in the house 
to house search. 
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
CAPABILITY: COMMAND 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.1 
Lack of Clearly Indentified In-Field Command
There was confusion about who had overall authority in the field as ongoing law enforcement 
activities were conducted. This issue became heightened as hundreds and then thousands of 
out-of-town police officers responded to Watertown. Because no Logistics Chief was assigned 
to coordinate incoming personnel, incoming personnel were not briefed, incorporated into ICS, 
or—with the exception of the tactical teams—organized into deployable teams or units. Instead, 
agency commanders and supervisors focused primarily on commanding their own personnel. 
In addition, many personnel did not recognize command authority from anyone outside their 
own agency. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Law enforcement agencies
Recommendation 37: Conduct Enhanced ICS Training for Law Enforcement. 
Ensure appropriate law enforcement personnel received enhanced ICS training to stress the im-
portance of a command structure in a complex incident involving multiple mutual aid resources, 
as well as the critical role of the Logistics Section Chief. 
Recommendation 38: Establish a Statewide Policy Regarding On Scene Command  
During Complex Critical Incidents. 
Law enforcement officials representing law enforcement agencies from across the Commonwealth 
should create plans and policies that can be implemented to maintain on scene command at 
complex incidents.
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IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.2 
Proximity of Command Vehicles to Staging Area
The vehicles used as command posts were located directly next to the designated mutual aid 
staging area. Because the staging area was overflowing with personnel and equipment, access to 
the command vehicles was, at times, problematic. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: UC members
Recommendation 39: Ensure command vehicles are located away from staging area. 
CAPABILITY: LAW ENFORCEMENT 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.3 
Lack of Weapons Discipline
Weapons discipline was lacking by the multitude of law enforcement officers in the field during 
both the firefight with the two suspects near Dexter Avenue and Laurel Streets in Watertown, as 
well as during the capture of the second suspect who was hiding in a winterized boat in a resi-
dential backyard.
Although initial responding officers practiced appropriate weapons discipline while they were 
engaged in the firefight with the suspects, additional officers arriving on scene near the conclusion 
of the firefight fired weapons toward the vicinity of the suspects without necessarily having a target 
lined up and identified, or having appropriately aimed their weapons. Officers lining both sides 
of the street also fired upon the second suspect as he fled the scene in a vehicle. Both instances 
created dangerous crossfire situations. 
Shortly after the firefight, an unmarked MSP black pickup truck was erroneously reported as 
stolen. The truck was spotted driving on Adams Street, a few blocks from the firefight, with two 
occupants. An officer witnessing the vehicle fired upon it. Upon further inspection, it was de-
termined that the occupants of the vehicle were a BPD officer and MSP trooper in plain clothes. 
They were unhurt.
Weapons discipline was also an issue during the actions to capture the second suspect who was 
hiding in a winterized boat parked in a residential backyard. One officer fired his weapon without 
appropriate authority in response to perceived movement in the boat, and surrounding officers 
followed suit in a round of “contagious fire,” assuming they were being fired on by the suspect. 
Weapons continued to be fired for several seconds until on scene supervisors ordered a ceasefire and 
regained control of the scene. The unauthorized shots created another dangerous crossfire situation. 
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Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Law enforcement agencies
Recommendation 40: Conduct Additional Training on Weapons Discipline. 
Conduct additional ICS and firearms training with a focused emphasis on weapons discipline, 
including ensuring careful target acquisition, trigger discipline, and authorization. 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.4 
Police Vehicles Hindered Access to and Egress from the Area
Unlike the day of the bombings in Boston, there was no radio traffic reminding responding per-
sonnel to maintain open roadways as they approached the scene. In an effort to respond quickly 
to the ongoing incident, arriving police officers stopped their vehicles at the closest point of access 
to the ongoing scene and abandoned them, often with emergency lights on and doors left open. 
This bottleneck of vehicles hindered access to the area by senior police officials, as well as egress 
from the area. This also was an issue for the ambulance transporting a critically wounded officer 
and for police vehicles that may have otherwise been able to pursue the fleeing suspect.
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Law enforcement agencies
Recommendation 41: Review Protocols and Conduct Training on Management of  
Responding Vehicles. 
Review protocols for responding officers and the management of their vehicles, as well as for 
dispatchers to remind responding officers to maintain open roadways when appropriate. Conduct 
training to ensure these protocols are universally understood. 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.5 
Inability to Retrieve Tactical Weapons from Vehicle Gun Mount 
During the firefight with the two suspects, initial responding Watertown police officers were not 
able to remove their patrol rifles from the secure mount in their vehicles and use them against 
the suspects. Because these rifles are rarely used and securely locked, officers did not have much 
experience removing them. As such, the officers could not make the rifle available for use at this 
critical time.   
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Law enforcement agencies
Recommendation 42: Regularly Exercise Removing and Using Rifles and Other Tactical 
Equipment Installed in Vehicles. 
Although this issue occurred with a Watertown police officer, it is common that law enforcement 
officers do not regularly practice removing and using tactical equipment mounted and/or stored 
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in their vehicles. As such, all law enforcement officers should exercise removing equipment from 
their mounts/storage areas at least weekly, and practice using the equipment to ensure they are 
able to access and use it under high-stress conditions.
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.6 
Lack of Training on IEDs
Officers confronted by IEDs had not been trained to deal with them. While the likelihood of 
such encounters is rare, an incident that includes IEDs can be a highly dangerous situation for 
responding officers. Law enforcement in the United States seldom face such a threat, and most 
have little to no IED awareness training. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Law enforcement agencies 
Recommendation 43: Conduct IED Awareness Training for Law Enforcement. 
Ensure law enforcement officers can obtain IED awareness training.
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.7 
Better Use of Local Expertise
It is widely known that local officials have the best understanding of their jurisdiction. However, 
many law enforcement officials did not make best use of local expertise even though most mutual 
aid responders were not familiar with the people and geography of Watertown. Lack of familiarity 
with the streets of Watertown made the deployment of resources and identification of out-of-
place items more difficult. False leads may have been more quickly investigated and eliminated, 
and some arrests may have been cleared more quickly if the Watertown PD had been consulted 
about them.
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Law enforcement agencies
Recommendation 44: Consult Local Knowledge as Standard Practice. 
Mutual aid law enforcement officials should always rely on local expertise familiar with the 
community.
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CAPABILITY: MUTUAL AID
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.8 
Self-Deployment and Lack of Coordination and Management for Mutual Aid Assets 
and Personnel 
Within 12 hours of the initial firefight with the two suspects, over 2,500 federal, state, and local 
officers converged on Watertown. As these mutual aid personnel began to arrive on scene, Wa-
tertown PD quickly identified the parking lot of the nearby Arsenal Mall as the staging area for 
all personnel responding to the scene. Watertown PD successfully conveyed the request to stage 
at the Arsenal Mall to the commanders of the departments and teams that had responded to the 
scene, and directly communicated this request to many of the officers who had arrived in the area 
but did not have explicit field assignments. The majority of officers complied with this request 
and arrived at the designated Staging Area. 
The UC did not designate a Logistics Section Chief or Staging Area Manager to manage, coor-
dinate and deploy personnel staged at the Arsenal Mall. Because no command or management 
structure was formally assigned to manage incoming mutual aid personnel, officers were not 
assigned roles within the operation or provided briefings on the command structure, status of the 
search, operational missions or priorities. It was not clear to in-coming law enforcement person-
nel who had overall authority in the field as ongoing law enforcement activities were conducted. 
As time went on, and in the absence of information, officers began to self-deploy into the field. 
Some officers listened to radio transmissions or heard media reports and took it upon themselves 
to deploy into the field rather than being assigned by the UC or the TOC. Others gained access 
into areas in the field through professional relationships they had with colleagues already in the 
field.  Some officers did inquire about the need for assistance, but in some cases, were given a 
request to deploy by an unauthorized individual. In some cases, because the command structure 
was not evident, officers only responding to orders received by their respective chain of command. 
When information about the potential location of the suspect was transmitted over radios, many 
officers self-deployed to the residential neighborhood where the boat was located. Each of these 
self-deployments created significant in-field command and control and officer safety issues. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Watertown PD and all agencies requested to send or self- 
deployed mutual aid assets 
Recommendation 45: Revise the Mutual Aid Protocol. 
Convene a meeting of state and local law enforcement officials coordinated by MEMA to establish 
a law enforcement mobilization plan for mutual aid at large incidents that addresses:
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• Requests for immediate assistance (within 15–30 minutes);
• Identification of an Incident Commander (in cases where the community with the  
incident needs assistance in managing a large event);
• Specific requests by the IC or UCC for longer term assistance (usually for specific  
capabilities such as SWAT, EOD, and crime scene investigation);
• Management of mutual aid personnel resources;
• Guidelines for responding mutual aid personnel; and
• Use of ICS for law enforcement in a large incident.
Depending upon the magnitude and type of incident, there needs to be a planned process that 
provides for immediate response from nearby agencies, and then limits and manages the response. 
The 2009 Massachusetts Statewide Law Enforcement Mobilization Plan (SLEMP) included many 
recommendations similar to ones we make here to address the law enforcement coordination 
gaps. That report could be the launching point for a renewed discussion. Legal jurisdiction is not 
really the issue—the relevant state laws governing authority to render mutual aid suffice. Rather, 
what is needed is agreement on the process to mobilize law enforcement resources, and how the 
incident commander will be selected. The protocols that are developed can be enacted with a 
statewide policy or a Governor’s Executive Order.   
Recommendation 46: Provide Mobilization Training. 
Following development of the law enforcement mobilization plan proposed in the recommen-
dation above, develop in-service training modules for all police officers in Massachusetts to 
understand the statewide mobilization system and policies for rendering mutual aid.      
Recommendation 47: Designate a Dedicated Logistics Section Chief and/or Staging Area 
Manager. 
Designating a Logistics Section Chief and/or Staging Area Manager will support the operation, 
create check-in procedures, and will track sources, personnel, assignments and deployments from 
the staging area. 
Recommendation 48: Limit Self-Deployment. 
It must be part of police training throughout the state that in complex, large incidents or multiple 
incidents, an officer does not respond unless requested by an official with the authority to make 
such a request. Only police units assigned by incident command should respond. If an officer who 
does not have an assignment happens to be near the location where the suspect is reported to be, 
that officer should report availability to respond, rather than responding directly to the incident.
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CAPABILITY: LOGISTICS 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.9 
Lack of Support for In-Field Personnel  
Although the officers staged at the Arsenal Mall were well cared for, the officers working in the 
field often went long periods of time without breaks, food or water. No one was assigned respon-
sibility for coordinating these logistics, and as such, there was not a systematic way to provide 
food, drink or relief for the officers maintaining the perimeter and conducting the grid search. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: UCC, law enforcement agencies, MANG
Recommendation 49: Plan for and Provide Adequate Relief for Responders. 
Designate a Logistics Section Chief, especially for larger incidents, to ensure officers in the field 
are provided an opportunity for relief, even if it is only for a short period of time. Additionally, 
when staffing a long operation, Command should plan for a second shift to limit officer fatigue 
and maintain officer/responder safety.
CAPABILITY: COMMUNICATIONS 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.10 
Challenges with Use of Radios 
Generally, there was a strong interoperable capability that allowed responders to communicate 
with one another. However, some SWAT teams experienced issues trying to communicate between 
teams because they were utilizing radios that did not have the required interoperable channels 
programmed. This limited their ability for on scene coordination. Federal law enforcement sys-
tems were not compatible with the state system, limiting the ability of federal law enforcement 
agents to communicate directly with state and local responders.
In addition, during the early part of the incident, it was difficult at times to transmit or receive 
critical information by radio. Many of the first responders displayed poor radio discipline and sev-
eral police departments reported hearing unnecessary chatter. Responders also underutilized the 
dedicated tactical channels. During disaster incidents, public safety personnel often are reluctant 
to use tactical channels. There were available interoperable capabilities throughout the incident, 
but responders who may have needed additional training to increase proficiency reverted back 
to the channels that they use for day-to-day incidents.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: All EMS, fire, and law enforcement agencies and dispatch 
centers. 
After Action Report for the Response to the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings120
Recommendation 50: Reinforce the Need to Maintain Radio Discipline. 
All first responders need to be reminded of the need for good radio discipline during a large scale 
event, and provided with protocols outlining appropriate and inappropriate use of messaging. 
Recommendation 51: Provide Training to Field Personnel on the Capabilities of their  
Radio Systems for Use in Large Operations. 
Additional training and tactical exercises should be conducted to increase public safety personnel’s 
experience and comfort with using interoperable systems and tactical channels. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: SWAT teams from law enforcement councils and police  
departments
Recommendation 52: Address Radio Equipment Gaps in Interoperability.
Review radio equipment gaps in interoperability and make recommendations to address them.  
Recommendation 53: Ensure Interoperable Channels are Programmed into Public Safety 
Radios.
The Massachusetts Tactical Channel Plan outlines the need to program the state interoperability 
channels into every radio. The agencies and SWAT teams with these channels programmed on 
their radios were able to access radio patches that allowed interoperable communications between 
teams. Those teams that did not have the channels programmed were either unable to communi-
cate across teams or needed to utilize a cache radio. Additionally, consider holding joint training 
and exercises for area SWAT teams, to identify and resolve communications and coordination 
issues prior to the next major incident where multiple SWAT teams need to operate together.
Recommendation 54: Federal agencies should evaluate how their systems can be better  
integrated into local and state systems. 
CAPABILITY:  
INFORMATION SHARING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.11 
Interpretation of the Shelter-in-Place Request Created Confusion and Inconsistencies 
in Enforcement. 
On Friday morning, the UC suspended transit service and requested residents to shelter-in-place. 
There was some confusion, especially in medical facilities, about the interpretation of this request 
and distinguishing the difference between this shelter-in-place request and a lockdown. It was 
unclear to them if they could change shifts or discharge patients. When hospitals, medical facili-
ties, and other impacted businesses called local police for guidance, they were given inconsistent 
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messages. For example, there were cases when just in time deliveries, such as linens, were stopped 
by police; whereas, in other areas they were allowed.  
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: MEMA, area hospitals, private ambulance services, community 
vendors to hospitals 
Recommendation 55: Work to Create Formal Definitions and Protocols for Shelter-in-
Place Requests. 
There must be a concentrated effort on the part of political officials, in collaboration with public 
health entities and hospitals, to develop formal definitions and protocols for shelter-in-place 
requests. MEMA should work with MDPH and other stakeholders to clarify shelter-in-place 
requests and identify critical personnel and services that may be exempt. 
HPP Capability 1 – Healthcare System Preparedness
CAPABILITY: PUBLIC INFORMATION
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.12 
Lack of Joint Information Center 
Four coordinated press conferences were held throughout the day to communicate important in-
formation to the public such as: the shelter-in-place request; the suspension of transit services; the 
status of house-to-house searches; warnings of controlled detonations of suspicious packages in the 
area; the lifting the shelter-in-place request; and ultimately, the apprehension of the at large suspect.  
In addition to sharing information with the public through traditional media outlets, various 
agencies utilized social media to provide information. In contrast to the press conferences, which 
were well managed and provided periodic coordinated messages, there was no coordination or 
validation of messages delivered by numerous agencies and organizations through social media. 
This led to some misleading or incorrect information being widely distributed through social 
media outlets. 
Other notification tools were used to provide information about the shelter-in-place request and 
clarify the meaning of the shelter-in-place request. However, there were some issues with access-
ing notification tools, such as Watertown’s WatertownALERT system, which are not used as part 
of daily operations. The individual(s) with access codes or log in information were not readily 
available. This created some delays in pushing information out to the public.    
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: All 
Recommendation 56: Activate a Joint Information Center. 
Utilize a Joint Information Center (JIC) or Joint Information System (JIS) concept to manage large 
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incidents. A JIC would have primary responsibilities of coordinating messaging across and be-
tween agencies and jurisdictions and managing the media. This could include providing periodic 
briefings between press conferences to satisfy the media’s need for the most updated information. 
A JIC/JIS could also provide a mechanism to 
coordinate messages shared with traditional 
media and on social media platforms. 
Recommendation 57: Ensure Cross- 
Training on the Use of Notification Tools 
and Social Media. 
Agencies should ensure that more than one 
person within the agency can access notifica-
tion tools and official social media accounts. 
CAPABILITY: SHELTER-IN-PLACE IMPACTS
IMPROVEMENT AREA 4.13 
Better Identify Critical Infrastructure, Services, and Personnel when Citizens are 
Requested to Shelter-in-Place. 
The shelter-in-place request had some clear impacts on area hospitals. Generally, hospitals were 
well prepared for a long-term operation; area hospitals were able to handle patient surge, caring 
for and feeding patients longer than anticipated, and holding over hospital staff. Because of the 
shelter-in-place request, hospitals experienced issues obtaining laundry services and other critical, 
operational supplies. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Boston area hospitals 
Recommendation 58: Better Define Critical Sectors, Personnel and Possible Exemptions 
for Shelter-in-Place Requests. 
Area hospitals should work with DPH and MEMA to better define critical sectors, critical per-
sonnel, and outline possible exemptions from orders or requests that impose travel restrictions. 
HPP Capability 1 – Healthcare System Preparedness 
HPP Capability 3 – Emergency Operations Coordination  
HPP Capability 10 – Medical Surge
Recommendation 59: Ensure that a regional stockpile of surgical supplies are ready for  
rapid access. 
HPP Capability 1 – Healthcare System Preparedness 
HPP Capability 3 – Emergency Operations Coordination  
Capability 10 – Medical Surge
Media Presence During Second Press  
Conference in Watertown
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F O C U S  A R E A  5
Recovery
BEST PRACTICES
BEST PRACTICE 5.1 
Well-Planned and Organized Re-Opening of Boylston Street 
Boston OEM excelled at spearheading plans to reopen Boylston Street. The restoration of Boyl-
ston Street was extremely organized, enabling residents to access their homes, businesses to be 
re-opened, and the public to revisit in record time. Trucks and personnel from various agencies 
staged at the boundary of the cordoned off area, ready to mobilize the moment the area was 
released to the City. Cleaning, restoring, inspecting and other activities were well thought out in 
a formal plan, and the plan was executed with strong coordination among several city agencies. 
On the morning of April 17, the Mayor assigned the responsibility for planning the re-opening 
of Boylston Street to OEM, and tasked all other City departments to support this critical mission. 
On Thursday, OEM and the agency representatives at the EOC supported the President and First 
Lady’s visit from their arrival at Logan Airport at 10:30 a.m., until their departure at 4:00 p.m. 
Immediately following the departure of the President and First Lady, OEM initiated a planning 
meeting with the agencies present in the EOC, including Office of Neighborhood Services, DND, 
Office of Inspectional Services, BPHC, Department of Public Works, BFD, and BPD, to develop 
the City’s plan for the recovery and restoration of Boylston Street. 
The planning session, which lasted approximately four hours, included 13 City agencies, ARC, 
Interstate Rental and the BAA. The resulting document was a comprehensive, five-phase plan 
that addressed all aspects of making the area ready for re-opening, from building inspections 
and street cleanup to resident and business owner reentry. OEM published the recovery plan and 
regularly updated the status of progress against the plan via WebEOC.
Recognizing that most people might not be fully aware of the enormous task involved in cleaning 
up and sanitizing the crime scene area and readying businesses to reopen, OEM and the Mayor 
publically released details of the recovery plan two days after it was finalized. OEM and the Office 
of Mayor announced the details of each phase of the recovery plan during an April 21 press con-
ference so that those directly affected, as well as the City at large, better understood the actions 
and activities that needed to be undertaken and completed before the area could be opened to the 
public. This transparency helped the public remain patient and reduced anxiety, as it was evident 
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that everything possible was being done to regain access to the area and renew commerce.
An important component of the recovery plan was providing private access to the area to survi-
vors, their families, and the families of the deceased before the broader public opening. The City 
organized a special gathering for survivors and ensured that the survivors and the relatives of the 
deceased had an opportunity to visit the area before it was opened to the public. 
OEM oversaw the implementation of the recovery plan, which included cleaning of the streets, the 
orderly re-population of buildings, provision of onsite mental health support, and the streamlining 
of health and occupancy permitting.   
BEST PRACTICE 5.2 
Strong Assistance to Businesses
As a core component of the City’s recovery planning, DND took the lead in refining a corollary 
assistance plan for businesses. DND worked closely with the Office of Constituent Engagement to 
develop a contact list of all the businesses in the affected area, then reached out to the owners with 
information about the plan for reopening the area. Information included actions the businesses 
would be required to take as part of the reentry process, such as obtaining required health and oc-
cupancy permits, and providing access to the FBI to some locations as their investigation continued. 
MEMA worked to quickly obtain a Small Business Administration (SBA) Economic Injury 
Disaster Loan (EIDL) declaration for impacted businesses. The City opened a Business Assistance 
Center, where the SBA was co-located to provide information on and assist business with obtain-
ing EIDL loans. In addition, DND sought out options for small business loans that some of the 
merchants needed to cover losses during the period of forced closure, negotiating with banks on 
their behalf. DND also answered questions about insurance coverage and served as ombudsman 
with the SBA on its EIDL program. 
BEST PRACTICE 5.3 
Early Meetings To Discuss Mutual Aid Response in Relationship to the Presidential 
Emergency Declaration and the Public Assistance Program
On April 17, 2013, the President issued and emergency declaration for the Boston Marathon 
bombings. The incident period for this emergency was ultimately defined as April 15–26, 2013.64 
Over the course of the week, more than 150 different municipalities and agencies provided mutual 
aid to Boston and Watertown. Most, though not all, mutual aid was provided through regional 
law enforcement councils; however, some direct mutual aid was provided by municipalities to 
64When the declaration was issued on April 17, 2013, the initial incident period was defined as April 15–22, 2013. MEMA 
appealed the incident period to include emergency protective measures that continued for several days after the 
apprehension of the suspects to include security for the Officer Sean Collier memorial service, as well as the enhanced 
security that continued until it could be confirmed that no other suspects were involved in the incidents. On July 19, 2013, 
FEMA approved the extension of the incident period through April 26, 2013.
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Boston. In addition, MSP requested assistance from New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Con-
necticut for EOD units, K-9 teams and Search and Rescue teams through the New England State 
Police Compact. 
The Public Assistance (PA) program, which is triggered once a Presidential Emergency Declara-
tion is issued, has stringent requirements relating to mutual aid for natural disasters, and it was 
not immediately clear how these requirements would be interpreted and applied to the Marathon 
bombings. As such, MEMA hosted a meeting with FEMA and key sub-applicants, including rep-
resentatives from Boston, Watertown, Cambridge, and MSP, to discuss these issues. Additionally, 
they were able to identify actions, such as amending mutual aid agreements or establishing post-
event mutual aid agreements, which were needed in order to ensure eligibility of mutual aid costs. 
These discussions were very valuable in heading off potential issues that would have emerged 
later in the PA reimbursement process.  
BEST PRACTICE 5.4 
FEMA Staff Co-Located at MEMA 
The emergency declaration and PA Program involved complex issues. Although costs associated 
with activities for emergency protective measures were eligible for reimbursement, costs related 
to the investigation and security measures for the Presidential visit were not eligible, and were 
not always easy to distinguish. In addition, mutual aid agreements needed to be appropriately 
documented. To best be able to discuss and resolve the complex issues related to eligibility of costs 
associated with the emergency declaration and PA Program, FEMA embedded PA staff at MEMA 
Headquarters, establishing an informal Joint Field Office. Having FEMA staff readily available 
greatly streamlined the PA process for FEMA, MEMA and the sub-applicants. 
BEST PRACTICE 5.5 
Weekly Public Assistance Program Coordination Meetings  
To ensure a continued open dialog to best address the complicated issues associated with the 
emergency declaration and PA Program, MEMA and FEMA hosted weekly coordination meetings 
with sub-applicants whose project worksheets were more complex, including Boston, Watertown, 
Cambridge, MSP and MANG. The meetings helped proactively address questions and issues 
related to the compilation of appropriate documentation to support project worksheets, and to 
assist sub-applicants through the PA process.  
BEST PRACTICE 5.6 
Revision of FEMA Recovery Policy RP9525.4 (Emergency Medical Care) 
Numerous hospitals, which are eligible private nonprofit sub-applicants under the PA Program, 
incurred significant increased operating costs for the unexpected surge in number of patients, 
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overtime costs for medical surge staff, and holdover staff for the April 19, 2013 shelter-in-place 
request. However, these increased operating costs, which were associated with the medical surge 
capacity they were required to implement in direct response to the bombings, were deemed in-
eligible under Recovery Policy 9525.4 (Emergency Medical Care).  
Subsequently, FEMA carefully reviewed RP9525.4, and revised the policy in February 2014, to deem 
certain emergency medical care activities eligible for reimbursement under the PA Program.65
BEST PRACTICE 5.7 
Continued Provision of Mental Health Services 
State and local mental health resources continued to be made available to the community at large 
for several weeks following the bombings. Emotional support and healing for the community 
remained a high priority. Resources continued to be made available to the public and were well 
advertised through various media outlets. 
PHEP Capability 7 – Mass Care
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
CAPABILITY: HEALTH AND MEDICAL
IMPROVEMENT AREA 5.1 
Better Mental Health Services for Non-Public Safety Personnel, Healthcare and 
Human Services Providers
The mental health needs of some healthcare and human services providers who supported in-
dividuals impacted by the bombings were not adequately addressed. In addition, City of Boston 
personnel who were part of the Boylston Street recovery effort and felt the stress of physically 
working in the impacted area did not have their mental health needs adequately addressed. 
Many of these individuals had first line interactions with survivors, their families, and others 
who were greatly impacted by the incident, and committed long hours over many days to provide 
support services and to restore Boylston Street back to normal. Appropriately, there was much 
concern and many resources provided for the well-being of public safety personnel, the public, 
employees of impacted businesses, and families members of those who were heavily impacted by 
the bombings. However, the level of support for non-public safety employees, healthcare providers, 
and human services providers was not as substantial. While a few city offices and some healthcare 
and human services employers set up debriefing sessions, some departments did little more than 
refer staff to an Employee Assistance Program. 
65 Unfortunately, hospitals were not successful in their formal appeals to FEMA to have their costs deemed eligible because the 
provisions of the policy that were in place at the time the costs were incurred deemed these activities ineligible.
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Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: Healthcare providers, human services providers, City of Boston, 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts   
Recommendation 60: Ensure Access to Mental Health Services for All Employees Involved 
in Disaster Response and Recovery Activities. 
Healthcare employers, human services employers, the Commonwealth and the City of Boston 
should explore opportunities to provide post-disaster services for employees. Employee Assis-
tance Programs should not serve as the sole resource for employees who have had direct contact 
with survivors, families, and impacted individuals, or have worked directly in the area of impact.
PHEP Capability 7 – Mass Care
PHEP Capability 14 – Responder Safety and Health
Recommendation 61: Train Managers on Psychological First Aid. 
Healthcare employers, human services employers, the Commonwealth and the City of Boston 
should consider providing psychological first aid training to managers to provide them with skills 
to identify signs of psychological trauma in their employees.  
PHEP Capability 7 – Mass Care 
PHEP Capability 14 – Responder Safety and Health
IMPROVEMENT AREA 5.2 
Difficulty in Applying Stafford Act Policies to a Terrorist Incident
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) and its asso-
ciated policies and regulations were developed to address disasters resulting from natural hazards. 
As such, there are nuances to these policies and regulations that are difficult to apply to manmade 
incidents, such as acts of terrorism. In particular, the policies and regulations defining eligible 
emergency protective measures and requirements for mutual aid required a degree of interpreta-
tion and analysis to determine applicability for this incident’s response activities.
FEMA decided early on that activities associated with the investigation of the crime were not 
eligible costs under the FEMA PA Program. Such activities included gathering and analyzing the 
thousands of photographs and video feeds provided to and obtained by law enforcement, ques-
tioning witnesses and suspects, analyzing and sharing intelligence information and performing 
forensics and attribution tasks. In addition, enhanced security measures related to the visit of 
dignitaries such as the President, First Lady and Vice President were ineligible. 
Activities deemed to be FEMA-eligible emergency protective measures included securing crime 
scene(s), response to additional threats, increased security because of heightened security risks 
(not including enhanced security measures for dignitary visits), door-to-door searches, and 
EOC/command post operations. 
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While the restrictions on eligible activities seemed to be clearly defined, it was extremely difficult 
for PA sub-applicants to clearly differentiate and document which law enforcement officers were 
working on investigative activities and enhanced dignitary security, versus FEMA PA-eligible 
emergency protective measures activities. In addition, certain specialized law enforcement equip-
ment was not captured in FEMA’s standard equipment rates, including SWAT vehicles, bearcats, 
and MSP helicopters, and required significant coordination, time and resources with sub-appli-
cants and FEMA Headquarters to identify reasonable reimbursement rates for equipment. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: FEMA, MEMA 
Recommendation 62: Develop Strong PA Guidance on Eligibility of Activities for Acts of 
Terrorism. 
FEMA, in coordination with MEMA, should proactively develop strong guidance for sub-appli-
cants on eligible activities, costs and documentation requirements associated with the PA Program 
for acts of terrorism. 
IMPROVEMENT AREA 5.3 
Better Communication Regarding All Federal Funding Opportunities
Months after the Presidential Emergency Declaration, the Executive Office of Public Safety and 
Security (EOPSS) and MEMA learned of a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Bureau of Justice 
Assistance (BJA) reimbursement grant opportunity for law enforcement agencies that would 
cover 100% of costs associated with law enforcement response to the Boston Marathon bombings, 
including investigative and mutual aid costs.66 
While this was ultimately good news for the eligible law enforcement agencies, the delay in communi-
cating the availability of a second federal grant program caused a great deal of unnecessary time and 
resources to be spent on interpreting the FEMA PA Program, and advocating for flexibility for costs 
initially deemed ineligible by FEMA. To properly identify eligible costs for the DOJ grant, MEMA had 
to coordinate with all potential applicants within a very short application period to determine what 
costs that were deemed ineligible under the PA program would be eligible under this new DOJ-BJA 
funding opportunity. 
Agencies/Jurisdictions Involved: DOJ, MEMA 
Recommendation 63: Ensure Timely Communication of Post-Disaster Grant Opportunities.
Ensuring timely communication of grant opportunities will allow the State Administrative Agency 
(SAA) and program staff to better communicate with potential applicants, streamline the request 
for information, and ultimately, create more efficient and effective use of federal grant dollars. 
66 Under the Stafford Act FEMA Public Assistance Program, applicants may receive up to 75% federal reimbursement for 
eligible costs.
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